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Lisa: Are you saying the end justifies the
means?
Coleman: That’s a very glib interpretation.
Bart: Hey, don’t talk to my sister that way!
Lisa: No, Bart, he’s right; I did over simplify.
Homer: Perhaps, but let’s not get bogged down
in semantics.
—The Simpsons, Grift of the Magi
Well, it is complicated a bit; but life and truth
and things do tend to be complicated.
—Austin (1961): 252
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INTRODUCT ION
’What is meaning?’. This has been the central question
in Twentieth-century Philosophy of language. The extraor-
dinary development of formal semantics for natural lan-
guages has gone hand in hand with the outstanding ad-
vances in formal logic reached during the first half of the
past century. The development of Model-theoretic seman-
tics and of Montagovian Grammar have given a hardly
overestimated contribution to out knowledge of natural
languages.
However, after Wittgenstein (1953) it has become custom-
ary to approach the question about meaning from the point
of view of its ’use’ in everyday conversational exchanges.
Between 1940s and 1960s, Oxford philosophical school of
so-called Ordinary Language Philosophy, in reaction to the
increasingly formalistic attitude in philosophy of language,
tried to seriously take into account Wittgenstein’s slogan
that meaning is its use and to put it into test of thorough
philosophical analysis.
The results of such pioneering philosophical effort, mainly
due to John Austin, Gilbert Ryle, Peter Strawson and Paul
Grice, is a series of papers, books and talks containing
a number of intuitions and insights which have been ex-
traordinarily influential in the following development of
philosophy of language and linguistics. Austin’s theory of
speech acts and performativeness (notoriously further de-
veloped by John Searle) is just one example of the quality
of the work of this Oxonian philosophical tradition, which
is nowadays regarded as a milestone in the contemporary
philosophy of language.
The present work is in the area of Pragmatics of lan-
guage and communication. Such field of linguistics and
philosophy of language is also known as Post-Gricean Prag-
matics, after the celebrated works of one of the Oxford
philosophers, Paul Grice. Starting from its seminal paper
IV
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Grice (1957), the core idea of Grice’s theory of meaning
is an attempt to take into account and develop in a con-
sistent philosophical theory Wittgenstein’s suggestion that
the concept of Meaning has to be analyzed in the specific
contexts of utterance.
Reacting to the formalistic orientation in Philosophy of
Language, Grice argues that - also with respect to the cor-
rect understanding of philosophical arguments and falla-
cies - word and sentence meaning has to be regarded not
as an isolated, formal notion, determined once and for all
by the meaning assigned to the lexicon by the dictionary
and the Fregean principle of compositionality.
Such an approach is eventually unable to give reason of
the pervasive ambiguities which ’infest’ natural language.
According to Grice, the formalistic account of the intrin-
sic deficiency of natural language and of the need for its
logical regimentation to avoid such kind of confusions is
widely unsatisfactory, as it largely clashes with people’s
everyday insights concerning the felicitous working of nat-
ural languages.
Grice’s central idea is that meaning is a intention-based
notion, i.e. besides the conventional meaning that a par-
ticular word bears whenever uttered in a specific sentence,
a realistic theory of meaning, one which is able to match
speaker’s intuition about the content of an utterance, should
allow for the recognition of the intentions lying behind a
speaker’s using a certain linguistic expression.
According to Grice, a quite conservative conception of
semantics can be maintained, once we acknowledge con-
versational exchanges to be governed by rules of rational-
ity and cooperativeness which go far beyond the mere de-
coding of linguistic messages, and which - once made ex-
plicit - make it possible to explain the significant amount
of information which is standardly inferred from sentence
meaning.
The theoretical development of such intuitions is given
in Grice’s hugely influential theory of conversational max-
ims and conversational implicatures. Roughly speaking, a
conversational implicature is a proposition which, though
being in a non-logical relation with the content of a ut-
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tered sentence, is inferred starting from such utterance, of-
ten by resorting to specific contextual clues making such
inference perfectly available and manifest to speakers and
hearers presumingly conforming themselves to the princi-
ple of cooperativeness and the conversational maxims.
Such an approach makes it possible to maintain a tradi-
tional view about semantic theory and at the same time
to support an elegantly parsimonious and unitary explana-
tion of the pragmatic, contextual, non-conventional effects
on speaker’s meaning.
After the full-fledged development of Grice’s theory of
meaning and communication, a widespread debate arose,
mainly focusing on the so-called Semantics/Pragmatics dis-
tinction. If it is true that all the implicit meaning is a
matter of conversational implicature and can be hence ex-
plained in terms of conversational maxims, how should
we account for such phenomena of linguistic ambiguity,
non-specificity and also implicitness which seems to affect
the very semantic and conventional content of sentences in
conversation?
Is it really possible to maintain a rigid borderline be-
tween the two branches of linguistics, even in light of the
contrasting evidences to the effect that, in many circum-
stances, pragmatics seems to actually intrude into seman-
tics?
Starting from the 1970s a number of different paradigm
have been developed to account for such phenomenon, cus-
tomarily labeled as ’semantic underdeterminacy’ (or un-
derdetermination, underspecificity, sense-generality, etc...),
either aiming to preserve the structure of Grice’s picture
and revising the theory as to account for such issues, or
with the goal of rejecting Grice’s view and developing a
different theory, maybe a semantically less committed but
psychologically more realistic one, as it was the case for
1986 Sperber & Wilson’s Relevance Theory.
In such approaches, a prominent role has been played by
Gricean notion of Generalized Conversational Implicature.
Roughly, this corresponds to a kind of default, standard,
preferred and plausibly non-inferential pragmatic effect on
speaker’s meaning. Generalized implicatures, in Grice’s
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view, are in fact those which arise in every situation of
utterance, almost irrespectively of specific contextual clues.
In the debate concerning the semantics/pragmatics in-
terface, it has been increasingly observed the importance
of the notion of default meanings and inferences, regarded
as shortcuts to the best interpretation as a way to explain
the incredible rapidity and efficiency of human communi-
cation and language understanding.
However, it has been noticed, by contrast, that a suitable
modelling of such notion seems to be very hard and that a
theory of meaning which resorts to the notion of preferred
interpretation can hardly be supported, as it would obvi-
ously lack some basic requirements of standard semantic
theories, such as a suitable formal apparatus, the condition
of compositionality of meaning, the capacity of matching
speaker’s intuitions concerning linguistic content along the
lines of a Gricean, intention-based, conception of meaning.
However, the intuitive appealing of the notion of default
interpretations together with cognitive evidences support-
ing the hypothesis of inferential shortcuts have led to the
formulation of various attempts to provide a theory of pre-
ferred meanings.
In the present work, I take into account one of the most
recent and well-constructed theories of default interpreta-
tions, the paradigm of Default Semantics due to the philoso-
pher of language and linguist Katarzyna Jaszczolt.
Such an approach on language understanding starts from
the acknowledgment of so-called merger representations
as the basic units of compositional meaning of acts of com-
munication. Merger representations are illustrated by (DRT-
Style) diagrams, with the proviso that each component
of the single-level semantic representation can stem from
different sources (including word meaning and sentence
structure as well as pragmatic inference, and various types
of default interpretations), none of which enjoy a composi-
tional privilege over the others.
While different types of default or presumptive mean-
ings have variously been advocated in Literature, I show
how the variety of ’defaults’ in Default Semantics are of
the deepest theoretical interest. That is why they are espe-
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cially intended to preserve the undeniable advantages of
a principle of compositionality in semantic analysis and at
the same time to take seriously into account the linguistic
underspecification of utterance meaning.
Such task is pursued by resorting to a solid formalism,
which is claimed to be able to cope with the various kinds
of pragmatic contribution to utterance meaning.
The thesis is organized in three chapters, as follows:
In the first chapter, I provide a detailed introduction to
Grice’s theory of meaning and communication. The theory
of conversational maxims and conversational implicature
is thoroughly developed and several problems arising from
the received view of his picture and different solutions to
them available in Literature are presented.
In the second chapter, I put into test Grice’s picture and
offer a number of objections and counterexamples leading
to the conclusion that Grice’s rigid semantics/pragmatics
distinction can hardly be maintained. After presenting
some radical objections to Grice’s semantic view, I give
a detailed overview of some of the most influential ap-
proaches to semantic underdeterminacy, presenting them
on a (virtual) scale of departure from Grice’s received con-
ception of Semantics. At the end of each presentation, I
give a number of strong objections and counter-examples,
eventually leading to the rejection of the presented approach.
Finally, in the third and last chapter, I present a detailed
overview of Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics. After develop-
ing in some details Jaszczolt’s paradigm, I try to show that
a large case study in Pragmatics is susceptible to treatment
on the basis of merger representations and defaults, and
I try to demonstrate how an approach of this kind can
help to get a more fine-grained position about the Seman-
tics/Pragmatics boundary, while saving what good has
been proposed from the opposite fronts of the debate.
As a testing ground for Default Semantics and for the
other paradigms presented, I chose to focus on the case
study of sentential connectives, asking whether the stan-
dard enrichments of semantic meaning which is triggered
by connectives in natural language can be traced to se-
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mantics, pragmatics or some sort of defaults. To answer
this questions, besides taking into account the debate con-
cerning logical form and the syntax/pragmatics and se-
mantics/pragmatics distinction, I will also consider evi-
dences from comparative linguistics, and will try to show
how the approach of Default Semantics, though slightly
revised, is perfectly able to match the data provided by
cross-linguistic study.
1 STEPS TOWARDGR ICEAN PRAGMAT ICS
Context is a criterion in settling the question of
why a man who has just put a cigarette in his
mouth has put his hand in his pocket; relevance
to an obvious end is a criterion in settling why
a man is running away from a bull.
—Grice (1989): 222.
1.1 preliminaries
Let’s start from the beginning. In 1967 the English philoso-
pher and linguist Paul Grice (1913-1988) gave a series of
talks at the University of Harvard under the title of ’Logic
and Conversation’, as invited speaker in the celebrated
William James Lectures. The text of these lectures remained
for a long time unpublished (also due to Grice’s notori-
ous perfectionism 1), although the manuscript of the talks
widely circulated among the scholars and gave rise to a
large debate. The lectures were finally published in 1989 in
Grice’s collection of papers ’Studies in the way of words’,
in a slightly revised and polished form. However, in the
two decades between the Harvard conferences and the of-
ficial publication of the text, the core ideas of Grice’s view
rapidly imposed and abruptly gave new directions to the
studies in philosophy of language and linguistics. A new
discipline was born under the title of Gricean Pragmatics.
The present work admittedly situates in the tradition
which can be easily traced back to the works of Paul Grice.
1 For the whole story about Grice’s William James Lectures, and also for
a enjoyable exposition of the background of Grice’s ideas and idiosyn-
crasies, see Chapman (2009), especially pp. 100-113.
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Besides, almost all of the account which I present and dis-
cuss in the course of the dissertation label themselves as
neo-Gricean (at least in the spirit). We will see soon what
does it mean in the specific. As regards to the central
problem of this work, the relation between the topic of
default interpretations and Grice’s ideas will result, as I
hope, more and more clearer in the development of the
thesis. Also the choice of the specific case study of sen-
tential connectives, which will be discussed in the second
part, bears a remarkable connection with Grice’s originary
aims and interests, as we will see. For the time being, it is
maybe worth noting that it is exactly a question concern-
ing the nature of the logical particles and the relationship
with their counterparts in natural language which is at the
beginning of the first of Grice’s Harvard lectures:
It is a commonplace of philosophical logic
that there are, or appear to be, divergences in
meaning between, on the one hand, at least some
of what I shall call the formal devices –, ∼, ∧,
∨, ⊃, (∀x), (∃x), (ιx) (when these are given a
standard two-valued interpretation) – and, on
the other, what are taken to be their analogues
or counterparts in natural language – such ex-
pressions as not, and, or, if, all, some (or at
least one), the. Some logicians may at some
time have wanted to claim that there are in fact
no such divergences; but such claims, if made
at all, have been somewhat rashly made, and
those suspected of making them have been sub-
jected to some pretty rough handling.
Althought Grice’s most extensive discussion is devoted
to the theme of particularized conversational implicatures
(that is, as we will see, to the sort of enrichment to the
compositional meaning that is mostly dependent on con-
textual clues), there are quite undeniable evidences that
that of default or standard enriched meanings was at the
center of Grice’s concerns, as it was conclusively proved by
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Levinson (2000)2. And this was so, exactly because ‘Grice
was interested in the whole phenomenon of implicature
largely because it promised an account of generally associ-
ated but defeasible inferences that rise from the use of the
logical connectives. And he was particularly interested in
the generalized implicatures, just because they are hard to
distinguish from semantical or conventional content’3.
Be that as it may, such discussion is largely tangential to
the main issue of default interpretations which, pace Grice
and his alleged lack of interest for the matter, is nowadays
widely acknowledged and is at the core of a widespread
debate.
However, for the purposes of the present work a short
overview of Grice’s own view and on his program is needed.
There are at least two reasons for this: first, it is impossi-
ble to appreciate many of the technical notions and dis-
tinctions without a proper background in Grice’s theory
of meaning and communication. As I already mentioned,
many of the contemporary accounts label themselves as
neo-Gricean and make extensive use of Gricean terms and
concepts, also with the explicit aim of objecting to many of
Grice’s own claims. Secondly, the sort of problems which
will be discussed in the next chapters have quite often at
their root a discussion which is traceable to readings of
Gricean (or broadly Gricean) ideas, distinctions and also
allusions. It would be quite hard to understand many of
the issues arising within pragmatic view if they are not
mirrored into original Grice’s picture.
2 p. 18 and relative footnotes, including an instructive anthology of
husty comments of well-known theorists, like Sperber and Wilson:
’[Grice’s] best known examples are particularized implicatures; the dis-
cussion of generalized implicatures is restricted to a few cases; and
there is no evidence that he saw the distinction as theoretically signifi-
cant’ (Sperber & Wilson (1987): 748) or Stephen Neale: ’The distinction
between ’generalized’ and ’particularized’ conversational implicature
is not represented in this diagram [presented in Neale’s paper (Levin-
son’s note)] because it is theoretically inert (for Grice)’ (Neale (1992):
524, note 18.)
3 Levinson (2000):18.
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1.2 meaning
’Do you mean that you think you can find out
the answer to it?’ said the March Hare.
’Exactly so,’ said Alice.
’Then you should say what you mean,’ the
March Hare went on.
’I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ’at least – at least I
mean what I say – that’s the same thing, you
know.’
’Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ’You
might just as well say that "I see what I eat" is
the same thing as "I eat what I see"!’.
—Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in
Wonderland
The main discussion of ’Logic and Conversation’ can be
easily traced back to an often cited, however short, Grice’s
paper of 1957, programmatically entitled ’Meaning’4. Like
for the Harvard Lectures, also this paper was written and
had a certain circulation before its official publication5. This
point is worth noting at least because it shows how the
discussion of several themes (like the one of conventions
and intentions) in large part anticipated, rather than follow,
the publication of influential works like Austin’s How to do
Things with Words (published in 1962, but read at Harvard
as William James Lectures in 1955) and Ryle’s The Concept
of Mind6.
Following a very common strategy among the so-called
ordinary language philosophers, in Meaning Grice suggests
to start from an analysis of how the verb ’to mean’ is used
4 Grice (1957)
5 See Chapman (2009): 63. ’Grice wrote the paper in practically its final
form in 1948 for a meeting of the Oxford Philosophical Society but, as
usual, he was hesitant to disseminate his ideas more widely. Almost a
decade later, Peter Strawson was worried that the Oxford philosophers
were not sufficiently represented in print. Unable to convince Grice to
revise his paper and send it to a journal, he persuaded him to hand
over the manuscript as it stood. Strawson and his wife Ann edited it
and submitted it to the Philosophical Review’
6 Ibidem
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in English. Such an analysis leads to a distinction between
two senses which the verb ’to mean’ can bear. The first one,
labeled as the natural notion of meaning, is that which is
in play when someone utters a sentence like (1)
(1) These clouds mean rain.
As opposed to this use of the verb ’meaning’, Grice claims
that another different sense of the verb is involved when
uttering a sentence like (2)
(2) Those three whistles of the referee (in a soccer
game) mean that the match is over.
This latter variety is called non-natural meaning. Ac-
cording to Grice, at least five main differences between
these two senses can be acknowledged. Such differences
can be grouped as follows:
1. Cancellability7: in the former case, that ’x means p’
also entails the truth of y, that is, the conclusion cannot be
cancelled and it is not possible for a speaker to go ahead
and say, e.g., ’x means p, but not-p’. By contrast, in the case
of non natural meaning, the conclusion is not entailed and
it is straightforwardly eliminable. For example, we cannot
say:
(1.1) These clouds mean rain, but it won’t rain.
However, we can say with no problems:
(2.1) Those three whistles of the referee (in a soccer
game) mean that the match is over. But it isn’t
in fact over: the referee has made a mistake.
2-3. Intention recognition From an occurrence of natural
meaning of the form ’x means p’ it cannot be argued the
7 This condition is also referred by Grice as a condition of ’factivity’ for
the verb ’to mean’: according to this distinction, natural meaning is
factive, while non natural meaning is not. See the Retrospective Epilogue
in Grice (1989): 359.
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conclusion that ’what is meant by x is p’ or that ’somebody
means p by x’. Exactly the opposite goes for non natural
meaning. For example, from (1) it cannot be inferred that
’what is meant by these clouds is rain’ or that ’someone
means rain by these clouds’. On the contrary, it is perfectly
possible to argue from (2) to the conclusion that ’what is
meant by the referee with those three whistles is that the
match is over’.
4-5. Admissible restatements Occurrence of natural mean-
ing cannot be followed by quotation marks, while this is
perfectly acceptable in the case of non natural meaning.
Furthermore, utterances containing occurrences of non nat-
ural meaning can be restated in the form ’the fact that...’
(for example, ’the fact that there are these clouds means
that it will rain’), while the same construction is by no
means a restatement of the meaning of the sentence in the
case of non natural meaning.
Conditions 2-3 point directly at the core of Grice’s notion
of non natural meaning (MeaningNN). What Grice wants
to claim is that for a speaker to mean something is equiv-
alent to have the intention of inducing in an audience a
certain effect by means of the recognition of the intention
behind that utterance, in a way that can be sketched as
follows. Note that the kind of definition given in ’Mean-
ing’ (and reported here) is no doubt quite sloppy and has
been object of several objections, pointing especially on its
psychological inadequacy of Grice’s definition8 However,
for the purposes of the present research it doesn’t matter
whether such definition lacks of psychological consistency,
it is enough to note that this definition involves a sort of
reflexivity condition and that for the intention in play to
be achieved it is sufficient that it is recognized9:
8 See Strawson (1964) for a classical discussion of the topic and Grice’s
attempt of emendation in Grice (1989), reprinted in Grice (1989): 86-
116.
9 The definition as given is from Levinson (2000):13. See also Neale
(1992): 544-550 for discussion and for the following, more fine-grained,
definition (p. 550):
By uttering x, U meant that p iff for some audience A,
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(3) S meansNN p by ’uttering’ U to A iff S intends:
a) A to think p
b) A to recognize that S intends (a)
c) A’s recognition of S’s intending (a) to be the
prime reason for A thinking p.
What is worth noting about this kind of definition of
’meaning’ is the idea that utterance meaning is not (or,
at least, not only) function of the semantics of the sen-
tence, that is, it does not only depend on the syntactic rules
of composition of the sentence together with the truth-
conditional value of its constituents, but it is, more cru-
cially, a matter of what is intended by a specific speaker
uttering a certain sentence (or, better, an occurrence or to-
ken of such sentence). The hearer’s job of recovery of the
speaker’s intentions behind the performance of an utter-
ance lies thus at the center of such a picture of commu-
nication. Of course, the anti-formalist claim that meaning
cannot be reduced to the outcome of the semantic analy-
sis of the sentence is not only proper of Grice, but is a
common claim among the ordinary language philosophers.
However, unlike Austin, who stressed the role of conven-
tion in performing a certain kind of speech act, what Grice
- yet from this seminal paper - seems to be interested in
is drawing a psychologically realistic explanation of lan-
guage use, which is centered not generically on the non-
linguistic, conventionalized potentialities of language use
but, rather, on the way in which a conventional content in-
teract with speaker’s intentions and hearer’s expectations
in a given circumstance of utterance to yield a felicitous
1. U uttered x intending A actively to entertain the thought that p
(or the thought that U believes that p)
2. U uttered x intending A to recognize that U intends A to actively
entertain the thought that p
3. U does not intend A to be deceived about U’s intentions (1) and
(2).
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act of meaning. Such strategy can be seen as a radical re-
interpretation of later Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning
is its use (an idea which was so familiar to Oxford philoso-
phers of ’ordinary language’ orientation), or – to put it in
Grice’s terms – a way of exploiting the intuition that ’what
words mean is a matter of what people mean by them’10.
1.3 logic and conversation
If I say to any one, ’I saw some of your children
to-day’, he might be justified in inferring that I
did not see them all, not because the words
mean it, but because, if I had seen them all, it is
most likely that I should have said so: even
though this cannot be presumed unless it is
presupposed that I must have known whether
the children I saw were all or not.
—Mill (1867): 501.
In the previous section, I mentioned the anti-formalist
spirit behind Grice’s analysis of meaning. Under the com-
mon name of ’formalists’, Grice intends to refer to the im-
portant tradition in the analytical philosophy of 20th cen-
tury that can be traced to the works of Frege: namely, the
idea, common to the positivists and to philosophers with a
strong predilection in mathematical logic (like Russell, Car-
nap, Quine, Ayer), that natural language is inadequate to
meet the standards of precision required by scientific enter-
prise and should be hence replaced and clarified by unam-
biguous formal languages and devices. However, Grice’s
position in the formalist/informalist debate is more fine-
grained that it could appear at first glance. Grice was all
but a mere advocate of the informalist approach to natu-
ral language meaning. The attempt to make it clear how a
middle level solution between the two fronts of the debate
could be found was one of Grice’s primary concerns in
his ’Logic and Conversation’, a solution which could have
10 Grice (1989):340.
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at the same time the advantages of a strict methodologi-
cal parsimony and of a grasp of psychologically relevant
aspects of the process of communication.
The seminal intuitions of ’Meaning’ are developed in
a comprehensive theory of meaning and conversation in
Grice’s William James Lectures. The central topic of this
lectures is the notion of implicature and specifically of con-
versational implicatures.
Before addressing the theoretical features of implicatures,
some examples will be of help to understand the however
commonplace phenomenon which Grice has in mind. One
of Grice’s most cited examples is the following: imagine
that A, a philosophy professor, is supposed to write a let-
ter of recommendation for one of his student, Mr’X. In this
situation A writes as follows11:
(4) Dear Sir, Mr. X’s command of English is excellent,
and his attendance at tutorials has been regular.
Yours, etc.
In a circumstance like the one just described, the ad-
dressee of A’s letter is legitimate to infer that what A is
trying to communicate goes beyond what he is explicitly
writing. Very likely this will be the fact that Mr. X is in-
deed by no means a good student of philosophy. Such an
effect is obtained by exploiting in a certain way the fea-
tures of ordinary communication: in this case, from the
fact that, when writing a letter of recommendation, one is
normally expected to communicate information about the
person recommended which are relevant for the purposes
of the letter itself, the recipient of the letter infers that there
is something else that is meant by A.
Here is another example given by Grice:
(5) A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these
days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York
lately.
11 From Grice (1989):33
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Clearly, what B is trying to communicate is that Smith is
likely to have a new girlfriend in New York. Note that, in
the appropriate context (e.g. that of Smith being an English
trader whose company has a branch office in New York),
B’s answer is consistent with the implicature that, for ex-
ample, Smith is so overloaded with work at present that
he has no time to find a new girlfriend. This clearly shows
that implicatures are a linguistic phenomenon whose pro-
duction is leaded by the exploitation of certain features of
communication to get non-conventional linguistics effects
and that (as the latter example clearly shows) these effects
are by no means in a logical relation (e.g. of entailment)
with the proposition expressed. That’s why Grice uses the
neologism ’implicature’ to address this case study, which
should not be confused with logical implication. However,
the crucial point is that Grice is not interested in provid-
ing random examples of linguistic tricks and machineries.
When focusing on this sort of examples, his central concern
is that of giving a possibly unitary explanation of meaning
in natural language, one being in line with the kind of
analysis given in ’Meaning’ ’in terms of complex audience-
directed intentions on the part of the utterer’12. Accord-
ing to Grice, such an account should programmatically be
able to explain this sort of cases where speakers’ intended
meaning departs so significantly from encoded one, a job
which has been widely neglected from philosophers of lan-
guage of ’formalistic’ tendency, but which in Grice’s view
is a central task for a theory aiming is to provide a mean-
ingful theory of linguistic communication.
According to Grice, the task of providing a maximally
unitary explanation of this sort of case study is reached
only once we acknowledge a strict correspondence between
the production of conversational effects like the ones out-
lined above and a series of principles or maxims which are
supposed to govern our communicative exchanges. More
generally, those maxims are on a hierarchy of dependence
and fall under an overall Cooperative Principle which is
supposed to be always active in linguistic behaviours sub-
12 Neale (1992):542.
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mitted to a general assumption of rationality of the partici-
pants to a conversational frame13. The Cooperative Princi-
ple, in Grice’s terms, is as follows14:
grice’s cooperative principle
Make your conversational contribution such
as is required, at the state at which it occurs,
by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk
exchange in which you are engaged.
As for the conversational maxims, Grice, ’echoing Kant’15
groups them in the four categories of Quantity, Quality, Re-
lation and Modality. There is of course a semi-serious mo-
tivation of philosophical tribute underlying such grouping.
However, as it has been noted by Chapman (2009), such
distinctions were probably chosen ’more importantly to
draw on their ideas of natural, universal divisions of ex-
perience’:
The regularities of conversational behaviour
were intended to include aspects of human be-
haviour and cognition beyond the purely lin-
guistic. [. . . ] Kant’s claims for both the funda-
mental and the exhaustive nature of these cate-
gories are explicit [. . . ] Kant goes so far as to
suggest that his table of categories, containing
all the basic concepts of understanding, could
provide the basis for any philosophical theory.
These, therefore, offered Grice divisions of ex-
perience with a sound pedigree and an estab-
lished claim to be universals of human cogni-
tion16.
13 More in general, the assumption of rationality is taken to be at the root
of human behavior in general. This is one of the unifying themes in
Grice’s whole work. See Chapman (2009):chapter 1.
14 From Grice (1989): 26.
15 Grice (1989): 26.
16 Chapman (2009): 100.
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In any case, once that we have acknowledged these as ac-
tual grounds for Grice’s choosing a Kantian label for his
conversational maxims17 one could go ahead and pose to
Grice the same question which quite naturally arises in the
kantian case, i.e. the question of the completeness and al-
leged exhaustiveness of the table of categories. Could one
ever be convinced about the need of these, and no more
than these, four groups?
Be that as it may, such discussion would take us too far
afield. What is worth stressing is only that, notwithstand-
ing the prescriptive form of the maxims, they are nonethe-
less intended to serve as descriptive (and, in a sense, tran-
scendentally descriptive) of our conversational behaviour.
The maxims are principles such that we automatically con-
form to them in our everyday conversational exchanges,
rather than instructions we are supposed to follow. For the
purposes of the present work it is sufficient to give quite
schematically a list of Grice’s maxims of conversation18.
grice’s maxims of conversation
quantity
• Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purposes of the exchange).
• Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
quality
• Try to make your contribution one that is true:
– Do not say what you believe to be false.
– Do not say that for which you lack adequate ev-
idence.
relation
17 It is worth noting that the label ’maxim’ itself has a strong kantian
connotation.
18 From Grice (1989): 26-27.
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• Be relevant.
manner
• Be perspicuous:
– Avoid obscurity of expression.
– Avoid ambiguity.
– Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
– Be orderly.
I am not entering here into the discussion concerning the
priority of certain maxims over others19. Let’s rather come
back to the examples (4) and (5) and add some comments
in light of Grice’s theories of cooperativeness and conver-
sational maxims. Mr. X’s letter of reference represent a
blatant violation of the first maxim of quantity. On the
other side, shared contextual knowledge, concerning what
one is expected to write in a letter of reference, makes the
manifestly poor information contained in the letter implic-
itly intended to communicate something else, namely that
the writer is not in the position of writing anything good
with respect to Mr. X’s philosophical skills. The conver-
sational implicature that ’Mr. X is by no means a good
student of philosophy’ (or something of the sort) is thus
triggered through the explicit violation of one of the max-
ims. The assumption of cooperativeness which underlies
19 It is clear, indeed, that Grice acknowledged a priority to the maxim of
quality: ’It is obvious that the observance of some of these maxims is
a matter of less urgency than is the observance of others; a man who
has expressed himself with undue prolixity would, in general, be open
to milder comment than would a man who has said something he be-
lieves to be false. Indeed, it might be felt that the importance of at least
the first maxim of Quality is such that it should not be included in a
scheme of the kind I am constructing; other maxims come into oper-
ation only on the assumption that this maxim of Quality is satisfied.’
(Grice (1989): 27). See also Neale (1992): 531. In fact, it is peculiar
that one of the most influential approaches in cognitive pragmatics, i.e.
Relevance theory, can no doubt be read as an attempt to argue for the
alleged priority of the maxim of Relation over the others (which are
then subsumed under the unique principle of Relevance).
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communication leads to the search for an interpretation by
virtue of which the violation of the maxim is used to gen-
erate some non-conventional conversational outcome, i.e.
a conversational implicature. The case of the example (5)
is similar, but here is a violation of the maxim of relation
(’Be relevant’). In order to assume that B is being cooper-
ative in his answer to A’s question, the addressee has to
go beyond ’what is said’ by B and his apparent nonobser-
vance of relevance and accordingly get to the implicated
message.
Grice distinguishes between particularized and gener-
alized conversational implicatures (henceforth PCIs and
GCIs respectively). PCIs are the kind of implicatures which
we encountered so far: they are triggered in ’particular oc-
casion by virtue of special features of the context20’ (again,
examples (4) and (5) are very good examples of PCI). GCIs,
by contrast, are the sort of implicatures which are ’nor-
mally’ triggered in almost all context of utterance by virtue
of ’the use of a certain form of words in an utterance ... (in
the absence of special circumstances)’21. Examples (6), (7)
and (8) are standardly accounted for as cases of GCI22
(6) I have three children.
(7) Some philosophy books are boring.
(8) Mary and John got married and had a baby.
In the examples above, I emphasized (using italics) the
lexical items which, according to Grice, (at least in ’normal’
contexts) carries the generalized implicatures. In example
(6) the number term three is claimed to have a conventional
meaning (’at least three’) which is pragmatically enriched
to get the intended interpretation in most context (’exactly
three’). In the case of (7), the quantifier expression ’some’
is, in its logical interpretation, compatible with the claim
that:
20 Grice (1989): 37.
21 Ibid.
22 At least among those theorists who agree about the existence of the
separate phenomenon of GCI, like Gazdar, Atlas, Horn and Levinson.
Levinson (as we will see) developed an articulated theory of GCI.
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(7.1) All philosophy books are boring.
However, in standard context of utterance, the inference
to (7.1) is blocked by the generalized implicature that:
(7.2) Some, but not all, philosophy books are boring.
In the example (8), the use of the english connective ’and’
is temporally (and maybe causally) marked. Such marked-
ness is claimed to be not part of the encoded meaning of
the lexical item ’and’ (whose meaning, as we will see, is
claimed to be analogous to this of the formal counterpart
∧, and to be, accordingly, entirely truth-conditional) but to
be the effect of a GCI which gives the intended interpreta-
tion (8.1)
(8.1) Mary and John got married and then (as a result)
had a baby.
Even if, according to Robyn Carston, ’[t]here is no ev-
idence that Grice gave any theoretical weight to a distinc-
tion between generalized and particularized conversational
implicature, and the postulation of a system of default log-
ical rules, attached to particular lexical items, runs counter
to the aim of accounting for pragmatic inference in terms
of quite general conversational maxims rooted in consider-
ations of human rationality23’, the distinction between GCI
and PCI is today really customary in pragmatics (thought
with substantial departures from Grice’s original discus-
sion) and gave rise to a wide debate.
23 Carston (2002): 259.
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1.4 what is said and what is impli-cated
House: ’I hired you because you are extremely
pretty.’
Cameron: ’You hired me to get into my pants?’
House: ’I can’t believe that that would shock
you. It’s also not what I said.’
—House MD: Pilot.
1.4.1 Conventional implicatures
Before getting to a summary of the whole Gricean pic-
ture, it is important to note that conversational implica-
tures (both GCIs and PCIs) do not exhaust, at least in
Grice’s view, the field of implicatures. One sort of impli-
catures is triggered - according to Grice - directly from the
conventional meaning of certain words such as the con-
trastive reading of term ’but’ in (9)24:
(9) John is a philosopher but he is rich
Conventional implicatures are theoretically controversial,
since they seem to blur two important and apparently rigid
distinctions in Grice’s theory: i.e. the distinction between
what is said and what is implicated and the distinction
between semantics and pragmatics. As Carston notes, con-
ventional implicature ’falls on opposite sides of the two
divides (it is semantic and it is implicated)25’.
To explain this point it is needed to introduce another
technical notion, correlative to that of implicature, i.e. the
notion of ’what is said’ (hereafter WIS). As a preliminary
remark, we can observe that one of Grice’s concerns is to
stress the logical independence of conversational implica-
tures from the content of the expressed sentence. Remem-
ber that one of the distinguishing features of the notion
24 From Bach (1999a): 332.
25 Carston (2002): 104.
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of MeaningNN was the property of cancellability. What
is non naturally meant by a certain act of communication
(be that a linguistic utterance or an other sensory stimulus,
like the whistles of the referee in example (2)) can always
be dropped without contradiction. This fact, as we already
noted, shows that what is meantNN by a certain utterance
is not part of what we can call the semantic content of the
uttered sentence. If we now turn back to the examples of
conversational implicatures, it is easy to note that the same
condition of cancellability applies:
(5.1) A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these
days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York
lately. But this is not to say that he has a new
girlfriend there.
(7.3) Some philosophy books are boring. In fact, all of
them are.
Note that both GCI and PCI are cancellable (or defeasi-
ble), while conventional implicatures are not. It is indeed
impossible to utter (9) without intending at the same time
the (unfortunately not so alleged) contrast between being
a philosopher and being well-heeled. This is why, even
if conventional implicatures - inasmuch as they are impli-
catures - belong to the layer of utterance meaning that
Grice labels as ’speaker’s meaning’ (as opposed to sentence
meaning), nonetheless they behave like an hybrid element
between conventional meaning (which belong to seman-
tics) and implicatures (which are claimed to be entirely a
matter of pragmatics). That’s why their status is so contro-
versial. To put it schematically, conventional implicatures
are claimed to bear the following three features26:
26 I follow here Bach (1999a)
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(10)
• They are triggered by certain locutions which
give rise to implicatures in virtue of their own
meanings (that is why they are conventional).
• The meaning of such locutions does not con-
tribute to WIS.
• Their truth-value does not affect the truth-value
of the entire utterance, so that the falsity of such
proposition in compatible with the truth of the
entire utterance (that is why they are implica-
tures).
At the same time, however, the contentious status of con-
ventional implicatures helps to shed light on an overall
rigidity of Grice’s picture of communication, that is the
hard-shelled separation between the three acknowledged
layers of meaning: sentence meaning, what is said and
what is implicated. To put it more vividly, the reader can
find helpful to resort to Figure 1.1 at page 23.
1.4.2 Kent Bach on conventional implicature
However, theorists are not unanimously in agreement
about the existence itself of the autonomous phenomenon
of conventional implicatures. According to Kent Bach, to
cite only one example, ’Grice’s category of conventional
implicature throws a monkey wrench into his distinction
[between WIS and what is implicated], inasmuch as con-
ventional implicatures derive from the meanings of partic-
ular expressions rather than from conversational circum-
stances. This monkey wrench needs to be removed’27. In
Bach’s view, the appeal of conventional implicature is en-
tirely intuitive and do not actually relies on any argument
in favour of its existence. Grice borrowed this category di-
rectly from an idea of Frege, which can be found e.g. in
his celebrated paper The Thought:
27 Bach (1999a): 327.
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Someone using the sentence ’Alfred has still
not come’ actually says ’Alfred has not come’,
and at the same time hints - but only hints -
that Alfred’s arrival is expected. Nobody can
say: Since Alfred’s arrival is not expected, the
sense of the sentence is false. The way that ’but’
differs from ’and’ is that we use it to intimate
that what follows it contrasts with what was to
be expected from what preceded it. Such con-
versational suggestions make no difference to the
thought28.
Bach’s strategy is to argue that the alleged category of
conventional implicatures is a theoretical artifact, that is a
myth, since there are no independent arguments in favour
of the existence of such category. On the contrary, follow-
ing a suggestion of Grice himself, he proposes an analysis
of the locutions which are claimed to trigger a conventional
implicature (what Bach calls ACIDs: alleged conventional
implicature devices) in terms of second-order speech act
operators. In a case like (9), Grice suggests that ’speakers
may be at one and the same time engaged in performing
speech-acts at different but related levels’, that is to say the
term ’but’ introduces a second-order speech act, which acts
as a modifier on the first-order (locutionary) speech act by
introducing the relevant contrastive effect.
In Bach’s analysis, terms like ’but’, ’still’, ’even’ work as
preservative operators, insomuch as they preserve the orig-
inal proposition while introducing the modification. Let,
for example, B1 be the unary preservative operator ex-
pressing the property F (e.g., the contrastive effect trig-
gered by ’but’), and let S be the proposition that p, then
B1(S)’ expresses both the proposition that p and the propo-
sition that F(p)’29.
Bach’s proposal articulates in three main steps: first, he
shows that - contrary to Gricean assumptions - the en-
riched meaning which ACIDs allegedly convey by means
of conventional implicature is, in fact, in many cases part
28 Frege (1918/1956), in McGuinness (1984): 357 (italics is from Bach).
29 Bach (1999a): 352.
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of what is said. This is demonstrated by showing that locu-
tions like ’but’, ’still’, etc..., pass the so-called IQ-Test (Indi-
rect Quotation Test), which states, roughly, that an element
of a sentence contributes to WIS of an utterance of that sen-
tence if and only if there can be an accurate indirect quota-
tion which specifies WIS and makes use in the ’that-clause’
of that element. Hence, the second clause of the definition
of conventional implicature in (10) is rejected.
Secondly, it is claimed that the conventional implicature
analysis is guided by a silent assumption which surrep-
titiously underlines ’people’s intuitions about what sen-
tences do and do not say’30. This is the assumption that
’every indicative sentence expresses exactly one proposi-
tion’31. Contrasting this assumption, Bach advocates for
a multi-proposition view. In his account, ’[w]ith sentences
containing ACIDs like ’but’, ’so’, ’even’, and ’still’, there is
no such thing as the proposition expressed - in these cases
what is said comprises more than one proposition. And
when the sentence does so without expressing the conjunc-
tion of these propositions, and these propositions differ in
truth value, the sentence as a whole is not assessable as
simply true or simply false.’32. Thus, in a case like (9), one
should not claim for an analysis as the one in (9.1):
(9.1)
(i) John is a philosopher and
(ii) John is rich and
(iii) there is a certain contrast between being a
philosopher and being rich.
The above analysis is wrong because it is claimed that
the utterance meaning is given by the conjunction of the
propositions (i)-(iii), while is hard to acknowledge that a
report of WIS in sentence (9.1) would include something
like clause (iii) (at least due to its redundancy). On the
30 Ivi: 351.
31 Ivi: 350.
32 Ivi: 351.
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other hand, IQ-Test ensures that contrastive meaning is in
fact part of WIS, thereby involving that a different analysis
is required. Bach’s claim is that the analysis in terms of
multiple proposition has the advantage of preserving the
idea that WIS includes something like the clause (iii)33 and
at the same time that, unlike a conjunction of propositions,
multiple propositions do not have a unitary truth-value:
i.e. they are not true or false altogether, and (as in the
case of implicatures) it is preserved that the falsity of the
sentence expressing contrast is compatible with the truth
of the sentences (i) and (ii).
According to Bach, the view that ’but’ triggers a con-
ventional implicature ’is the result of insisting on separat-
ing the contrastive import of ’but’ from its conjunctive im-
port’34, while the constrastive one is obtained by means
of a second-order speech act operator which, while mod-
ifying the proposition within its scope, at the same time
preserves it. Hence, the third point in the definition (10)
is rejected: the truth-conditional independence of the two
sentences is saved but this does not involve the generation
of an implicature. On the contrary, such fact is explained
by resorting to a multi-propositional view.
Therefore, it is possible to reject in a very convincing
way the idea that conventional implicatures are, in fact, im-
plicatures. To sum up, this is why they affect the truth-
conditional content of the sentence expressed by the utter-
ance (i.e. they are part of WIS) and express multiple propo-
sitions, the relation among which is neither of entailment
nor of implicature.
Conventional implicatures, as we already noted, present
an obvious problem since they seem to belong at the same
time to two different layers of the theory of meaning, which
33 However, as it is noted by Bach, the precis sort of contrast which is
conveyed by the locution ’but’ is to be contextually filled. In Bach’s
analysis of the layers of meaning, as we will see in the next chapter,
the acknowledgment of the contrastive effect is to be recognized at that
level of WIS which follows semantic completion, while the particular
sort of contrastive effect has to be contextually fleshed out by means
of a process of pragmatic expansion. See infra: 101.
34 Bach (1999a): 348.
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are sharply severed. This quite straightforward consider-
ation had led us to the result that the existence itself of
this theoretical object can be easily questioned and the cat-
egory of conventional implicature can thus be removed. In
other accounts, like that of Relevance Theory, whose over-
all strategy consists in advocating for a continuum of cases
of pragmatic enrichment against the sharp distinctions be-
tween WIS and the pragmatics acknowledged by Grice’s
theory of implicatures, the way adopted for rejecting the
category of conventional implicature is quite different and
makes use of the distinction between conceptual and pro-
cedural meaning. However, I will not enter here into this
topic, just because such distinction will be discussed in the
third chapters35.
1.4.3 Grice on ’what is said’
In the previous section I presented Kent Bach’s account
on conventional implicatures. Such discussion has no di-
rect import on the main issue of this work. However, it
represents a first example of how the sharp picture of com-
munication drawn by Grice can be criticized. And, more
importantly for the purposes of the present work, such
first criticism to Grice’s view on implicatures is directed
on those implicatures whose generation seem to involve
no inferential commitment and are triggered in, at a first
approximation, ’standard’ contexts.
It is now time to put into test the overall picture which
result from Grice’s analysis. It can be useful to resort to
Figure 1.1 and give some critic remarks on it. However, it
is fair to note incidentally that the diagram provided is by
no means neutral, in so much as it results from a recon-
struction of Grice’s theory. However, it represents quite
straightforwardly the received view about Grice’s picture
of communication36 and it can be accepted, I think, with-
out further hesitation. As it should be clear, the red arrow
35 see infra: 151.
36 Similar schemes can be found e.g. in Bianchi (2004): , Carston (2002):
112, Neale (1992): Recanati (2004a):
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represents the hybrid nature of conventional implicatures
which, although belonging to the layer of speaker’s mean-
ing, are strictly related to the conventional meaning of the
sentence.
Utterance Meaning
Sentence Meaning Speaker’s Meaning
What is said What is implicated
Conventionally Conversationally
Figure 1.1: Grice’s picture of communication
Following Grice’s picture of communication, utterance
meaning corresponds to the overall layer of what we can
also call, echoing Recanati (1989), ’what is communicated’37.
Such level includes both conventional and non-conventional
contributions to the meaning of a certain utterance and,
most importantly, this two kinds of contributions are sharply
severed in Grice’s view. However, as we already noted, a
first kind of counter-example to this scheme is represented
by the phenomenon of Gricean conventional implicatures.
37 Assuming that the equation utterance meaning = what is communicated
actually holds, the distinction between the two labels is merely termi-
nological and only helps to stress respectively a perspective oriented
to the analysis of meaning or one which is more concerned with the
steps involved in communication understanding. However, as we will
see when focusing on the paradigm of Default Semantics, it is possi-
ble to question the idea that an analysis in terms of utterance really
exhausts the dominion of what is communicated
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Nonetheless, also assuming that we are able to cope with
such category, either in the Gricean or in the Bachian way,
it is still possible to ask whether this is the only sort of
phenomenon which apparently threaten the Gricean dis-
tinctions. Let’s consider the following examples:
(11) Jane went to the bank.
(12) Visiting relatives can be boring.
(13) He is here now, but she is not: she is at his place.
If we try to provide an analysis in Gricean terms of
such utterances, it is easy to see that none of the examples
(11)–(13) expresses a complete proposition after the con-
ventional meaning of the sentences have been established.
This is due to the polisemy of the term ’bank’ in (11), which
could refer both to the edge of a river (say, bank1 and to a
financial institution (bank2) . It is straightforward that de-
ciding whether it is the case that Jane went to the financial
bank or to the river bank is something which pertains to
the level of what has been said by the utterer of (11) and
cannot be by no means an implicature.
The same goes for (12), where the sort of ambiguity we
are concerned with is not lexical but structural, that is to
say it depends on the way we parse the syntactic structure
of the sentence, either to mean that the act of visiting rela-
tives can be boring (as in (12.1)) or that relatives who come
to visit can be boring (as in (12.2))
(12.1)
S
VP
can be boring
NP
N
relatives
Adj
Visiting
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(12.2)
S
VP
can be boring
NP
N
relatives
Ger
Visiting
Finally, in the case of (13), the full understanding of the
utterance is subordinate to the resolution of the many in-
dexical terms that is to say the assignment of references
to pronouns, possessives, temporal and spacial deixis (like
here, now). Assuming, for argument’s sake, that He = John,
She = Janet, t = the time of the utterance and s = Janet’s
house, the steps one hearer have to process to get a full
proposition (like the one at the point 3.) are roughly as
follows:
(13.2)
(i) He1 is here now, but she2 is not: she2 is at
his1 place.
(ii) x is in s at t, but y is not: y is at x’s place.
(iii) John is at Janet’s house at the time of the ut-
terance, but Janet is not: Janet is at John’s
place.
To get the right interpretation, i.e. the one at point 3.
the hearer has to assign the correct reference to the indexi-
cal expressions (and correctly attributing the anaphoric an-
chors between co-referential pronouns, that is why of step
1.). It is easy to see that the proposition expressed by a
sentence like (13) is strongly underdetermined by the sur-
face structure of the sentence, at least until all the job of
indexical resolution is done. What guides such process of
reference instantiation is obviously a criterion of best fit
which ultimately relies upon contextual knowledge. Grice
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himself was well aware of this fact. In fact he proposed
that what is said, as a technical notion of his picture, de-
parts from sentence (conventional) meaning only in two
respects:
1. It provides disambiguation for all possible ambigu-
ous expressions (be that case of lexical or structural
ambiguity) and
2. it provides a reference for all indexical expressions.
What we get, according to Grice, is a fully propositional
item, something capable of being truth or false and, what
is most remarkable, something which can suitably act as
an input for the process of implicature generation:
To work out that a particular conversational
implicature is present, the hearer will rely on
the following data: (1) the conventional mean-
ing of the words used, together with the iden-
tity of any references that may be involved; (2)
the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3)
the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utter-
ance; (4) other items of background knowledge;
and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all rele-
vant items falling under the previous headings
are available to both participants and both par-
ticipants know or assume this to be the case38.
The importance given by Grice to the notion of WIS
can hardly be overestimated. As was properly noted by
Stephen Neale, ’[t]he more one reflects on his work, the
more one feels that the notion of what is said is for Grice
a fundamentally important notion in philosophy39’. And
the reason for such centrality is not difficult to understand.
Grice’s first concern was to clear the field of philosophi-
cal debates from the confusions and fallacies arising from
the misrecognition of the discrepancy between those as-
pects of meaning which bear logical relation between each
38 Grice (1989): 31.
39 Neale (1992): 555.
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others, and those others whose links are only conversa-
tional. From the point of view of a theory of communi-
cation, this fact leads Grice to a sharp separation between
what is conventionally conveyed and those aspect of mean-
ing which rely upon the recognition of the intentions be-
hind a speaker’s uttering a certain utterance. In Grice’s
view, the field of meaning which depend upon contextual
knowledge and inferential exploitation of the conventional
meaning, i.e. the field of Pragmatics, should be hopefully
taken apart, in order to preserve a methodological crite-
rion of parsimony in philosophical and linguistic analysis,
which could eventually help to deal with a notion of se-
mantic meaning which is the most theoretically useful and
treatable as possible. Hence, although a certain amount of
’contextual’ contribution to WIS has to be acknowledged,
at least in order to preserve the intuitions about what is for
a sentence to express a complete proposition, one which is
capable of being true or false, nonetheless such contribu-
tions - in Grice’s view - had to be kept to a minimum. By
doing so, one has the double advantage of safeguarding a
conception of Semantics which is entirely a matter of
(i) conventional meaning of the words;
(ii) sentence structure and
(iii) compositionality of (i) in accordance with the rules pre-
scribed by (ii),
and at the same time invoking a single methodological cri-
terion for the analysis of cases of departures from linguistic
meaning.
This is why, as Grice explicitly writes,
[i]n the sense in which I am using the word
say, I intend what someone has said to be closely
related to the conventional meaning of the words
(the sentence) he has uttered40.’
WIS is thus ’closely related’, while of course not overlap-
ping, to sentence meaning. Apart disambiguation, every-
thing by virtue of which WIS departs from conventional
40 Grice (1989): 25.
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meaning is a matter of, we can say, indexicality in the nar-
row context sense41, i.e. only those elements in the sentence
which are clearly indexical are necessary for a complete
proposition to be uttered.
But, it may be asked, why allow exactly such compo-
nents of contextual completion to be needed to WIS and
not others? This is exactly because it is part of the seman-
tics of pure indexicals (i.e. pronouns, variables for time
and place,...) to refer to extra-linguistic context in a way
that is, nonetheless, conventional, i.e. linguistically deter-
mined and mandated.
It is hence a very well restricted form of context-depen-
dence the only one which is allowed (and, according to
Grice, required) in order to WIS to express a complete
proposition, by means of a slight departure from conven-
tional meaning. A kind of context-dependence, the one
’exhibited by (pure) indexicals’, which ’has nothing to do
with the radical form of context-dependence which affects
speaker’s meaning42’.
Everything else, according to Grice, is a matter of impli-
cature and hence pertains to the level of Pragmatics.
Grice has a very well formulated methodological princi-
ple at the basis of his theory of meaning. It is a principle
of methodological parsimony which closely reminds prin-
ciples of ontological simplicity advocated by philosophers
of Nominalistic orientation. Incidentally, this is why the ti-
tle of the present chapter echoes the title of a celebrated pa-
per by Nelson Goodman and Willard Quine43. As a further
wink to the nominalistic tradition, the principle is explicitly
41 For the distinction between narrow and wide context, see Recanati
(2004a): 56-8 and in particular the following quotation from Bach, cited
at the same place: ’There are two quite different sorts of context, and
each plays quite a different role. Wide context concerns any contextual
information relevant to determining the speaker’s intention and to the
successful and felicitous performance of the speech act . . . Narrow
context concerns information specifically relevant to determining the
semantic values of [indexicals] . . . Narrow context is semantic, wide
context pragmatic’
42 Recanati (2004a): 56
43 Goodman & Quine (1947).
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formulated as a modified version of the famous Occam’s
Razor44:
modified occam’s razor
Senses are not to be multiplied beyond neces-
sity
It is worth noting that the principle is introduced exactly
at the end of Grice’s discussion of the sentential connective
∨ and its counterpart in natural language (’or’). Accord-
ing to Grice, it is not the case of postulating a linguistic
ambiguity, where it is possible to explain a discrepancy
between conventional (semantic) and conversational mean-
ing of a certain linguistic item as an occurrence of prag-
matic exploitation of the former (in terms of implicatures).
In the case of sentential connectives, as we will see, the
truth-functional meaning should be maintained as the pri-
mary meaning and the conversational enriched interpreta-
tion has to be explained in terms of implicatures. A really
contentious conclusion which will be discussed in more
details in the following chapters.
For the time being, let’s consider Grice’s overall conclu-
sion about the distinguishing features of the three layers
of meaning, namely sentence meaning, WIS, and implica-
tures. We know that WIS is a middle level, whose theoreti-
cal value is the one of a psychologically realistic though se-
mantically very treatable representation of utterance mean-
ing. The context-dependence of such semantic represen-
tation is reduced to a minimum, and all the contextual
import to the sentence structure is limited to those, very
controlled, aspects of contextuality which help to lead to
a complete, truth-evaluable, proposition. Then, the level
of what is said (i.e., the semantics of the sentence, in the
sense of a proposition capable to bear an actual relation to
a thought or a state of affairs) can undergo a process of
pragmatic exploitation which, given the cooperative prin-
44 Grice (1989): 47.
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ciple and the maxims of conversations, leads to the gen-
eration (and, from the hearer’s perspective, calculation) of
implicatures.
The obvious questions are now: is such picture of com-
munication realistic? Whether or not psychological plau-
sibility has a role to play in Grice’s shaping the level of
what is said, is this alleged level of meaning (also where
intended as a theoretical object, whose utility is limited
to semantic purposes) immune to independent counter-
examples showing its theoretical fragility? The answer, in
both case, has to be negative.
As a bridging passage to the next chapter (which will be
entirely devoted to a discussion of some influential para-
digms which have been proposed in response to the chal-
lenge to original Grice’s picture) I will just consider a few
examples which seem, at least at first glace, to threaten
Grice’s idea. These counter-examples will serve as an open-
ing to more fine-grained, although Gricean in spirit, views
of meaning in communication.
The question we have to ask ourselves is: are the lin-
guistic processes of contextual filling acknowledged and
isolated by Grice, i.e. disambiguation and indexical reso-
lution, necessary and sufficient conditions for full proposi-
tionality? Let’s consider the following examples:
(14) He is an indiscriminate dog-lover; he likes some
cats and dogs (from Levinson (2000): 175)
(15) Paul’s book is amazing.
Let’s briefly discuss examples (14)-(21) above (we will
come back to them in the next chapter).
The second clause of example (14) is an instance of some-
thing we have already encountered, i.e. structurally (syn-
tactically) ambiguous sentences. Such sentence can be dis-
ambiguates in the following two ways:
(14.1) He is an indiscriminate dog-lover; he loves [[some
cats] and dogs].
(14.2) He is an indiscriminate dog-lover; he loves [some
[cats and dogs]].
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Sentence (14.1) conversationally implicates that
(14.1.1) He loves some-but-not-all cats.
while sentence (14.2) has as implicature that
(14.2.1) He loves some-but-not-all cats and dogs.
Now, the implicature (14.2.1) is in fact incompatible with
the truth of the first clause of (14), namely that ’he is an
indiscriminate dog lover’, which entails that ’he loves all
dogs’. This predicts that the correct syntactic form is the
one in (14.1), the paradox being that the mentioned im-
plicatures ’are instrumental in the disambiguation process
which is essential in arriving at ’what is said’ by the utter-
ance45’.
That is to say: the same process which is in act in the
generation of the implicatures seems to be in play for the
disambiguation of a syntactic structure, a process, the lat-
ter, which is supposed to bridge the gap between sentence
meaning and WIS and that is allegedly totally severed from
the process (guided by the maxims) of implicature genera-
tion.
We have, so it seems, a first strong counterexample to the
idea that (once fixed the reference for indexical elements)
disambiguation is a sufficient condition for the determina-
tion of a full proposition. It seems clear from example (14)
that the process of disambiguation can be itself guided by
the same processes which guide the generation of implica-
tures.
This gives rise to the so-called ’Grice’s Circle’, which will
be one of the topic of the next chapter.
Let’s briefly turn to example (15): once fixed the refer-
ence for the proper name ’Paul’46 it is hard to acknowl-
edge that what we are facing is a complete proposition.
For to say that Paul’s book is amazing is not only to say
something about a particular book (that it is amazing) but
45 Carston (2002): 97.
46 Irrespective of the issue of the semantics for proper names as rigid
designators or abbreviations for definite descriptions.
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also to acknowledge a certain relation between Paul and
the book, a relation triggered by the genitive construction
and which must be specified according to contextual con-
sideration. Is the book the one owned by Paul, written by
Paul, borrowed from the library by Paul, and so on... A
possessive sentence like (15) means something like: there
exists a book which bears the relation R to (the referent
of the name) John and which is amazing. In a formal way,
the Logical Form of the sentence expressed by (15) is some-
thing of the following sort:
(15.1) ∃x(book(x)∧ R(x,Paul)∧ amazing(x))
The value (that is, in semantics, the meaning) of the re-
lation R has to be contextually supplied. On the one hand,
it is impossible to claim that the contextual instantiation of
such relation is a case of implicature, since there is no com-
plete proposition expressed (what is said) from which the
implicature can be carried, before the instantiation of the
relation. On the other hand, a principle of best fit, likely
guided by Grice’s principle of cooperation and maxim of
relation, is at work for the job of instantiation of the free
variable R and, accordingly, for the full proposition to be
expressed. Here is another case in which for WIS to be
elaborated it is necessary to resort to the kind of processes
allegedly limited to the generation of implicatures.
I will turn back to these and similar examples in the next
chapter. What these two examples show, however, is that
there is a very well recognizable problem of context depen-
dence also for filling the gap between sentence meaning
and WIS. It is now clear that such gap is not as minimal
as it has been claimed by Grice and that it requires to be
filled by a set of contextual considerations which seem to
be guided by the same principles which in fact guide the
process of generation/calculation of the implicature. How
it is possible to adjust Grice’s picture in order to deal in a
more convincing and sophisticated way with these kind of
phenomena is the topic of the next chapter.
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1.5 summary
For the time being, let’s sketch a summary of the results
reached in the present chapter. As a starting point, we
considered Grice’s contribution to the theory of meaning
in his 1957 paper. As I have noticed, this paper makes an
opening to an intention-based analysis of linguistic mean-
ing. This seminal view is also ’inferential’, since it is mainly
interested in the inferential job the hearer is supposed to
perform in order to go back to speaker’s intentions behind
his use of a certain sentence. Grice’s work was oriented
to stress the role of intentions in communication and, at
the same time, to sharply distinguish the contribution of
the inferential intention-based job from the conventional
aspect of meaning.
In the Harvard William James Lectures, such analysis is
developed in an articulated theory of linguistic communi-
cation, where the intention-based approach is grounded in
a more general theory of rationality and cooperativeness
and four groups of maxims allegedly regulating commu-
nication are stated by Grice and it is claimed that all non-
conventional, i.e. conversational, effects are traceable back
to the violation or to the exploitation of a certain maxim or
of the more general cooperative principle.
Even if it is likely that Grice’s main concern was to clear
the confusion arising in philosophical arguing between strict
logical relations (like entailment, contradiction, etc...) and
those relation whose nature is not logic but only conversa-
tional, and to claim that the former, but not the latter, are
relevant in philosophy, while conversational relations (like
implicatures) represent the source of incorrectness and fal-
lacy in many philosophical arguments47, however, his work
has been almost uniquely influential in the field of Prag-
matics of language and communication. Examples of con-
versational implicatures have been provided and discussed,
and the distinction between generalized and particularized
conversational implicatures has been introduced.
47 See Carston (2002): 102-105.
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Furthermore, a wide discussion has been introduced about
the very notion of what is said. What is its theoretical util-
ity for Grice? Why has it been introduced and so sharply
severed from other levels of meaning? Is it possible to
support such rigid picture? Such questions have been ad-
dressed carefully, always keeping an eye on the examples.
Starting from the case of so-called conventional implica-
tures, it has been demonstrated that such alleged pheno-
menon can be utterly questioned and also eliminated from
our picture of communication. Bach’s analysis, which has
been explained in certain detail, shows that conventional
implicatures, instead of being an hybrid, hardly treatable
element between sentence meaning and implicatures are in
fact part of what is said, which is then enriched in a way
which, though minimal, was not predicted by Grice.
Moreover, I explained Grice’s view concerning the dis-
tinction between sentence meaning and WIS and analyzed
the sort of processes which, according to Grice, are neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for sentence meaning to ex-
press a complete proposition. Such processes of contextual
filling are disambiguation and indexical resolution, and are
intended to keep to a minimum the role which the context
has to play for the determination of the semantic content.
Such role has to be one which is clearly recognizable, inso-
far as it is a form of linguistically controlled contextuality.
Such idea has been eventually threatened by a pair of ex-
amples in the final section of the present chapters. What
these examples shows is that disambiguation and reference
assignment are in many cases not by themselves enough
for a complete proposition to be expressed. By contrast, it
seems that the same processes of contextual exploitation of
what is said which are in play for the generation of impli-
catures have a role to play for the determination itself of
propositional content, i.e. of what is said. Such examples
have been used as a bridging point towards the next chap-
ter, which will be entirely devoted to the phenomenon of
semantic underdetermination.
2 SEMANT ICUNDERDETERM INACY
In this field, our intuitions are not just a first
shot at a theory – something like Wittgenstein’s
ladder, which may be thrown away after it has
been climbed up – but also part of what the theory
is about. And as such they cannot be neglected.
—Recanati (1989): 115.
2.1 taking stock and looking for-ward
In the previous chapter, we ploughing through Grice’s
theory of meaning and communication. It was a quite
long enterprize, which eventually led us to the acknowl-
edgment of certain deficiencies in the overall picture. We
saw that Gricean picture, however genial and influential
in its seminal intuitions, is unable to cope with a range of
phenomena, which need to be accounter for in a different
manner. These are the kind of cases where the explicit layer
of utterance meaning (what is said) is itself underdeter-
mined by the semantics of the sentence and is subordinate
to the resolution of a high degree of context-dependence:
a resolution which crucially depends on the same sorts of
processes which guide the generation of implicatures.
In the present chapter, I will introduce the semantic un-
derdeterminacy view and show that such phenomena un-
fitting with Gricean view represent in fact not only a little
exception to the Gricean scheme, but on the contrary is
almost the rule. While discussing the semantic underdeter-
minacy thesis, I will introduce in more details the distinc-
tion between Semantics and Pragmatics, and I will show to
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what extant it overlaps the distinction between what is said
and what is implicated in Gricean terms. Furthermore, a
third important distinction, the one between explicit and
implicit, will be introduced and discussed. I will show
how these three distinctions have each its theoretical im-
portance and how they eventually do not completely over-
lap. On the contrary, the however slight differences be-
tween such demarcations will be shown to be able to shed
light on the right treatment of the chosen examples. Such
distinctions will be gradually introduced through the dis-
cussion of some of the most influential extant paradigms in
the Semantics/Pragmatics interface, with a strong predilec-
tion for those paradigms which share the assumption about
semantic underdeterminacy.
I will show how the phenomenon of semantic underde-
terminacy gives rise to a sort of circularity in Grice’s view.
In order to deal with such issue I will schematically present
three possible sketchy solutions to it. Then, each potential
solution will be developed, by taking thoroughly into ac-
count some representative approaches of the three orienta-
tions.
First, I will discuss the pretty conservative hidden index-
ical view, advocated among others by Jason Stanley.
Then, I will turn to an analysis of an intermediate pro-
posal, due to Stephen Levinson. Levinson’s approach tries
to take seriously into account the circularity involved in
Grice’s theory, but to overcome it by means of a revision
of the very Gricean assumptions and conceptual tools. The
result is a theory of default interpretations which will be,
in fact, the heart of the present chapter. I will discuss in
details the variety of defaults introduced by Levinson and
I will eventually give some conclusive reason to reject his
view.
At the end of the chapter, I will outline a third, more rad-
ical approach to the problems arising from semantic under-
determinacy. This is the paradigm developed by François
Recanati and labeled as ’Truth-conditional pragmatics’.
It will become clear in the next chapter how the threads
intertwined in the wide and articulated discussion of the
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present chapter can be pulled all together in a unified the-
ory of default meanings.
2.2 the cat and the mat
I shall begin from a famous 1978 paper by John Searle,
Literal Meaning1. In this paper Searle argues that the notion
of Literal Meaning, as it is quite uncontentiously accepted,
is not as acceptable as it can seem at first glance and has
no theoretical plausibility at all. The consensus view, as
Searle outlines it, is that:
Sentences have literal meanings. The literal
meaning of a sentence is entirely determined by
the meanings of its component words (or mor-
phemes) and the syntactical rules according to
which these elements are combined. (...)
The literal meaning of a sentence needs to
be sharply distinguished from what a speaker
means by the sentence when he utters it to per-
form a speech act, for the speaker’s utterance
meaning may depart from the literal sentence
meaning in a variety of ways.2
Such a picture, according to Searle, has to be rejected,
since eventually it can be shown that there is no such no-
tion of (absolute, non-relativized) literal meaning at all.
It is easy to see that Searle’s sketch of the received view
about literal meaning closely resembles the Grice’s view
concerning the distinction between sentence meaning, what
is said and what is implicated. We can straightforwardly
paraphrase Grice and say that the literal meaning of a sen-
tence p corresponds to the conventional meaning of p, en-
riched with those minimal elements of contextuality which
contribute to provide a complete, truth-evaluable (and, ac-
cordingly, meaningful) proposition. In a nutshell, literal
1 Searle (1978).
2 Searle (1978): 207.
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meaning equates with what is said, exactly in virtue of its
close relation with sentence meaning.
But can actually such equation be plausibly maintained?
We have already seen that counterexamples to this sharp
picture are not hard to be found. However, Searle’s claim
is that such counterexamples are not so exceptional as they
can appear, but they represent in fact the rule. He calls
this idea ’thesis of the relativity of meaning’. According
to Searle, perfectly unambiguous sentences lack the condi-
tions for a unique, straightforward determination of their
meaning and truth-conditions, as far as their meaning in
conversation (their utterance meaning) can be shown to
rely on a complex sort of background assumptions, which
can by no means be fully specified. The literal, non-fi/-
gu/-ra/-ti/-ve meaning of every declarative sentence, ac-
cording to Searle, is dependent on a set of background
specifications. Searle’s celebrated example is with the sen-
tence
(16) The cat is on the mat.
Such sentence seems to have a clear literal interpretation,
one which can be roughly sketched as in Figure 2.13
Figure 2.1: ’The cat is on the mat’
However, Searle argues:
But now suppose that the cat and the mat are
in exactly the relations depicted only they are
both floating freely in outer space, perhaps out-
side the Milky Way galaxy altogether. In such
3 From Searle (1978): 211.
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a situation the scene would be just as well de-
picted if we turned the paper on edge or upside
down since there is no gravitational field rela-
tive to which one is above the other. Is the cat
still on the mat? And was the earth’s gravita-
tional field one of the things depicted in our
drawing? What I think it is correct to say as a
first approximation in answer to these questions
is that the notion of the literal meaning of the
sentence "The cat is on the mat" does not have
a clear application, unless we make some fur-
ther assumptions, in the case of cats and mats
floating freely in outer space, and though our
picture did not depict the earth’s gravitational
field, it like the sentence only has an application
relative to a set of background assumptions.
Searle is not denying that the notion of literal mean-
ing has to be utterly banished from our theorizing, how-
ever he thinks that only a restricted, relativized to a set of
background assumption, notion of literal meaning can be
maintained. What he wishes to preserve of the received
view is the useful distinction between sentence meaning
and speaker’s meaning, and the related idea that contex-
tual information can make the latter depart strongly from
the former (as in the case of implicatures). However, he
claims that a complex set of contextual information, one
which is (not in principle, but as a mere matter of fact) not
completely specifiable and accordingly does not have a se-
mantic realization in the logical form of the sentence4 is
in play also in the determination of the explicit content of
simple sentences.
We can imagine a situation like the following: A and B
both know that whenever their house-mate John goes out,
4 Searle gives two arguments against the full specification of background
assumption and its semantic realization: ’[f]irst, they are not fixed and
definite in number and content; we would never know when to stop
in our specifications. And second, each specification of an assump-
tion tends to bring in other assumptions, those that determine the
applicability of the literal meaning of the sentence used in the spec-
ification.’Searle (1978): 215.
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he takes with him its cat. In this scenario, the following
conversation takes place:
(16.1) A: Is John at home?
B: The cat is on the mat.literal meaning = Sentence meaning + back-
ground assumptions.implicature = ’John is not at home’
In such a situation, context plays, in Searle’s terms, a
double role: the first one, is to provide all background as-
sumption which are needed to set the standard scenario
(the one sketched in Figure 2.1 for ’the cat is on the mat’.
The second role the context plays (in Grice’s terms) is, given
the assumption about John’s peculiar love for his cat and
given the overt violation of the maxim of relevance, to
trigger the conversational implicature that ’John is not at
home’.
But how should we explain a phenomenon of context-
sensitivity which, according to Searle, is so pervasive in
communication and, at the same time, is different from
implicature?
Following Grice’s picture, it is clear that - apart from PCI
(as it is the case of the implicature in the example (16.1)) -
the only possible explanation for the contextual filling of a
sentence like (16) is one which resort to the notion of GCI
or of conventional implicature. But this is undoubtedly
not the case: first, there is no lexical item in sentence (16)
which triggers an implicature by virtue of its own meaning,
unless we want consider the preposition ’on’ as bearing, as
an implicature, the contextual information about the stan-
dard cat-mat space disposition. What, of course, we do not
want! Secondly, there is clearly no occurence of GCI, since
even if the standard scenario (the one in figure 2.1) is acti-
vated in the most contexts, it would be a paradox to draw
the conclusion that the ’literal’ interpretation of the sen-
tence is, in fact, an implicature. We would be left with no
clear distinction between literal and implicated meaning.
Let’s sum up the conclusions of Searle’s relativistic view:
examples of apparently simple sentences whose interpre-
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tation is ’literal’ in most of the contexts show a pervasive
phenomenon of context-dependence which can be by no
means reduced to occurrences of Gricean implicatures, be
those conventional, generalized or particularized.
The determination of literal meaning of a simple sen-
tence (or, in Grice’s terms, the determination of WIS) is
itself dependent upon a complex set of background as-
sumptions which cannot be made fully explicit and which
however affect the truth-conditional content of the uttered
sentence. All these evidences show that the conventional
(linguistic) meaning of a certain sentence strongly under-
determines the utterance meaning, not only in a way which
can be explained in terms of the exploitation of the maxims
of conversations to get non-conventional, conversational
(additional) meanings, but also in a way which is extremely
pervasive insofar as it concerns - to use a Gricean terminol-
ogy - the said itself of WIS, i.e. the explicit content of the
sentence, irrespective of implicature.
We are now face to face with the core of the problem
of semantic underdeterminacy. It has become really cus-
tomary in Pragmatics to talk about semantic underdeter-
minacy5, as a phenomenon which is extremely pervasive
in natural language and which needs to be explained in
terms which radically overwhelm or at least considerably
emend the original Gricean picture.
I began discussing John Searle’s paper, as Searle is one
of the advocates of the so-called radical underdeterminacy
view. The thesis that the literal meaning of a sentence only
determines a set of truth-conditions (or no set of truth-
conditions at all) only relative to a set of background as-
sumptions6. Searle’s view about semantic underdetermi-
nacy is radical insofar as linguistic meaning is claimed to
fail to fully determine what is said, not only in a specific
and well restricted class of examples, but for every utter-
ance. In the words of François Recanati, one of the most
5 To my knowledge, the most beautiful and extensive discussion of se-
mantic underdeterminacy is in Carston (2002): chap. 1. This is also
one of the best books ever written on the Semantics/Pragmatics and,
more specifically, explicit/implicit distinction.
6 Searle (1980): 227.
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influential supporters of radical underdeterminacy thesis
(what he calls ’Contextualism’),
semantic interpretation by itself is powerless
to determine what is said, when the sentence
contains a semantically underdeterminate expres-
sion. Now I take it that such expressions can be
found all over the place...7
This is a very strong claim, as it supports the view that
every utterance in communication expresses a proposition
whose semantic content is underdetermined by the linguis-
tic meaning of the sentence, that is to say ’the meaning
encoded in the linguistic expressions used, the relatively
stable meanings in a linguistic system, meanings which are
widely shared across a community of users of the system8’.
Also, I have started the discussion of semantic under-
determinacy wirth Searle’s paper because, whereas really
weakly, it seems to hint the idea that the psychological pro-
cess of reconstruction of the proper set of background as-
sumption is guided, at least in cases of literal uses of lan-
guage, by considerations of ’standardness’ concerning the
choice of the best fitting scenario in relation with our con-
textual knowledge of language and world.
2.3 i love you too
Following the exhaustive repartition of Carston (2002),
we can distinguish four sources of semantic underdetermi-
nacy, which are as follows:
1. Multiple encodings (i.e. ambiguity);
2. indexical references;
3. missing constituents;
4. unspecified scopes of elements;
5. underspecificity or weakness of encoded conceptual
content;
7 Recanati (2004a): 58.
8 Carston (2002): 19–20.
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6. overspecificity or narrowness of encoded conceptual
content.
As I mentioned, Grice considers only the forms of un-
derdeterminacy at points (1) and (2): that is to say, he sees
the processes of disambiguation and indexical resolution
as the only ones needed for WIS to get fully determined.
We have already seen examples where pragmatic con-
siderations of the sort of those involved in the generation
of implicatures seem to intrude the semantics also in the
case of ambiguity and reference assignment for indexical
elements.
Such pragmatic operations are much more evident in the
determination of the semantic content of linguistically un-
derdetermined sentences by virtue of sources of underde-
terminacy like (3)-(6).
So, e.g., examples (17)-(19) are cases of missing constituents,
that is to say: cases where a constituent in logical form of
the sentence is required for the utterance to express a com-
plete proposition.
(17) On the table.
(18) It’s raining.
(19) John is not strong enough.
A sentence like (17), uttered e.g. in response to a ques-
tion like ’where is Laura’s book?’, is a case of syntactic
ellipsis where the missing elements undergo a process of
mental reconstruction to get the truth-evaluable proposi-
tion that ’[Laura’s book is] on the table’. Irrespective of the
details concerning how the syntactic process of reconstruc-
tion is performed, however such process is psychologically
driven by clear pragmatic considerations. That is why it is
considered as a case of semantic underdeterminacy, even
if it pertains to the interface between syntactics and prag-
matics more than the semantics/pragmatics one.
Sentence (18), at least in normal contexts, means that it is
raining in the place where the utterance takes place. It is,
roughly, as if a hidden constituent as a variable for place
is in the logical form (that is, the deep structure) of the
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sentence and it is filled with the most suitable location in
the context. I will discuss in more details a similar view
later in this chapter.
Finally, a sentence like (19) is not completely proposi-
tional, that is to say it cannot be evaluated as true or false
until the right contextual parameter (strong enough for
what?) is supplied.
In these three examples, we have a case of missing con-
stituents (be those part of the logical form or only of the
proposition expressed, i.e. of the thought) which need to be
contextually provided for the sentence to express a com-
plete proposition. The logical form of sentences (17)-(19) is
incomplete and, accordingly, it lacks a truth-value until the
appropriate value for the missing constituent is filled into
it. This is why we can treat cases like these as examples of
sub-propositional logical form.
Consider now the following examples:
(20) Everyone isn’t hungry.
(21) I love you too.
In the first of the two above examples, it is possible to
observe the non-specificity (or, following Jay Atlas ? sense-
generality of negation, which can be taken to have wide
scope (i.e. not everyone is hungry) or narrow scope (i.e.
everyone is not hungry). We treat such cases of under-
determined meaning as occurrences of non-specific logical
form, since sentences (20) can accordingly give rise to two
different logical forms, which are as follows:
(20.1) ¬∀(x)(hungry(x))
(20.2) ∀(x)(¬hungry(x))
Example (21) is from Bach9. It is a very nice example
of semantic underdeterminacy, where the source of non-
specificity is a particular linguistic element, in this case the
particle ’too’. In example (21), the particle can have scope
9 Bach (1994): ?, who adds that this is his favourite example.
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over the entire sentence, as in (21.1), or over each different
lexical element of the utterance, as in (21.2)-(21.4):
(21.1) [I love you]x toox.
(21.2) [I]x love you toox.
(21.3) I [love]x you toox.
(21.4) I love [you]x toox.
In other cases, the encoded conceptual content of a lex-
ical item has to be pragmatically strengthened to get the
correct interpretation:
(22) I have nothing to wear.
(23) I have had breakfast.
Examples (22) and (23) normally express, respectively,
a manifest falsity and a clear truism. However, the right
interpretation (at least in the most contexts) is that the ut-
terer of (22) has nothing appropriate to wear and that the ut-
terer of (23) has had breakfast on the day of the utterance.
So in the first case, the domain over which the quantifier
’nothing’ ranges has to be restricted to a contextually de-
termined subset of the set universe. Analogously, in the
second example the time-span to which the perfect tense
refer has to be contextually supplied to cover only the day
of the utterance. Notice that a perfectly analogous sentence
like (24)
(24) I have eaten sushi.
can be perfectly appropriately uttered to mean that the
utterer has eaten sushi once in her life.
Notice, moreover, that in the above examples, the truth-
conditions of the intended sentence depart from the truth-
conditions of the alleged ’literal’ proposition expressed, so
that while, literally speaking, (22) is always false and (23)
is always true, the intended proposition can be true or false
depending on the circumstances in which the sentence is
uttered.
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Finally, there are cases where the conceptual encoded
meaning is not to be strengthened to get the intended propo-
sition, but to be accommodated or loosened to the extent
it is required from contextual evidence. So consider for
example:
(25) A: Do you want to go to the cinema?
B: I am tired.10
(26) Her face is oblong.11
In the example (25) what is communicated by B is the
implicature that she is not incline to go to the cinema. The
implicature is generated starting from WIS by B, namely
that he is tired, where the concept of ’tiredness’ has to be
contextually accommodated to get the correct interpreta-
tion i.e. - following Sperber and Wilson - ’that she is tired
enough not to want to go to the cinema. If she were ’techni-
cally’ tired, but not tired enough for it to matter, her utter-
ance would be misleading, not just by suggesting a wrong
reason for her not wanting to go to the cinema, but also by
giving a wrong indication of her degree of tiredness.12’
Analogously in example (26) a literal interpretation would
lead to an obvious falsity, while the encoded concept of ’ob-
long’ has to be taken loosely to be suitably attributed to a
human face.
I will turn back to these examples and discuss possible
accounts of explanation for each of the mentioned phenom-
ena later in the present chapter. Such overview on few ex-
amples has been only given to provide the reader some
instantiation of the taxonomy for linguistic underdetermi-
nacy sketched above.
For the time being, a bit of familiarity with these kinds
of examples is only useful for the introduction of a first dis-
cussion about the Semantics/Pragmatics distinction, which
is the topic of the next section.
10 From Sperber & Wilson (1997).
11 Carston (2002): 27.
12 Sperber & Wilson (1997): 12 (online version).
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2.4 approaching the semantics/prag-matics distinction
Let’s briefly take stock. We have seen at the end of the
previous chapter that there are counter-examples to the
Gricean picture of communication, according to which all
contextual contribution to utterance meaning, apart from
disambiguation and indexical resolution, is a matter of con-
versational implicature. The resultant view about the dis-
tinction between Semantics and Pragmatics is something
which can be put schematically in the following propor-
tion:
(27) Semantics : Pragmatics = ’WIS’ : Implicature.
This has been a hugely influential view among philoso-
phers of language and linguists. For example, one of the
most influential and discussed definition of Pragmatics is
the one by Gazdar, which explicitly states that:
(28) Pragmatics = meaning minus truth conditions13
Gazdar’s slogan obviously reflects a conception of Prag-
matics (which is of course Gricean), but - more impor-
tantly - it reflects a rigid conception of semantics as a dis-
cipline whose exclusive field of study is that of the truth-
conditional side of linguistic meaning, where truth condi-
tional meaning is considered in isolation as the formally
treatable output of syntactic rules of composition and en-
coded meaning of portions of natural language, regarded
in the same way of symbolic languages. More extensively:
The overall account is a truth-theoretically in-
terpreted formal system which is rigorously com-
positional, predicting the meaning of a compos-
ite expression solely in terms of some function
over the meanings assigned to its parts, those
meanings defined relative to a unitary and onto-
logically parsimonious truth-theoretic concept
13 Gazdar (1979): 2.
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of semantics (...). The corresponding assertion
about natural languages is that a natural lan-
guage can and should be defined on the same
pattern with only minimal extension of the un-
derlying semantic vocabulary (to worlds and
times, each world-time pair being a discrete ’in-
dex of evaluation’) to allow, for example, the
interpretation of tense as involving truth of an
assertion at some given world-time index. The
consequence of this commitment is that the rela-
tion between string, assigned structure and in-
terpretation must be direct, as in these calculi.
There is no place for an intermediate level of
representation since if there were, the concep-
tion of natural languages as sets of strings over
which inference is directly definable would no
longer be sustained. In so far as such represen-
tations are invoked in talking about meanings,
it is assumed that they are for convenience only
and are eliminable. Predictably, there is no allu-
sion to psychological properties of reasoning14.
The quotation above refers to a particular, model-theoretic
(i.e. Montagovian) account of semantics, but it shows very
well the orientation of the contemporary studies in formal
semantics.
Grice himself, as we know, wanted to preserve a inde-
pendent role for semantic analysis: this is why he imposed
a kind of Syntactic correlation contraint15 on his analysis of
WIS: ’according to which what is said must correspond to
’the elements of [the sentence], their order, and their syntac-
tic character’ (Grice (1989): 87). A definition which closely
resembles the requirement of strict semantic composition-
ality of Kempson’s passage.
I will turn back soon to the compositionality issue: obvi-
ously compositionality is very natural and well-motivated
requirement for a semantic theory, and according to many
14 Kempson (1996): 580.
15 The expression is from Bach.
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scholars there are way to preserve compositionality also
while supporting a radically underdeterminacy view16
Be that as it may, Gricean motivations are at the core of
definitions of Pragmatics as Gazdar’s. And what is central
in Grice’s sharpening the field of pragmatics is undoubt-
edly the issue of truth-conditions. Such motivation is clear
if we consider the discrepancy betweeen GCI and PCI in
Grice’s theory: while it is quite easy to agree with the
assumption that PCIs represent clear cases of implicated
meaning, something which goes manifestly beyond what
has been uttered, it is by no means equally straightforward
to view examples which involve meaning departures from
the encoded meaning of logical particles like connectives
(like in example (8)), quantifiers (as in (7)) and number
terms (like (6)) as cases of actual implicature. According to
Robyn Carston, indeed:
What appears to have bound these rather dis-
parate aspects of utterance meaning together,
and so motivated the common label of impli-
cature, was that they did not contribute to the
truth-conditional content of the utterance, that
is, the proposition it expressed, or what the speaker
of the utterance said17.
Carston’s quotation makes definitely clear another equa-
tion which is claimed by the advocates of the literal Gricean
picture: i.e. the equation between Semantics and three
16 As we will see, different paradigms have proposed solutions to the
loss of the principle of compositionality in radically underdetermined
views: according to Carston (2002: 72), we should resort to a kind
of translational - i.e. conceptual, representational - rather than truth-
conditional semantics to save the principle of compositionality as it
traditionally is formulated. A different move is to invoke a kind of
pragmatic compositionality which affect the truth-conditional content
of the sentence uttered, like in Recanati’s view (e.g. Recanati (2004a)
and ?). A third option is the one of Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics (Jaszc-
zolt (2005a)): semantic compositionality, according to this approach,
can be strictly preserved, by denying the compositional privilege of
syntax over other sources of meaning. I will discuss in details this
issues in the present and in the next chapter.
17 Carston (2004b): 65.
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other layers of utterance meaning, namely the layer of truth-
conditions, of the proposition expressed and of what is
said. To these layers, we should add, at this stage, the level
of the explicit, as opposed to the implicit (i.e. implicated)
meaning.
Semantics =
1. truth-conditional content
2. proposition expressed
3. what is said
4. explicit
Table 2.1
Following the standard Gricean (and Gazdarian) view
about the Semantics/Pragmatics distinction, we have there-
fore that Semantics is equated with points 1.-4. in the table
2.4, while the battlefield of Pragmatics is tout court equated
with the phenomenon of conversational implicature.
One could then ask whether is such picture realistic. It
would be enough to show that there are counter-examples
to the Gazdarian formula (28), that more specifically is the
same as to say that there are counter-examples to some or
all of the equation sketched in Table 2.4.
In short, to reject the Grice-Gazdar thesis is to show
that there are pragmatic phenomena which affect the truth-
conditional content of the sentence uttered and which are
not occurrences of conversational implicature.
We have already encountered examples of this kind at
the end of the previous chapter. Example (14) and (15)
are cases where Gricean allowed contextual processes lead-
ing to the determination of the truth-conditional content
(WIS), i.e. disambiguation and reference fixing, seem to be
themselves maxim-driven, that is to say such processes of
minimal contextual filling seem to be subordinate to the
same processes which guide the generation of conversa-
tional implicature. Besides these examples, I showed in the
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present chapter that the meaning of sentence in communi-
cation is - at least in the most of cases - radically under-
determined by the semantic content of the sentence. Con-
sider once again examples of semantic underdeterminacy
like (17)-(25) listed before.
In all these examples there is a manifest discrepancy be-
tween the truth-conditional content of the alleged literal
meaning (where it is possible to state one) and the in-
tended sentence. In all the cases listed above, either the
truth-conditions actually diverge (as, e.g., in (22)), or can
diverge (as in (23)), or it is impossible to ascribe to the lit-
eral sentence any truth-value at all (like in the case of (17)).
Also, if we agree with the radical underdeterminacy view
advocated by Searle, the process of understanding of in
principle any sentence is dependent upon a complex set
of background assumptions which are potentially infinite
and which strongly underdetermines the truth-conditional
content of the sentence, because, for example, the relevant
cat-mat space relationship is by all means part of the truth-
conditions of the sentence (16).
That the truth-conditionals of a sentence in isolation can
be widely different from those of the sentence uttered in a
specific context is particularly manifest in the case of clear
tautologies like (29) and (30):
(29) Now means now!
(30) War is war.
All these evidences show that, once we acknowledge the
Gricean picture and accordingly state that both (31).a and
(31).b hold:
(31) a. All pragmatically-derived (maxim-dependent)
meaning constitutes conversational implicature.
b. Conversational implicatures arise from the ap-
plication of conversational maxims to ’the say-
ing of what is said’ and so require the prior
determination of what is said18.
18 From Carston (2004b): 69.
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we are at the same time forced to recognize that there
is a circularity in the traditional definition of the Seman-
tics/Pragmatics distinction. Pragmatic processes play a
role in the determination of the truth-conditional content
of an utterance, by means of the same sort of processes
which guide the derivation of implicatures. Stephen Levin-
son is one of the theorists who acknowledged and dis-
cussed this phenomenon and he felicitously labeled it as
’Grice’s Circle’ (Fig. 2.4).
truth-conditional
 content
implicatures
Figure 2.2: Grice’s circle
Provided then that the phenomenon of linguistic under-
determinacy shows the weakness of Grice’s picture, there
are several possible solutions to escape the problems aris-
ing from the acknowledgment of Grice’s Circle.
1. One can simply reject the existence of something like
the Grice’s Circle and try to show that all the alleged
phenomena of pragmatic interference into the truth-
conditional content of a sentence can be in fact seman-
ticized and shown to be part of the (deep) syntactic
structure of the sentence. This approach is advocated
by the followers of a syntacticist or ’indexicalist’ ap-
proach to Pragmatics, like J. Kings and Jason Stanley.
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2. A different hypothesis is to recognize the existence
of Grice’s circle and accordingly try to accommodate
the Gricean picture, specifically by allowing Pragmat-
ics to intrude into the Semantics of the sentence. That
is to say: one can recognize Grice’s circle and and
claim that it is not a vicious circle and that, accord-
ingly, it does not represent a real threat to the Gricean
theory. One can go further, and suggest that the
Gricean picture can be accommodated so to success-
fully deal with the phenomenon of semantic underde-
terminacy simply by resorting to a more sophisticate
sort of the same tools which Grice himself had ini-
tially introduced. One representative example of this
approach is the one of Stephen Levinson himself.
3. A third option is to claim that the extremely per-
vasive phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy
(and the conseguent acknowledgment of Grice’s Cir-
cle) is indeed an argument to reject the Gricean pic-
ture about the Semantics/Pragmatics distinction. This
is the way followed under different theoretical as-
sumptions by Relevance theorists and by François Re-
canati in the foundation his Truth-conditional prag-
matics.
Let’s analyze these three options in the specific.
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2.5 stanley’s indexicalism
It is just as absurd to suppose that our
conception of semantics should be modified to
account for every communicative action which
involves the use of language.
—Stanley (2007): 46.
2.5.1 Syntax, semantics and logical form
In the Gricean picture, the only form of contextual filling
of the logical form of the sentence is relative to disambigua-
tion and reference assignment. That is, in reaching full
propositionality for a sentence uttered, context provides
evidences for choosing the relevant grammatical structure
and for appropriately resolve the reference of indexical el-
ements.
According to Grice, this is a semantic job, since this
kind of processes are directly controlled by the grammati-
cal structure of the sentence or by elements in the linguis-
tic form of the sentence. Besides being linguistically con-
trolled, such processes are also linguistically mandatory,
since in many cases there is no proposition expressed at all
before these two jobs are performed.
These are the central motivations for Grice to allow such
determinate, minimal processes of contextual instantation
to be part of the job of semantics. This is also, as we noted,
a very conservative variety of semantics, one which allows
to have a very neat and formally easily treatable concep-
tion of semantic structure (and of logical form of the sen-
tence), sharply severed from the pragmatic contribution
to utterance meaning which, in Grice’s view, is also quite
straightforwardly treatable insofar as it is acknowledged
as maxim-driven.
Semantically, we have then two roles that the context can
play:
1. grammatical role of context;
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2. truth-conditional role of context19.
The first one is added to the utterance to get the appro-
priate logical form (corresponding to the Gricean process
of lexical and structural disambiguation), while the second
is in play in the reference assignment to pronominal ele-
ments to get a truth-evaluable item.
Following the terminology of François Recanati (e.g. Re-
canati (1989), 2004b, 2004a), we can label the process con-
trolling the truth-conditional role of context as saturation,
insofar as it provides an assignment for the open slots in
the semantic structure of the sentence which linguistically
require contextual instantiation.
Now, Stanley’s claim is that saturation is the only pro-
cess involved in the explanation of all contextual effects on
the truth-conditional content of the sentence.
Advocates of the semantic underdeterminacy view taught
us that there truth-conditional content can be affected by
pragmatic processes of the sort of those involved in the
derivation of implicature. Stanley contrasts this conclusion
and argue that such alleged pragmatic effect can in fact
be semanticized by showing that they can be traceable to
syntactic elements in the logical form of the sentence.
Stanley’s view is, in his own words, very conservative
about semantics: despite he shares with theorists of the
semantic underdeterminacy view the idea that semantics
interprets not context-invariant sentences in isolation but,
rather sentences relative to a context (a rich semantics, as
we could call it), however Stanley claims that such view
of semantics overlaps with Grice’s conception of semantics
according to which ’semantics concerns truth-conditions20’
and it is the input for pragmatics.
Stanley’s thesis is ’that all truth-conditional effects of
extra-linguistic context can be traced to logical form21’. One
important assumption of Stanley’s view concerns the no-
tion itself of logical form: he declares to be an advocate of a
19 See Stanley (2007): 37 and 78-80. A it is noted also by Stanley (2007: 130
fn. 7) the grammatical role of context corresponds to the pre-semantic
role of context as acknowledged by John Perry ,e.g. (2001): 40 ff.
20 Stanley (2007): 33.
21 Stanley (2007): 30.
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descriptivist conception of logical form22: according to Stan-
ley, ’[t]alk of logical form in this sense involves attributing
hidden complexity to sentences of natural language, com-
plexity which is ultimately revealed by empirical inquiry23.’
There is, it is claimed, a deep syntactic structure of the sen-
tence, which is different from the surface structure, and
which contains elements sensitive to the contexts. In this
view, all ’the effects of context on the truth-conditional in-
terpretation of an assertion are restricted to assigning the
values to elements in the expression uttered,24’ elements
which are syntactically realized in the ’real’ structure of
the sentence.
Stanley’s strategy consists in rejecting that the alleged
cases of semantic underdeterminacy are in fact cases in
which a pragmatic contribution to what is said is in play to
get the complete propositional form. In each case, Stanley
argues, it is possible to show that there is a variable in the
logical form of the sentence which undergoes a process
of contextual instantiation which is perfectly analogous to
those in action in the process of saturation (i.e. indexical
resolution).
Consider sentence like (18), repeated here as (32):
(32) It’s raining.
According to Stanley, an advocate of free pragmatic con-
tribution to the truth-conditional content of the sentence
should, in this case, postulate an unarticulate constituent
in the structure of the sentence, according to the following
definition:
22 As opposed to the revisionary view about logical form, which is the
logicistic (Frege, Russell) claim that natural language is defective and
ambiguous in many ways and needs to be regimented to reach the
purposes of objectivity of mathematical and scientific knowledge.
23 Ibidem.
24 Stanley (2007): 34.
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definition of unarticulate constituent (uc)
x is an unarticulated constituent of an utter-
ance u iff
1. x is an element supplied by context to the
truth-conditions of u, and
2. x is not the semantic value of any con-
stituent of the logical form of the sentence
uttered25.
Assuming a covert temporal variable t for time, in an UC
account a sentence like (32) would be analyzed as follows:
(32.1) ’It is raining(t)’ is true in a context c if and only
if the denotation of ’rains’ takes <t,l> to the
True, where l is the contextually salient loca-
tion in c.
The problem with this analysis is that in a sentence like
(32.2), it fails to predict the most salient interpretation:
(32.2) Every time John lights a cigarette, it rains.
The natural interpretation for (32.2) is obviously as fol-
lows:
(32.2.1) For every time t at which John lights a cigarette,
it rains at t at the location in which John lights
a cigarette at t.
However, following to the UC analysis, it is impossible
(according to Stanley) to get the natural interpretation. To
the contrary, the only possible interpretation made possi-
ble by UC is the minimally salient (although not impossi-
ble26) reading (32.2.2):
26 For, as Stanley writes, ’suppose that John is a mad scientist, who has
established a connection between his cigarette lighter and a certain
location l, such that whenever he lights a cigarette with it, it rains
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(32.2.2) For every time t at which John lights a cigarette,
the denotation of ’rains’ takes <t,l> to the True,
where l is the contextually salient location in
the context of utterance of [(32.2)].
Contrary to the assumption of the UC view, Stanley sug-
gests that if a hidden variable realized in the logical form
of the sentence is also postulated for place (and not only
for time) we would be able to straightforwardly get both
the possible readings.
One possible option is to assume that, instead of in-
troducing a couple of variables (both for time and place)
’rains’ introduces a hidden event variable, ’which can ei-
ther be bound as in [(32.2.1) (the natural interpretation for
(32.2))], or free, as in [(32.2.2)]27’.
In this case, the semantic representation of (32.2) would
be as in (32.2.7)28
at location l. In this situation, standing at location l, [(32.2)] may be
uttered with the interpretation as in [(32.2.2)]. Stanley (2007): 52 fn.
29.
27 Stanley (2007): 53.
28 Stanley (2007): 258. Notice that the alternative option, i.e. to postulate
an hidden variable for place in addition to the one for time is rejected
insofar as it is objectionable. In fact, Recanati (2004a: 109-111) objected
to Stanley’s analysis that if we consider the following example
(32.2.3) Everywhere I go, it rains
we are forced, in Stanley’s view, to acknowledge that the variable l
for place is present also in the sentence ’it rains’ uttered in isolation.
However, Recanati objects, according to his ’variadic analysis’, it is the
sentence modifier itself ’Everywhere I go’ which ’contributes both the
expansive (adicity-increasing) variadic function and the operator which
binds the extra argument-role’ (Recanati (2004a): 111). Accordingly,
Recanati claims, the correct semantic representation of (32.2.3) is as in
(32.2.4):
(32.2.4) [For every place l such that I go to l](in l (it rains))
where the operator in square brackets operates on the sub-formula
(in l (it rains)), while the simple formula ’it rains’ does not contain
a free bindable variable l for place. However, in the event-analysis
supported by Stanley this problem is not more present, as the proper
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(32.2.7) ∀e(John lights a cigarette at e→ rains(e))
Stanley’s strategy should be now quite clear: under the
’quite innocent29’ assumption (labeled as Binding Assump-
tion) that ’for explicit quantifier expressions, within a clause,
semantic binding and syntactic binding coincide30’, i.e. that
’there is no binding without a bindable variable31’ in the
’real’ logical form of the sentence, the strategy of UC ad-
vocates and, more generally, of advocates of any kind of
free pragmatic enrichment to the logical form of the sen-
tence (i.e. to the truth-conditional content) is rejected by
showing that it is possible to build situations in which the
alleged unarticulate constituent is in fact controlled by an
operator in the sentence. This fact is claimed to prove that
such constituent is indeed articulate, and is in fact present
in the hidden logical structure of the sentence.
The indexicalist approach is quite the same in cases of
sub-propositional logical forms like (19): in such cases, as
in the case of (18) the relevant comparison class is claimed
to be provided by a hidden indexical in the logical struc-
ture of the sentence by showing that it is, in the same way
as in (32.2), bindable by an operator in the sentence. Anal-
ogous strategies are followed in the other cases of semantic
underdeterminacy of the taxonomy presented above, and
especially in cases of quantifier domain restriction as in
(22)32.
representation of (32.2.3) is either as in (32.2.5) or as in (32.2.6) (from
Stanley (2007): 258):
(32.2.5) ∀x∀e(e is a goint to x byme→ (rains(e)))
(32.2.6) ∀x(I go to x→ ∃e(rains(e)∧At(x, e)))
29 Stanley (2007): 48.
30 Ibidem.
31 Recanati (2004a): 110.
32 See Stanley & Szabó (2000)
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2.5.2 Some objections
A number of objections has been moved against the hid-
den indexical view advocated by Stanley (and also by King).
One important objection, which I already mentioned, is
due to François Recanati. According to Recanati, the over-
all indexicalist strategy rests on a fallacy which he labels
’Binding Fallacy’. In Recanati’s view, as we already have
seen in the case of a sentence like (18) (see footnote 28) the
idea that there are always empty slot in the logical form
to be contextually saturated is strongly undermined by the
consideration that such slots are in fact generated only in
presence of a sentence modifier introducing what he calls a
variadic function33. In the absence of such predicate mod-
ifiers, the relevant slots are absent (e.g. the slot for loca-
tion in the ’raining’ sentence), therefore a hidden indexical
analysis cannot be invoked where sentences are uttered in
isolation and not bound by a sentence operator. This is
why the indexicalist argument is eventually fallacious.
However, Recanati’s argument suffers of a double weak-
ness: first of all, it depends on the acceptance of the vari-
adic analysis for predicate modifiers and secondly, it can
be bypassed by claiming that predicates standardly intro-
duce an event variables (which include quantification over
times, locations, etc..) rather than a number of free slots
for each optional argument.
All in all, I think that the best argument against the hid-
den indexicalist view is that such account lacks a unitary
principle of treatment for the whole case study. In par-
ticular, it is always up to the indexicalist to show that an
alleged case of semantic underdetermined sentence has an
appropriate semantic representation involving free slots in
the syntactic structure. To use the words of Kasia Jaszczolt,
it seems that, in each case, ’the onus of proof lies on the
33 Roughly, a variadic function is a function which, in presence of a pred-
icate modifier (adverb or prepositional phrase), takes as input the orig-
inal relation and gives as output the same relation with a different
adicity, i.e. an increased or decreased amount of argument-roles. See
Recanati (2004a): 107-109.
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advocates of syntactic slots and there has not as yet been
any successful proof provided34’.
Moreover,
[O]ne can be semanticizing meaning without
ascribing all of it to syntax. The diverence is
not merely terminological: Stanley, Szabò, and
King talk about a rich semantic content, not just
semantic content that can be ascribed on the ba-
sis of the sentence alone. So, they want to have
their cake and eat it: they want a rich semantic
content, that is they want more than the sen-
tence but at the same time they want to call it
a sentence, a unit of syntax. One may wonder
for what purpose they make this move. After
all, semanticizing meaning (having rich seman-
tics) can be achieved in more intuitively plausi-
ble ways in dynamic semantic theories35.
2.6 three levels of meaning. levin-son’s default interpretations
In the previous section, I have sketched in some details
the the syntactic approach to the issue of semantic under-
determinacy. According to the view of Jason Stanley, for
example, there is no question about Grice’s circle, exactly
insofar as ’all truth-conditional effects of extra-linguistic
context can be traced to logical form’ and are then inte-
grant part of the Semantics, and by no means of the Prag-
matics, of the utterance.
However, semanticizing the truth-conditional import of
context and accordingly getting rid of the entire phenomenon
of semantic underdeterminacy at all is not the only possi-
ble alternative to escape the circularity involved in Grice’s
circle. Another possible solution is trying to refine Grice’s
own view and to articulate a more fine-grained picture of
34 Jaszczolt (2005a): 15.
35 Jaszczolt (2005a): 15–16.
62 semantic underdeterminacy
communication, one capable of explaining the spectrum of
phenomena of semantic underdeterminacy.
In the account of Stephen Levinson such goal is (allegedly)
achieved by making use of a much more sophisticated ver-
sion of the same theoretical tools which were first intro-
duced by Grice himself.
2.6.1 GCI and the three heuristics
According to Levinson, ’Grice was essentially correct in
thinking of meaning as a composite notion; that is to say,
he correctly considered that the full import of an utterance
could only be captured by distinguishing many different
kinds of content’. However, his originar distinction be-
tween sentence meaning and speaker’s meaning (see Fig-
ure 1.1) is inadequate for the purpose of appropriately de-
scribing the such components of meaning, as it does not
exhaust components needed to a correct analysis of mean-
ing.
Grice’s picture is indeed open to objections and it seems
untenable when faced with the phenomenon of semantic
underdeterminacy because it involves the sort of vicious
circularity which is manifest in Grice’s Circle (Figure 2.4.
However, Levinson claims, once we acknowledge that
the shaped division of meaning levels ought to be relaxed
to allow for a new layer, the difficulty of Grice’s Circle im-
mediately disappear and it is possible to cope with seman-
tic underdetermined sentences in a straightforward way.
In Levinson’s view, the two-levels view advocated by
Grice, although of course responding to reasonable crite-
ria of methodological parsimony, is inadequate and poten-
tially pernicious, insofar as it ’underestimates the regular-
ity, recurrence, and systematicity of many kinds of prag-
matic inferences36. The idea is that a division which en-
tails only a level of sentence-meaning, based on the con-
ventional meaning of the words together with a standard
compositional semantics, and a level of speaker’s mean-
ing, based on the recovery of the intentions behind the
36 Levinson (1995): 93.
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speaker’s uttering a certain sentence, fails to acknowledge
a fundamental and neglected level of communication, that
is
a level of systematic pragmatic inference based
not on direct computations about speaker-inten-
tions but rather on general expectations about
how language is normally used. These expec-
tations give rise to presumptions, default infer-
ences, about both content and force37.
.
According to Levinson, to introduce this third layer of
meaning is essentially to develop Grice’s original notion
of Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI). Grice in-
troduced this kind of implicature, but failed to fully de-
velop its theoretical import and utility. To repeat, GCI ’are
the sort of implicatures which are ’normally’ triggered in
almost all context of utterance by virtue of ’the use of a
certain form of words in an utterance ... (in the absence
of special circumstances)’. This is, plainly, a definition of
a kind of standard mechanism of pragmatic enrichment
of the conventional meaning of certain expressions, such
as logical connectives and quantifiers, number words, etc...
However, Grice did not insist on the systematic nature of
such inferences, which is on the contrary the main purpose
of Levinson’s account.
To clarify the regularity with which such implicatures
are generated, let’s consider the following example:
(33) Two possible contexts for B’s utterance(-form):
(a) Context 1.
A: ’What time is it?’
B: ’Some of the guests are already leaving?’
PCI: ’It must be late’
GCI: ’Not all the guests are already leaving’
(b) Context 2.
A: ’Where’s John?’
37 Ibidem.
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B: ’Some of the guests are already leaving?’
PCI: ’Perhaps John is already leaving’
GCI: ’Not all the guests are already leaving’
What example (33) shows is that GCIs can coexist with
PCIs, but that - unlike PCIs - the non-truth conditional con-
tribution to the utterance meaning which GCIs provide re-
main unchanged, irrespective of the shift of context.
If Grice failed to acknowledge the utility of GCI, accord-
ing to Levinson
Its utility lies precisely in the idea that cer-
tain linguistic expressions will tend to be asso-
ciated with specific pragmatic inferences across
a broad range of contexts, so that these associ-
ated inferences can be predicted in a systematic
way, and play a systematic role in shaping pat-
terns of lexicalisation and grammaticalisation.
Levinson claims that Grice was essentially right in claim-
ing that the correct analysis of such phenomena of stan-
dard enriched meaning is in terms of implicature and should
not be confused with the conventional meaning of certain
expressions (e.g. connectives, numerals, etc...). Although
these expressions are so regularly associated with the rele-
vant generalized implicature, ’it is the regularity of associ-
ation that makes the confusion so tempting’.
However, Grice’s main omission was to sacrifice an im-
portant theoretical distinction on the altar of methodolog-
ical parsimony. In fact, though being implicatures and
not be passible of being semanticized, GCIs require a fur-
ther bifurcation at the level of utterance meaning in or-
der to be successfully treated. Such bifurcation calls into
account the type/token distinction, firstly introduced by
Charles Peirce. One thing, Levinson argues, is utterance-
token meaning, that is the utterance of a specific sentence
as it is used in a specific context by a specific speaker. Such
is the level of Grice’s speaker’s meaning, a level at which
PCIs are generated and at which the speaker’s intentions
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behind her uttering a certain sentence are in play for the
determination of the overall communicated message. An-
other thing, by contrast, is the utterance-type meaning. It is
at this stage, independent of a computation of speaker’s in-
tentions as triggered by specific contexts of utterance, that
GCI arises.
With this move, we are left with the possibility of pre-
serve an independent layer for conventional, sentence mean-
ing38 and with an independent level of PCI. In addition,
there is a middle level - i.e. a level of systematic pragmatic
inferences which, in absence of contrasting evidences39,
are generated in every context though not being part of
the conventional meaning - at which all the phenomena of
pragmatic enrichment to sentence meaning which are not
occurrences of PCI belong.
That is to say, a level at which an analysis of semantic
underdetermined meanings can be given in purely Gricean
terms (See Figure 2.3).
Communicated meaning
1. Sentence Meaning Utterance meaning
2. Utterance-type mean. 3. Utterance-token mean.
(Grice’s speaker’s mean.)
Figure 2.3: Levinson’s three levels of meaning
38 However, a further bifurcation between sentence-type and sentence-
token meaning is always possible, and it roughly corresponds to
Gricean distinctio between un-saturated/saturated sentence meaning.
39 Indeed, insofar as they are implicatures, GCIs have the property of
cancellability.
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The natural question is then: what guides the genera-
tion of GCI? What makes such kind of implicature a case
of ’presumptive’ meaning and, accordingly, of systematic
inference? According to Levinson, Grice’s maxims are not
sufficient to account for the regular nature of GCI.
According to Levinson, the crucial move is to change our
view about Grice’s conversational maxims.
Instead of thinking about them as rules (or
rules of thumb) or behavioral norms, it is useful
to think of them as primarily inferential heuris-
tics which then motivate the behavioral norms40.
When regarded as inferential heuristics, it is possible to
see ’that some of the maxims and not others have a special
status as inducers of GCIs’.
Two main arguments are given by Levinson in support
of this view: first, the problem of the ’bottleneck of hu-
man communication’ and secondly, the ’logical problem of
reconstructing speaker’s intentions41’.
According to the first issue, once we focus our attention
on the incredible efficiency of human communication, i.e.
’the specialised physiology, the neurological pathways and
the learning abilities that support the structural complex-
ities of language, and above all the sheer miracle of the
apparent speed and effortlessness whereby communicative
intentions are encoded in articulatory gestures and acous-
tic signals converted into meanings’, it is natural to ac-
knowledge for a deep mismatch between such outstand-
ing speed and efficiency and the incomparable slowness of
the articulation process. In a slogan: ’we can think faster
than we can speak’, and moreover ’the psycholinguistic
evidence seems to suggest that all the other processes in
the entire complex chain of production and comprehen-
sion systems could run three to four times faster than the
normal pace dictated by the articulation process42’.
Hence, Levinson concludes:
40 Levinson (2000): 35.
41 Levinson (2000): 30
42 Levinson (1995): 96.
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It is this mismatch between articulation rates
on the one hand, and the rates of mental repa-
ration for speech production or the speed of
speech comprehension on the other hand, which
points to a single fundamental bottleneck in the
efficiency of human communication, occasioned
no doubt by absolute physiological constraints
on the articulators43.
Closely related to this issue, there is the problem of re-
constructing speaker’s intention. Such problem, as already
noted, is implicit in Gricean view. From a logical point of
view, an intention-based approach to meaning in conversa-
tion can be analyzed in the same terms as a standard logic
of action or practical reasoning: ’we observe the behavior
and figure out the underlying intention by the same rules
that we convert intentions into the actions that will effec-
tuate them’44. The problem is that, when seen from the
point of view of the hearer, the operation of reconstruction
of such sort of practical reasoning can hardly be claimed to
be realistic, and it is in fact impossible in principle. This is
due to the fact that it is impossible for the hearer to ’work
backwards from a conclusion to the premises from which it
was deduced’ as ’there is always an infinite set of premises
which might yield the same conclusion’.
Levinson’s argument is that it is no more possible to
support a standard Gricean view, since it is radically un-
dermined by these two abovementioned related issues. On
the other hand, if we had a default mechanism which al-
lows an interpreter to bring into the understanding of any
minimal piece of coded message any kind of background
knowledge and to accordingly to remarkably increase the
informativeness of the message itself, we would have the
possibility to find a solution to the mentioned problems
43 Levinson (2000): 28. See also Levinson (1995): 96. ’Although we may
admire the rich monosyllables of husband-wife communication, the
process of recovery of nonce speaker–meaning generally guarantees
neither speed nor reliability.
44 Levinson (2000): 30.
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and eventually ’to overcome the limit on the rate of encod-
ing45’.
Such standard patterns of inference which work as de-
fault inducers of GCIs are mutuated from Grice’s first and
second Maxim of Quantity and from the Maxim of Man-
ner46. As implicatures, Levinson’s default GCIs are cance-
lable given relevant clues in discourse. However, the main
point is that, given the three heuristics, they arise automat-
ically and without any inferential process47.
Here are Levinson’s three heuristics:
levinson’s three heuristics
first (q-) heuristic
• What isn’t said, isn’t.
second (i) heuristic
• What is expressed simply is stereotypically exempli-
fied.
third (m) heuristic
• What is said in an abnormal way isn’t normal.
The first heuristic is responsible for scalar implicature
and, in general, to implicatures where the correct inter-
pretation ’depends crucially on a restriction to a set of
salient alternates48’. In such contexts, what the heuristic
prescribes is that, relative to the relevant alternates, what
is not said is not the case. So, for example, a case like (7),
which triggers the scalar implicature from ’some’ to ’not
all’ is induced by the Q-Heuristic. The Q-Heuristics works
45 Levinson (2000): 31.
46 See p. 12.
47 Although the heuristics give rise, in Levinson’s terms, to the relative
Q-, I- and M- inferences, nonetheless such label is not to be intended in
the sense of a process. On the contrary, these are automatic, effortless
’inferences’.
48 Levinson (2000): 36.
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the same way for most of the logical vocabulary, by intro-
ducing default inferences of the mentioned sort (e.g. con-
nectives, quantifiers, modals...). Analogously, in the case
of property which are ’extensionally compatible’, the Q-
Heuristics works to exclude some logically admissible im-
plications. So, for example, in a case involving reference to
colors, like (34):
(34) Her dress was red.
on the assumption of a Q-Inference it is conveyed that
the relevant dress is not also blue or yellow.
The third heuristic relates to the relation between marked-
ness of the used expression and non-stereotypicality of
the situations described. Consider, for example, the dif-
ferences between the two sentences of example (35):
(35) a. Bill stopped the car.
b. Bill caused the car to stop.
In such case, ’use of a periphrastic alternative to a simple
causative verb [in (35).b] suggests some deviation from the
expected chain of events49’.
2.6.2 Intrusive constructions
I will now shortly focus on the second (I)-Heuristics. In
the example (35).a the use of an unmarked expression in-
duce the GCI that the car was stopped in the stereotypical
manner (i.e. with the foot pedal).
Let’s once again Searle’s example of the cat and the mat
(example (16)). Radical relativity of meaning, in Searle’s
terms, or radical semantic underdeterminacy view, in stan-
dard words, suggests that the interpretation of such exam-
ple, when uttered in a specific context, is underdetermined
by the semantics of the sentence, at least for what concern
the interpretation to give to the particle ’on’. Searle sug-
gests that a set of possible scenarios are compatible with
49 Levinson (2000): 39.
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the ’literal meaning’ of the sentence (16) and that, accord-
ingly, also for the determination of such literal interpreta-
tion it is necessary to resort to a complex set of background
assumptions.
As I noticed incidentally, Searle seems to hint the idea
that, at least in cases of relatively simple and unmarked
sentences, the ’standard’ interpretation seems to be reached
following some vague criteria of ’standardness’.
Now, provided Levinson’s second heuristics, we are in
the position to concretize such suggestion, so that the lit-
eral meaning of a sentence like (16) and the subsequent
standard interpretation of the cat-mat spatial disposition
is no more a mystery but is straightforwardly obtained as
a default I-Inference.
Given the unmarkedness of a sentence like (16) we have
thus a simple explanation for the automatic ruling out of
the counterintuitive interpretations imagined by Searle.
Given Levinson’s second heuristic, such interpretations
simply cannot arise!
The same sort of principle governs the choice of the best
interpretation in cases like (15), repeated below as (36):
(36) Paul’s book is amazing.
The choice of the best interpretation for the genitive (the
book Paul borrowed, written, read, ... as appropriate) is re-
garded as a case of generality-narrowing and driven by the
I-Principle to get a maximally informative (i.e. stereotypi-
cal) interpretation from a minimal specification50.
But, one can object, given the specific status of GCIs as
standard implicatures, that is as inducers of default infer-
ences, why one should reject the original Gricean view that,
insofar as they are in fact implicatures, such pragmatically
derived effects of meaning are generated after the full de-
termination of what is said?
That is to say: isn’t Levinson’s argument about GCIs in-
dependent on his conclusion about Grice’s circle, and why
should the one entails the other?
50 See Levinson (2000): 37.
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To clarify this point, Levinson introduces the notion of
intrusive constructions. These are cases in which the intru-
sion of an implicature into a sub-part of a sentence seem
to require that the derivation of the implicature is needed
to develop the right truth-conditional analysis of the sen-
tence.
To explain the point, it is worth resorting to a celebrated
seminal paper by L. J. Cohen (1971). In this paper Co-
hen argues against Grice’s view on the enriched interpreta-
tions arising in contexts where a logical connective is used.
To repeat, Grice’s claim - motivated by considerations of
methodological uniformity and parsimony like his modi-
fied Ockham’s razor - was that all the non truth-functional
effects arising in the interpretation of utterances containing
occurrences of logical connectives should not be ascribed
to the semantics of these particles but, rather, have to be an-
alyzed in terms of generalized conversational implicature.
Cohen’s objection goes as follows. Consider two sen-
tences like (37).a and (37).b:
(37) a. If the old king has died of a heart attack and a
republic has been declared, then Tom will be
quite content.
b. If a republic has been declared and the old
king has died of a heart attack, then Tom will
be quite content.
The two sentences of example (37) are of the form
(37.1) a. (p∧ q)→ r
b. (q∧ p)→ r
Given the truth-functional definition of the connective
∧ sentences (37).a and (37).b are truth-conditionally equiv-
alent. However, it is easy to acknowledge that the two
utterances can differ in their truth-conditions. In particu-
lar, given the additional temporal ordering and causal link
between the two conjuncts of the antecedent, it is possible
to imagine a situation in which the first sentence is true,
while the second is false, and vice versa.
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The point noticed by Cohen is that the pragmatic effect
of temporal ordering and causal connection seem to affect
the truth conditional content of the two antecedents. And,
accordingly, it seems to affect the truth-conditional content
of the entire conditional. So, given a strictly compositional
analysis of the semantics of sentences involving condition-
als, an example like (37) apparently undermines the view
that what is composed, in a sentence including sentences
embedded under logical operators, are the truth-values of
such sentences obtained by the standard semantic analysis
of such operators.
However, as it has been noticed (e.g. by Wilson (1975):
151), this is the case not only for conditionals but also for
other kinds of construction like the one in (38).
(38) Driving home and drinking three beers is better
than drinking three beers and driving home.
Provided that a sentence like ’A is better than B’ would
be contradictory if A and B weren’t distinct, under the
semantic interpretation of the connective ’and’ a sentence
like (38) would express an obvious falsity. Which is patently
not the case!
Let’s make a step back to better understand the point.
It is important to recall Grice’s distinction between saying,
meaning and implicating. Grice’s notion of saying is de-
pendent on his notion of meaning something: it is impos-
sible for a speaker to say something without such saying
being (part of) what is meant by the speaker51. That of say-
ing ’is thus a notion closely aligned with what is asserted.
So, connecting this back to the definition of conversational
implicatures, we see that a conversational implicature gen-
erated by an indicative utterance is calculated on the basis
of what a speaker has asserted52’.
51 This is the reason why in Grice’s analysis, irony is regarded as an
act of ’making as if to say’: one cannot commit oneself to the said of
an ironical statement, since what is meant by it is normally just the
opposite.
52 Simons (2010): 141.
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Furthermore, given the constraint on the definition of
conversational implicature at (31).b, we know that ’conver-
sational implicatures arise from the application of conver-
sational maxims to ’the saying of what is said’ and so re-
quire the prior determination of what is said’53.
Merging together these two Gricean assumptions leads
us to the conclusion that conversational implicature cannot
arise locally, i.e. within unasserted sub-parts of a sentence,
but need to be calculated (and generated) globally, that is
to say, at the level of the whole asserted sentence.
The problem should be now clearer: if unasserted sub-
clauses of declarative utterances cannot give rise to con-
versational implicatures, how is it possible to get the cor-
rect interpretation of the sentences like (37) and (38), pro-
vided that the right interpretations of the whole sentence
crucially depend in such cases on the generation of conver-
sational implicatures at sub-sentential level?
In Cohen’s view, this kind of examples represent a con-
clusive counter-argument against Grice’s conception about
the pragmatic nature of the enriched meaning of sentential
connectives, and at the same time such examples would
lead - in Cohen’s view - to the conclusion that such en-
riched interpretation should be built-in into the semantics
of the natural language counterparts of logical connectives.
However, Levinson argues that if we are not yet com-
mitted to the idea that pragmatics cannot intrude into the
truth-conditional content of the sentence, and if we are
then prepared to reject the clause b of Carston’s defini-
tion (31), then we are in the position to reverse Cohen’s
argument and to use this sort of examples exactly to show
that pragmatics is intrusive into semantics and that such
intrusive readings are default and are in fact governed by
Levinson’s three heuristics.
53 From Carston (2004b): 69.
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2.6.3 Some objections
Consider again the effect of embedding sentences involv-
ing standard GCIs (conjunction buttressing54, standard scalar
implicature and specification of the semantics for number
terms as in examples (39), (40) and (41)) under the scope
of other sentential operators:
(39) If you have a baby and get married, then the baby
is strictly speaking illegitimate (Levinson (2000):
206)
(40) Either the guests stole some of the teaspoons, or
we didn’t have many to begin with. (Simons
(2010): 149)
(41) If each side in the soccer game got three goals,
then the game was a draw. (Levinson (2000):
205)
In each of the examples (39)-(41) the relevant GCI (from
’and’ to ’and then’, from ’some’ to ’some but not all’ and from
’twenty’ to ’exactly twenty’) has to be generated for the truth-
conditional content of the whole sentence to be determined.
In Levinson’s analysis this shows that there is indeed a
circularity between what is said and implicature. Nonethe-
less, rather than representing a threaten to Gricean picture,
this only proofs the need to introduce into this picture
the idea that pragmatics can be intrusive into semantics.
Such circularity can be successfully treated, avoiding any
’semantic retreat’ simply by acknowledge that pragmatic
intrusions are matter of GCIs and default inferences which
are driven by Levinson’s heuristics.
However, such conclusions are not as straightforward as
it can appear from my presentation above. According to
Mandy Simons (Simons, 2010) there is no need to resort
to default mechanisms to explain cases of pragmatic intru-
sion. In particular, slight modifications to Grice’s original
54 As Levinson labels the phenomenon of standard conjunction implica-
tures
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theory would work, without any commitment to automatic
processes and defaults.
Provided that ’[t]here is no reason why, as theorists, we
have to take Grice’s views as an unseparable whole’, there
is no insurmountable theoretical motivation for maintain-
ing that implicatures derive only from asserted pieces of
discourse. On the contrary, it is perfectly ’commonsensical’
to think that un-asserted subparts of complex sentences
can generate implicatures at sub-sentential level which even-
tually interact with global pragmatic considerations.
Once acknowledge that conceptual strengthening arise
locally, it is easy to see that in example like ??-(41) both
the antecedent of the conditionals and the single disjuncts
are ’visible’ to the interpreter ’as a linguistic unit with a
specific function within the discourse55.
On this account, once slightly reformulated, standard
Gricean conversational maxims can be held to guide the
process of local derivation of implicatures, without postu-
lating any additional ’default’ heuristic.
[The interpreter] seeks to assign to it an in-
terpretation which maximizes the cooperativity
of the speaker. But interpretation is not nec-
essarily linear. We need not assume that the
interpreter assigns an interpretation to the an-
tecedent entirely independently of the attempt
to make sense of the utterance as a whole. Rather,
it seems plausible that the interpreter assigns
to the antecedent an interpretation which im-
proves the overall sensibleness of the utterance
Another couple of strong objections to Levinson’s theory
are offered by Emma Borg56. Borg is an advocate of a form
of semantic minimalism which try to take seriously into
account the phenomenon of semantic underdeterminacy.
Borg’s objections are directed against respectively Levin-
son’s account of intrusive construction and his idea of de-
fault inferences.
55 Simons (2010): 157
56 See Borg (2010).
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Starting from the first objection, Borg argues that one
desideratum of any successful theory of implicature is to
find a way to accommodate ’the putative semantic (truth-
conditional) relevance of some implicatures57’ into the Gri-
cean picture.
However, Borg writes, on this specific point Levinson’s
account of intrusive construction, far from representing a
successful treatment of such kind of phenomena, runs the
risk of being a mere re-description of it58. One destitute of
any explanatory power about the phenomenon, to explain
which it has been introduced. I find such objection really
appropriate. It is undoubted that Levinson’s discussion
of intrusive constructions very much resembles a simple
taxonomy of these case study. Furthermore, beyond the ac-
knowledgment that such examples represent cases of gen-
uine GCIs, Levinson’s account of semantic analysis, which
is based on DRT, is only tentative and does not offer more
than a direction of further inquiry.
Furthermore, Borg goes on by exposing a relevant mis-
match between Levinson’s own theory and experimental
evidences. Concerning a typical case of Q-Implicature, such
as scalar implicature leading from, e.g., ’’some’ to ’not all’,
Borg writes that:
The problem is that experiments seem to show
that the logical readings of scalar implicatures
are accessed more quickly than pragmatic read-
ings, yet such findings undermine the claim that
it is the pragmatic reading which provides the
default interpretation in these cases59.
Such evidence seems to undermine the view that scalar im-
plicatures are in fact default implicatures: the fact that they
are delayed inferences, rather than effortless ones, seem to
militate in favor of a view which keeps apart ’literal seman-
tic content and pragmatically determined implicatures60’.
57 Borg (2010): 268.
58 See Borg (2010): 272.
59 Borg (2010): 272.
60 Borg (2010): 274.
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Moving on, against the very notion of utterance-type mean-
ing, which is central in Levinson’s default interpretation
view, are directed some of the objections of Anne Bezuiden-
hout61). Bezuidenhout have two main objections against
Levinson’s theory.
First, she claims that it is hard to see in which sense it is
possible to say that GCIs are associated with certain types
of expressions (utterance-type), while the case study seem
to suggest that such inferences are highly context depen-
dent.
Second, Bezuidenhout argues that one of the assumed
purposes of Levinson’s theory, i.e. that of explaining how
the theory of default interpretations and GCIs can help to
get over the ’bottleneck’ of human communication, is far
from being reached. On the contrary, she argues, there
are examples which show that the generation of multiple
GCIs leads to ’exacerbate processing difficulties rather than
alleviating them62’
However serious such objections are, I am inclined to
think that they are slightly misguided.
Let’s start from the first line of objection. Bezuidenhout
considers examples like (42), (43) and (44):
(42) John smiled at the secretary.
(43) JohnŠs book is on the table.
(44) Susan turned the key and the engine started.
These all give rise to GCIs according to Levinson’s I-
principle. In example (42), the concept of secretary is by
default restricted to that of female secretary. In (43) the
relevant relationship between John and the book is auto-
matically fulfilled. Finally, (44) is a standard example of
conjunction buttressing.
According to Bezuidenhout, Levinson’s theory of enrich-
ment to a stereotype (in case of I-inferences) can hardly be
maintained if we acknowledge that in both cases (42) and
(43) the information required to access the stereotype re-
61 See Bezuidenhout (2002)
62 Bezuidenhout (2002): 265.
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quire a knowledge of the wide context which are incompat-
ible with the stereotypical reading being associated with
simply a type of expressions. In her words:
...we have reason to think that if stereotypi-
cal information is used in the course of the en-
richment processes required by the I-Principle,
this information is not confined to stereotyp-
ical information made accessible through the
use of certain types of expressions. (...) How-
ever, if the stereotypes needed in enrichment
are independent of utterance type, this suggests
that the presumptive meanings that depend on
these stereotypes are themselves not associated
with the utterance type. And this threatens the
claim that presumptive meanings belong to a
special level of utterance type meaning interme-
diate between sentence-type meaning and speaker
meaning.
I find this line of objection a bit confused: the search for
a stereotypical reading is triggered by I-heuristic in Levin-
son’s view, but this does not mean that such stereotype is
directly associated with a lexical item or a linguistic expres-
sion. In an example like (45):
(45) Philosophers love drinking.
the narrowing of the encoded conceptual content from
’drinking’ to ’drinking alcoholics’ is stereotypical to such an
extent that it is lexicalized not only in English. In cases
like this it is possible to say that a stereotypical reading is
directly associated with an expression type.
However, this is not what is intended by Levinson’s I-
heuristic. Everything which is activated by this inferential
shortcut is a rule which roughly prescribes to search for the
most stereotypical reading (of course, in a specific context)
and then stop. The fact that such stereotypes can often be
found only by resorting to the extra-linguistic context is by
no means an objection to the existence of the I-heuristic.
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The case of conjunction buttressing ((44)) is quite anal-
ogous. Bezuidenhout notes that the same kinds of asso-
ciations which are generated by the use of the connective
’and’ are triggered also by the simple ’narrative’ juxtaposi-
tion. So an utterance like (44) generates the same (tempo-
ral/causal) connections as the utterance (46).
(46) Susan turned the key. The engine started.
As Bezuidenhout writes:
...the fact that adjoined sentences invite some
of the same inferences as conjunctions counts
against the claim that it is the connective ’and’
itself that carries the default meanings.
But, again, it is possible to say that sentences (44) and
(46) trigger the same sort of GCI in force of the same de-
fault interpretation without being forced to reject the con-
clusion that the former do so by virtue of its utterance-type
meaning. The fact that the syntactical realization of the two
sentences is different does not militate against their activat-
ing the same implicature. In both case, i.e. parataxis and
explicit conjunction, it is the same principle, namely ’the
tendency to find from minimal specifications maximally
cohesive, rich interpretations63’ which is in play.
Two sentences of different utterance-type can give rise
to the same kind of GCIs. It is true that adjunction itself
does not ’count as an utterance-type to which these GCIs
can be attached’. However, the fact that the same kind of
enrichment can be obtained by means of a stylistic device
does not block the possibility of a generalization over a
class of expression types. Moreover, we can go further and
argue that the sort of narrative juxtaposition which is in
play here standardly mirrors the utterance-type of conjunc-
tive sentences, is regularly associated with the same sort
of (at least temporal) connection between the juxtaposed
sentences and therefore represents by itself a closely rese-
bling utterance-type. In one case it is a matter of a specific
63 Levinson (2000): 126.
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expression (a connective), in another the GCI is due to cri-
teria of discourse coherence and adhesiveness. What is
central in both cases is that the heuristic works the same
way by suggesting the maximally informative interpreta-
tion (through the search for a stereotype) for the minimally
specified form.
All in all, I think that, while responses to Bezuidenhout’s
firs objection can be found, it remains nonetheless very
corrosive with respect to the claim for existence of a mid-
dle layer of meaning, while it is substantially inoffensive
against the very idea of default interpretations.
As for the second objection, Bezuidenhout argues that
in many cases potentially more than one GCI is activated.
In case of conjunction buttressing, for example, at least the
following alternative enriched readings are possible:
1. The second event is understood to be temporally con-
tained in first. For example, ’He went to London and
he saw the Queen’.
2. The two events are understood to be contemporane-
ous. For example, ’She likes to ride her bike and to
listen to her Walkman’.
3. The first event is understood to enable but not to di-
rectly cause the second. For example, ’I forgot to hide
the cake and the kids ate it’.
4. The second event is understood to come into being
as the first unfolds. For example, ’I talked to Susan
and found I liked her’.
5. The first event is the reason for the second. For exam-
ple, ’His calculator gave the answer ’3’ and he wrote
down ’3’ as his answer’.
According to Bezuidenhout
...this great variety of causal, temporal, and
justificatory understandings cannot all be de-
fault interpretations, in the sense that all these
possible enrichments are simultaneously accessed
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whenever a hearer processes a conjunction. That
would defeat the idea of a default interpreta-
tion, which presumably is meant to make pro-
cessing easier, not to add to the processing load.
So if Levinson is committed to the idea of de-
fault interpretations, he owes us an account of
which of these possible enrichments counts as
the default interpretation and why it is the de-
fault64.’
But, again, two assumptions in Bezuidenhout’s argument
are misleading. First, it is a mistake to think that a particu-
lar utterance-type deterministically activates a certain GCI.
This is not true, since the role of the heuristics in presence
of certain expressions is just to offer a shortcut to the infer-
ential job and lead to the most accessible, default reading.
Secondly, it is wrong to claim that the hearer actually
processes all the possible GCIs simultaneously. Everything
which is needed is that, in presence of certain expressions
like and-conjunction, such enrichments are in principle avail-
able to the hearer as default inferences linked to a specific
expression. Given this proviso, the search for the default is
obviously context-dependent (remember that it is nonethe-
less a matter of utterance and not of sentence type) but in
a way which is highly constrained by the utterance-type. It
is this strong constraint which is supposed to highly accel-
erate, rather than delay, the interpretation process.
Finally, one line of objection which I find really con-
clusive against Levinson’s view is due to Robyn Carston.
However, this is a meta-level objection, depending on the
acceptance of certain underlying assumptions in the theory
of communication.
We should step back to the Gazdarian definition of Prag-
matics, introduced at the beginning of the present chapter
(see (28)).
To repeat, Gazdar thesis, mutuated from Grice’s received
view, states that all the pragmatically derived aspects of
meanings are severed from the truth-conditional content of
64 Bezuidenhout (2002): 272-3
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the sentence, and specifically, are derived after the ’said’ of
what is said (semantic content) has been fully determined.
These conditions are schematically summed up by Robyn
Carston in the abovementioned constraints on the defini-
tion of conversational implicature( (31), repeated here as
(47)):
(47) a. All pragmatically-derived (maxim-dependent)
meaning constitutes conversational implicature.
b. Conversational implicatures arise from the ap-
plication of conversational maxims to ’the say-
ing of what is said’ and so require the prior
determination of what is said65.
According to Carston, it is only when one is committed
with the Grice-Gazdar thesis that the issue of Grice’s Circle
arise. In particular, Levinson’s view about intrusive con-
structions is induced by the purpose of maintaining the re-
ceived view. This is performed by slightly accommodating
the case study with a slight modification of requirement b.
in definition (47).
By attaching the notion of default to that of GCI, Levinson
is then able to fully preserve the condition a. and accord-
ingly to maintain that all pragmatic effects of meaning are
occurrences of conversational implicatures, thus support-
ing the shape distinction between truth-conditional seman-
tics and non truth-conditional pragmatics. At the same
time the idea if GCI as default interpretation ’makes it pos-
sible to preserve the essence of assumption b. since only
a very circumscribed and distinct type of pragmatic infer-
ence contributes to what is said.’ However, according to
Carston, such approach is unsatisfactory. And precisely
because it requires to split the pragmatic field into ’two
totally distinct subtheories’. And with the additional para-
dox that, to save Grice’s letter, both the subtheories are in-
volved with the same kind of phenomena (conversational
implicatures broadly conceived), while at the same time
65 From Carston (2004b): 69.
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[t]he two systems run their own distinct modes
of inference, in accordance with their propri-
etary pragmatic principles; the first is a com-
ponent of an overall theory of grammar, while
the second is simply part of general reasoning’
.
Therefore, to escape the impasse generated by Levinson’s
theory the only alternative seem to assume that there is
only one kind of pragmatic inferential principle which is re-
sponsible for both the generation of GCI and PCI. No mat-
ter about the pragmatic intrusion into the truth-conditional
content.
However, Levinson objects, this equates to a ’semantic
retreat’, since by allowing the pragmatic processes to freely
interact with truth-conditions, there is no room left for the
semantic enterprise as it is traditionally conceived.
Semantic retreat therefore has the consequence
that semantics does not look like either of the fa-
miliar, conventional, rival enterprises: it is not
about truth-conditional content on the one hand,
nor about the relations of sense that hold be-
tween sentences on the other hand. Instead, it
is exclusively about a new, strange level popu-
lated by semantic wraiths a level of fragmentary
structures, underspecification and half-informa-
tion, even archi-sememes (Atlas 1989: 146). The
recognition of the existence of this level is one
of the important sea changes in the history of se-
mantics it is real enough, but it is relative terra
incognita66.
However, Carston’s responses, one which is common in
Relevance Theory, is that it is necessary to distinguish two
senses of semantics. The first, i.e. linguistic semantics, is
concerned with ’the context-invariant meaning encoded in
the linguistic system and naturally takes its place within a
wider theory of utterance meaning67’. So, linguistic seman-
tics offer the input to pragmatics and they both outputs in
66 Levinson (2000): 241.
67 Carston (2002): 99.
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logical forms and propositions. These latters are then input
to the second kind of semantics, truth-conditional seman-
tics. Truth-conditional semantics deals with propositions
or thoughts, i.e. mental objects which are independent
from encoded meaning.
The picture we end with has a clear seman-
tics/pragmatics distinction, where semantics is
understood as tranlations of linguistic forms into
logical forms, partially articulated conceptual
representations which are the output of the gram-
mar. Natural language semantics, then, is au-
tonomous and provides the input to pragmat-
ics, which plays a major role in determining the
explicature of an utterance as well as determin-
ing implicatures, both of which are distinct and
complete propositional forms, and as such are
the domain for truth-conditional semantics68.
Be that as it may, the idea that to escape the theoretical
oddity and non-economy of Levinson’s theory it is needed
to reject the Gazdarian conception of Pragmatics seem the
only one available. In the next section, I will sketch one of
the most influential paradigms which share this assump-
tion, namely Recanati’s Truth-conditional Pragmatics.
However, from Carston’s objection it seems to follow
that we have to throw out the baby with the bath water,
that is to say, that, if we want to preserve the theoretical
uniformity of treatment without resorting to different prag-
matic machineries, we have to give up the very idea of de-
fault meanings, at all. However, as it will showed in the
next chapter, this is not the case.
2.7 tacking stock (ii)
It is maybe worth taking stock very shortly and sum up
the road I am drawing in the present chapter.
68 Carston (1988): 49.
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Let’s start from recalling the three options I presented
in section 2.469 as potential alternatives to overcome the
impasse in Grice’s theory created by the phenomenon of
Grice’s Circle.
In section 2.5 I presented a representative of the first the-
oretical possibility, i.e. the extremely conservative hypoth-
esis of hidden indexicalism advocated, among others, by
Jason Stanley.
In the previous section, I presented a detailed overview
about Levinson’s theory of GCIs, which is the most remark-
able representant of the second option, i.e. one which, al-
though acknowledging the counter-examples threatening
Grice’s theory at its heart, tries to respond to such objec-
tions, by means of a revision of Grice’s own concepts.
What I am going to present now is a really influential
variety of the third approach, i.e. the most radically re-
visionary of Grice’s received view. This approach is char-
acterized by a radical account about semantic underdeter-
minacy and is shared among philosophers of language of
different orientations: in particular, Relevance Theory and
Contextualism in philosophy of language. It is this latter
theoretical option which I am going to present here, specif-
ically in the influential and articulated version developed
since the end of the ’80s by François Recanati.
2.8 françois recanati. truth-con-ditional pragmatics
In the previous section, while analyzing Levinson’s ac-
count, I focused on one of the equations that I presented
in Table 2.470, i.e. the one between semantics and truth-
conditional content. I showed how such equation can hardly
me maintained, due to the phenomenon of the intrusion of
pragmatic elements into the truth-conditional content of
uttered sentences.
69 See p. 52
70 See p. 50.
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Approaching the problem of semantic underdeterminacy,
the French philosopher François Recanati focuses on an-
other, closely related, equation in our Table, i.e. that be-
tween semantics and Grice’s notion of ’what is said’. Reca-
nati shows how it is necessary to recast the standard con-
ception of what is said, by basing this latter on speakers’
intuitions about truth-conditions.
Recanati’s highly provocative view starts from a radical
underdeterminacy view and takes into account the psy-
chological process of recovery of pragmatically derived in-
terpretations. His approach eventually results in a theory
of ’truth-conditional pragmatics’, which allows pragmatic
processes of enrichment to freely intrude, although at dif-
ferent levels of conscious availability, into each stage of lan-
guage understanding.
2.8.1 Semantic minimalism
As I tried to show, ‘what is said’ for Grice is a crucial no-
tion, whose exact collocation in his theory is problematic.
Recanati refers to the three levels of the Gricean picture as
to the ‘basic triad’: sentence meaning, ‘what is said’, ‘what
is implicated’.
As we have seen, according to Grice, ‘What is said’ ex-
plicitly belong to the speaker’s meaning, however due to
the strict relation we pointed out to the sentence meaning,
it behaves like an hybrid element between the two sides
and seems to be a very strict neighbor of sentence mean-
ing. Grice himself focuses on this point:
In the sense in which I am using the word say,
I intend what someone has said to be closely re-
lated to the conventional meaning of the words
(the sentence) he has uttered71.
Commenting on this Gricean claim, Recanati72 argues
that different theoretical perspectives definitively depend
on the sense one wants to accord to this ‘close relation’.
71 Ivi, p. 25.
72 Recanati (2004a), p. 7.
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Schematically, there are only two possibilities: the first one
is to associate ‘what is said’ with sentence meaning against
‘what is implicated, as Grice’s quotation above seems to
suggest. The second is to link ‘what is said’ with ‘what
is implicated’ by setting them against sentence meaning.
This second reading is supported by other considerations
in Grice’s account, first of all the idea that ‘what is said’ is
part of the speaker’s meaning (Table ??).
The common name Recanati uses to refer to the set of
theories that argue for the first choice is Minimalism. The
central notion here is that of ‘minimal proposition’. Reca-
nati sketched a hypothetic (and likely too schematic) scale
of theories which go from Literalism to Contextualism73.
Minimalism, in Recanati’s terms, is concretely the first
theoretically solid and quite sophisticated variety of Liter-
alism. Recanati characterizes Minimalism as follows:
What I call ‘Minimalism’ construes the con-
straint [between sentence meaning and ‘what is
said’] very strictly: ‘what is said’, in the mini-
malist framework, departs from the conventional
meaning of the sentence (and incorporates con-
textual elements) only when it is necessary to ‘com-
plete’ the meaning of the sentence and make it propo-
sitional. In other words, the distance between
sentence meaning and what is said is kept to a
minimum (hence the name ‘Minimalism’)74.
Using a Minimalist perspective, ‘what is said’ corresponds
to the minimal expressed proposition, whose only form of
context-dependence lies in (that of ) those components of
the sentence, having a semantic value that is a parameter
rigidly referred to the context of use, i.e. to the pure index-
ical elements (demonstratives, pronouns, verbal tenses,...).
As already mentioned, Recanati calls this ‘minimal’ con-
textual-dependent process ‘saturation’. Saturation is a form
73 Ivi, p. 86. On the literalist side Recanati indicates the following scale:
Literalism, Indexicalism and the Syncretic View, while on the contex-
tualist side there is only Quasi-Contextualism and Contextualism.
74 Ivi, p. 7
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Literal Meaning

Sentence
Meaning
What is said
Literal Meaning
vs vs
Speaker’s Meaning Speaker’s Meaning

What is Said
What is
Implicated
Table 2.2
of meaning-controlled contextuality: ‘for a minimalist, the
level of WIS is determined on the basis of literal mean-
ing, flanked by contextual considerations (i.e. ‘departures’
from meaning) only to the extent to which literal meaning
itself is sensitive to the identity of this or that contextual
parameter’75. This means that the process of saturation
is ‘linguistically mandated’, that is there is a slot in the
sentence itself that has to be completed or a free variable
requiring ‘contextual instantiation’76, and whose reference
to the context is strictly driven (controlled) by linguistic
considerations (bottom-up, in Recanati’s terms77). Let’s con-
sider the example (6). In the minimalist account we have
three steps:
1. The sentence meaning: ‘x has three children’ (the in-
terpretation of the quantifier ‘three’ being the stan-
dard interpretation, i.e. ‘at least three’). This expres-
sion is not yet fully propositional, since it misses the
reference of the indexical element, which has to be
‘saturated’ with reference to the context at hand.
2. The Minimal Proposition (or ‘what is said’): ‘P has
(at least) three children’.
3. ‘What is implicated’: ‘P has (exactly) three children.
75 Predelli (2006), p. 26.
76 Recanati (2004a), p. 7.
77 Ivi, p. 18.
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2.8.2 Intuitive Truth-conditions
The crucial point Recanati is concerned with deals with
truth-evaluability. Since propositionality coincides, in Re-
canati’s view, with truth-evaluability78, the sentence at the
point 1. above has not truth-conditions at all. It is a pure
abstraction or, as Recanati says ‘a semantic schema’79. The
problems arise when we consider the truth-conditions of
2. and 3., which clearly differ. 2. can be true if the ut-
terer of (6) has three children as well as she has five, while
(47). is true if and only if the speaker has (exactly) three
children. Should we admit, as the Minimalist view seems
to suggest, that in understanding an utterance like (6) one
preliminarily deals with the alleged minimal proposition,
whose truth-conditions are not that of the intended propo-
sition? The question becomes even more urgent if we con-
sider some other examples, like (18) and (23), repeated be-
low as (48) and (49)
(48) It rains.
(49) I have had breakfast.
An utterer of (48) would say a trivial truth, since there
is always a place in the universe where it rains80. Accord-
ing to Minimalism, the correct interpretation of (48) as ‘It
rains here’ is a case of genuine conversational implicature
(arising from the violation of the maxim of quantity). Sim-
ilarly, an expression like (49), once completed by virtue of
saturation, would express the banal truth that the utterer
of (49) has had breakfast at least once in her whole life (be-
fore the time t* = the time of utterance, according to the
78 Ivi, p. 90. ‘According to Contextualism - a provocative view which
certainly deserves to be explored - there is no level of meaning which
is both (i) propositional (truth-evaluable) and (ii) minimalist, that is, un-
affected by top-down factors’ (italics added).
79 Ivi, p. 56. ‘On my view semantic interpretation, characterized by its
deductive character, does not deliver complete propositions: it deliv-
ers only semantic schemata - propositional functions, to use Russell’s
phrase’.
80 See p. 58, fn. 28
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interpretation of the verb tense81). And the contrary of ??
‘I haven’t had breakfast’ would express the obvious falsity
that the speaker has never had breakfast before the time of
the utterance.
The absurdity of such claims is self-evident. However,
it is necessary to clearly focus the point of the discussion
before giving up the Minimalist claim. Recanati’s first as-
sumption is the coincidence between propositionality and
truth-evaluability. Once a sentence is made fully proposi-
tional by virtue of the only, meaning-controlled, process
of saturation, a minimalist would say that it actually is
passable to be true or false, even if its truth-conditions
are manifestly different from those of the intended propo-
sition. This is, a minimalist suggests, a purely semantic
way to ascribe to a sentence truth-conditions. This seems
reasonable! What Recanati is concerned with is a very re-
stricted notion of truth-conditions, that is to say the notion
of intuitive truth-conditions.
I take the conversational participants’ intuitions
concerning what is said to be revealed by their
views concerning the utterance’s truth condi-
tions. I assume that whoever fully understands
a declarative utterance knows which state of af-
fairs would possibly constitute a truth-maker
for that utterance, i.e. knows in what sort of
circumstance it would be true82.
The point is crucial, since the difference between the two
notions is deeper than it could appear at first glance. So
far as we are concerned with intuitive truth-conditions we
are not dealing with an automatic, linguistic dispositive,
otherwise we are strongly dependent on the speaker’s and
hearer’s linguistic competence. This is particularly mani-
fest if we consider an example like (50).
(50) Oscar cuts the sun.
81 See Recanati (2004a), p. 8.
82 Recanati (2004b), p. 6.
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‘Without a proper background’83, Recanati writes, ‘we
are unable to specify intuitive truth-conditions for the pred-
icate ‘cuts the sun’84. The semantic and intuitive truth-
conditions in this case does not only differ, as in the exam-
ples above. In one case we do have truth-conditions (that is,
we have a meta-linguistic propriety of the proposition, de-
pending from the compositional rules of the sentence (50)),
while in the other we don’t have truth-conditions at all!
However, Recanati asks, what are actually the semantic
truth conditions of a proposition like (50). Well, provided
that there is ‘a crucial difference between ‘knowledge of
truth-conditions and knowledge that truth-conditions are
satisfied’85, the Literalist’s response will be to intend the
truth-conditions of (50) in a ‘purely ‘disquotational’ man-
ner’86: that is to say:
the sentence ‘Oscar cuts the sun’ does pos-
sess truth-conditions; such truth-conditions are
determined by a recursive truth-theory for the
language, which issues theorems such as ‘Oscar
cuts the sun is true iff Oscar cuts the sun’. We
know those truth-conditions provided we know
the language. What we don’t know, simply in
virtue of knowing the language, is a method of
verification for those truth-conditions87.
This is a purely semantic way to ascribe to a proposi-
tion truth-evaluability and it seems acceptable. Why does
Recanati insist that a notion of intuitive truth condition is
still required? The point is that truth-conditions, consid-
ered in the ‘disquotational’ sense, are merely propriety of
the propositions, insensitive of the meaning such propo-
sitions can bear in a concrete conversational exchange. ‘If
pure disquotational knowledge counts as knowledge of truth-
conditions (in a suitably weak sense), then knowledge of
83 Recanati (2004a), p. 92 (footnote 19).
84 Ivi, p. 92.
85 Ibidem, The inner quotation is from Emma Borg, ‘Saying What you
Mean’.
86 Ibidem.
87 Ibidem.
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truth-conditions (in that sense) does not count as knowledge
of meaning’88.
As it is clear from the emphasis, the point of such an ar-
gument is epistemological rather than linguistic; better, Reca-
nati argues that there is no legitimate linguistic arguments
(in the sense of the study of natural languages) without
such a reference to epistemological and psychological con-
siderations.
2.8.3 Availability approach
In introducing the scheme of Recanati’s discussion so
far, I intentionally inverted the presentation order of his
arguments. The reason for this strategy is that Recanati al-
ways starts by presenting his ‘Availability based Approach’
first, and only at a second stage explains the distinction be-
tween semantic and intuitive view on truth-conditions89. I
consider my presentation order to better serve explanatory
purposes, as once we understand that what we are con-
cerned with is a psychological notion of truth-condition,
we can appreciate the value of Recanati’s response to the
main objections of Literalism, representing a response aim-
ing to have psychological plausibility.
The point of the ‘availability based approach’ is that what
is said ‘corresponds to the primary truth-evaluable repre-
sentation made available to the subject (at the personal
level) as a result of processing the sentence’90. Let’s re-
call the example (6). In a minimalist account the mini-
mal proposition expressed by the utterer of (6) is, as we
have seen, the proposition that ‘I have at least three chil-
dren’. This minimal proposition corresponds to ’what is
88 Recanati (2004a), p. 93 (footnote 25). Emphasis added.
89 Both in the paper we discuss and in the book Literal Meaning Reca-
nati actually introduces the distinction at the very beginning, but he
doesn’t explain the technical notion of intuitive truth conditions. He
only notes that ‘this divergence between the intuitive truth-conditions
of an utterance and the literal truth-conditions postulated by the [mini-
malist] theorist is particularly striking’ in connection with the example
of the ‘three children’ (see Recanati (2004a), pp. 10-11).
90 Recanati (2004b), p. 8.
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said’ by the utterer of (6), distinct from ‘what is implicated’,
that corresponds to the proposition that I have no more
than three children. For a minimalist, the intended propo-
sition arises from the combination of ‘what is said’ and
‘what is implicated’ and corresponds to a different level in
language understanding, that is the level of what is glob-
ally communicated (‘I have exactly three children’). How-
ever this latter, Recanati claims, is the only proposition the
speaker and the hearer are actually conscious of. From a
psychological point of view, the problem with this picture
is that it ‘lacks generality’91. In particular, it actually holds
in the cases of GCIs, like (6) or like (8), repeated below as
(51):
(51) Mary and John got married and had a baby.
(51) is an example of ‘bridging-inference’ or, in Levin-
son’s terms, conjunction buttressing.
In these cases, the globally communicated expression
(the proposition that I have exactly three children and the
proposition that Mary and John got married and then had
a baby) is actually the only conscious proposition for both
speaker and hearer, ‘what is said’ and ‘what is implicated’
(and the inferential relation between them) being processed
at the sub-personal level.
The problem is that, as we know, GCIs, in Grice’s pic-
tures, do not exhaust the dominion of conversational im-
plicatures, the complementary set being that of PCIs.
To repeat, the main feature of this kind of implicatures
is that they are strictly dependent on the (encyclopaedic
knowledge about the) context of utterance. An example
like (52)92:
(52) I am Italian,
implicating, in the relevant context, that ‘I am a good
cook’ is an example of PCI.
91 Ivi, p. 2.
92 Example (slightly modified) from Recanati (2004a), p. 8.
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In such cases, the overt violation of Gricean maxims is
straightforwardly used to produce some non-conventional
conversational effects. In these cases - that is, cases of
genuine conversational implicatures - one is aware both of
‘what is said’ and of ‘what is implicated’, and also of the
inferential relation linking them. The minimalist account
does not explain the dissymmetry93, at the psychological
level, between generalized and particularized implicatures:
its account on conscious awareness and communication
seems to fit for the former but not for the latter ones.
Recanati’s availability Principle states that “what is said’
must be analysed in conformity with the intuitions shared
by those who fully understand the utterance - typically
the speaker and the hearer, in a normal conversational set-
ting’94. The notion of intuition plays here a great role, and
is supposed to justify my inversion of the topics. What Re-
canati says is that ‘what is said’ is the first conscious truth-
evaluable representation made available by the speaker,
that is to say that the truth-conditions of the minimal propo-
sitions have no role to play at all in a concrete account on
language understanding. ‘What is said’ captures thus an
important level in language understanding that roughly
corresponds to (and safeguards) the semantic intuitions
of the participants to a conversational exchange about the
content of an utterance.
2.8.4 Primary pragmatic processes
As we saw, the only form of context-dependence affect-
ing the Minimal proposition is that of the pure indexical
expressions (components which in a standard Kaplanian
analysis refer to the extra-linguistic context in virtue of
their own conventional semantic nature). The only process
allowed from a Minimalist point of view for the resolution
of such context-dependence was that of saturation, a pro-
cess, which eventually yielded to the first complete (truth-
93 But, one should ask, is it supposed to?
94 Recanati (2004b), pp. 5-6. For the notion of ‘normal interpreter’ see
Recanati (2004a), pp. 19-20.
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evaluable) proposition, i.e. the Minimal proposition (‘what
is said’).
Now, the psychological notion of ‘what is said’ represents
a much richer proposition than the minimal proposition.
This proposition has its own (intuitive) truth-conditions,
and it is regarded, psychologically, as the first proposition
actually encountered in any conversational setting. To be
so, it has to undergo a train of processes whose nature is
entirely pragmatic. What Recanati commits himself to is
the assumption that the truth-conditions of ‘what is said’
are affected from a train of pragmatic processes which are
totally unconscious and that eventually give as their re-
sult a complete and conscious proposition, namely ‘what is
said’. This proposition can then undergo a process of infer-
ential exploitation to give rise to the implicatures. Recanati’s
parallel between perception and language understanding
can be very helpful to explain his central idea (Table 2.3).
The core of this analogy is the idea that ‘what is said’,
like perception, works both as the first output of a com-
plex train of processing which ultimately yields a ‘concep-
tual experience’95, and as an input for further processes
of inferential exploitation. This means that ‘what is said’
is a form of well determinate (truth-evaluable) representa-
tion (‘conceptual’ in a very technical sense) whose primary
character (psychologically speaking) is its conscious avail-
ability.
Besides saturation, the other sorts of primary (uncon-
scious) pragmatic processes96 (not linguistically mandated,
up-bottom) are Enrichment, Loosening and Semantic Trans-
fert. These are well-documented phenomenon in linguis-
tics, exemplified by the following propositions:
(53) Mary took out the key and opened the door.
(54) France is hexagonal.
(55) The ham-sandwich left without paying.
95 Recanati (2004a), p. 7.
96 For further discussion see Recanati (2004a), pp. 23-37.
96 semantic underdeterminacy
Unconscious Conscious
Visual
Stimulus
Train of
Processing
Perception
A is aware of
what he sees Further
processing
(inferential
exploitation)
A is aware of
the fact that he
is seeing
Retinal
Stimuli
−→ John’s car −→ John is
around
Unconscious Conscious
Speaker’s
Utterance
Primary
pragmatic
processes
Experience
A is aware of
what is said Secondary
pragmatic
processesA is aware of
the fact that the
speaker is say-
ing it
Auditory
Stimuli
(Saturation
and En-
richment,
Loosen-
ing,
Transfert)
−→
wis −→ Implicatures
Table 2.3
In the example (53) the connective ‘and’ is used to con-
vey a richer sense than the conventional one, namely the
clause that Mary opened the door ‘with the key’ (or, alter-
natively, the predicate ‘to open’ is used to convey a richer
concept than the lexicalised one, namely the ad hoc con-
cept97 open with the key. In the example (54) the pred-
icate ‘hexagonal’ is used in a ‘loose sense’ (to convey the
97 The notion of ad hoc concept was firstly introduced in the 80s by the
cognitive theorist Lawrence Barsalou (see Barsalou (1983), (?).). The
core idea is that the process of categorization is not so rigid as the
theories of the prototypes suggest and often involves the formation of
‘occasional’ concepts with respect to special contexts and goals. The ad
hoc categories were particularly exploited in the theoretic area of the
Relevance Theory: integrated with the cognitive principle of relevance it
has be seen as a unitary solution to the problems of semantic under-
determinacy at the lexical level (lexical pragmatic). See for discussion
Wilson & Sperber (2002).
2.8 truth-conditional pragmatics 97
ad hoc concept ’approximately hexagonal’ or ‘hexago-
nal to the extent such a geopolitic entity can be’). In
the proposition (55) the substantive ham-sandwich refers
to the ham-sandwich orderer, that is to a fully different
concept bearing a systematic relation to the former.
The crucial point is that these processes affect the in-
tuitive truth-conditions of the utterances. In a semantic
account the truth-conditions of the sentence are functions
of the components of the sentence itself, according to the
Fregean principle of compositionality. Allowing pragmatic
processes to affect the truth-conditions of a sentence means
to deny that semantic compositionality is the mark of truth-
evaluability.
What I am rejecting is not the claim that the
literal interpretation of the constituent is accessed
before the derived interpretation - that I take to
be obvious - but the claim that a similar priority
holds at the level of the complete sentence; that
is, I reject the claim that the process of semantic
composition begins by paying attention only to
literal semantic values, and turns to derived val-
ues only after the literal semantic value of the
whole (the proposition literally expressed) has
been computed. It is this picture which I think
is unwarranted98.
What Recanati suggests is a form of ‘parallelism’ be-
tween the processing of semantic (literal) and derived in-
terpretation: ‘the literal meaning has not compositional priv-
ilege over derived meanings’99. The view of Recanati is
hence double: his account on language understanding is
not purely inferential, but associative100 plus inferential, while
the Gricean account was inferential in a very conservative
way. This view is called by Recanati ‘truth-conditional
98 Recanati (2004a), p. 28.
99 Ibidem.
100 Ibidem. ‘On this view, derived meanings still proceed (associatively)
from literal meanings, which they indeed presuppose; but, although
generated serially, they are processed in parallel’. (Italics added).
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Pragmatics’. The problem is that in such an associative pic-
ture we have different candidates (literal or non-literal) for
each linguistic component, none of which has a ‘composi-
tional privilege’ over the others. What drives the process of
language understanding is hence the intuitions on ‘what is
said’ shared by the language users: the choice of the best
interpretation for each component of the sentence (either
the literal, semantic one or the derived one) is function of
its ‘order of accessibility’101 (that depends on the context at
hand), without committing us to the idea that the semantic
value is computed before the derived one.
If we recall the schematic idea of Literalism in the figure
(27) we easily see that Recanati reformulated the propor-
tion as follows:
(56) ‘What is said’: ‘what is implicated’ = ‘Pragmatics
& Semantics’: ‘Pragmatics’
What does this actually mean? If we recall the examples
of generalized/particularized implicatures, we easily see
that the cases of GCIs like (6) or (53) are now reclassified as
the outputs (’what is said’) of primary pragmatic processes
(of free enrichment), while the only form of genuine (infer-
ential) implicatures (’what is implicated’) remains that of
the particularized implicatures like (8). The asymmetry at
the psychological level is thus removed102.
In this way, Recanati is able to overcome the apparent
paradox in Levinson’s view. Generation of both GCI and
PCI is explained by resorting to the same sort of prag-
matic processes, without invoking any intermediate level
of utterance-type meaning.
At the same time, Grice’s intuitive distinction between
the two varieties of implicatures is maintained and justified
on the basis of a principle of conscious availability. More-
over, such a distinction based on a psychological criterion
on conscious accessibility allows for a distinction between
default and non-default (inferential) interpretation.
101 Ivi, p. 31.
102 Recanati (2004b), p. 10.
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Default meanings, therefore, are the ones based on pri-
mary pragmatic processes (so they belong to pragmatics)
and are accordingly non consciously available. Non-default
interpretations are the ones based on secondary pragmatic
processes and their nature is hence inferential.
2.8.5 Some objections
Let’s summarize some of the results of the present chap-
ter in the light of Recanati’s view.
The literalist proportion (27) customarily implies another
sort of proportion:
(57) ‘What is said’: ‘What is implicated’= Explicit: Im-
plicit
(= Semantics : Pragmatics).
This is, roughly, true not only of Minimalism but also of
Grice’s theory of communication.
Even though he construed saying as a variety
of non-natural meaning, Grice espoused Mini-
malism. On his view, disambiguation and sat-
uration suffice to give us the literal interpreta-
tion of the utterance .- what is literally said. All
other pragmatic processes involved in the in-
terpretation of the utterance are secondary and
presuppose the identification of what is said.
Interpretation is construed as a two-step proce-
dure: (i) The interpreter accesses the literal in-
terpretations of all constituents in the sentence
and uses them to compute the proposition lit-
erally expressed, with respect to the context at
hand; (ii) on the basis of this proposition and
general conversational principles he or she in-
fers what the speaker means (which may be dis-
tinct from what is said, that is, from the propo-
sition literally expressed)103.
103 Recanati (2004a), p. 27.
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What is relevant here is that Recanati sees a clash be-
tween two technical locutions in Grice’s account: that of
saying and that of ‘what is said’. Although saying is a va-
riety of non-natural meaning (that is, it is a matter of in-
tention recognition), and although ‘what is said’ is, on this
very basis, placed by Grice on the side of the speaker’s
meaning, nonetheless Grice considers ‘what is said’ (the
explicit) as strictly related to the semantic content of the
sentence, and ‘what is implicated’ (the implicit) as the only
true pragmatic contribution to the speaker’s meaning. As
we know and as Robyn Carston pointed out, the level of
the implicit, so conceived, is an hybrid containing very dif-
ferent kinds of ‘implicatures’, namely conventional and con-
versational, but also - as we saw from Recanati - among the
latters, generalized and particularized.
What appears to have bound these rather dis-
parate aspects of utterance meaning together,
and so motivated the common label of impli-
cature, was that they did not contribute to the
truth-conditional content of the utterance, that
is, the proposition it expressed, or what the speaker
of the utterance said104.
This kind of concern in Grice’s theory, namely the con-
cern of safeguarding a purely semantic ground for the ‘ex-
plicit’, collides with the well-documented phenomenon of
semantic underdeterminacy
As it should be clear, Recanati argues in favor a radi-
cal form of semantic underdeterminacy view. According
to Recanati ‘such [semantically underdetermined] expres-
sions can be found all over the place’105 . Primary prag-
matic processes affect the explicit ground of the sentence:
the outcome is a level, the level of ‘what is said’, that - very
different from Grice’s received view - is now regarded as a
pragmatic notion.
104 Carston (2004b), p. 65. Carston’s paper belongs to the same collectin
in which Recanati’s paper is published, namely Bianchi (2004).
105 Recanati (2004a), p. 58.
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Syncretic View and other objections
Provided the impossibility for the Minimalist view to
account for semantic underdeterminacy, in a way that is
consistent with purposes of psychological reality, Recanati
refers himself to a different and more sophisticated form of
Literalism, one that tries to seriously take into account the
problems of semantic underdeterminacy. This whole set of
theories is identified by Recanati under the common name
of ‘Syncretic View’. The reason for this title is that this
perspective tries to accommodate both the (alleged) theo-
retical need of a notion of minimal proposition and the
psychological concerns of truth-conditional Pragmatics.
Schematically, the difference between the Minimalist and
Recanati’s availability approach can be sketched as follows:
Min
Sentence Meaning -> Saturation ->
WIS(min/sem) -> Optional processes -> What is
communicated
Rec
Sentence Meaning -> Primary pragm. Processes
-> WIS (pragm) -> Secondary pragm. Processes ->
What is communicated
Table 2.4
As we saw, what commits Recanati to the existence of
a train of (unconscious) pragmatic processes, implied also
in the determination of ‘what is said’, is the fact that the
level of the explicit is in many cases (for Recanati, in ev-
ery case) underdetermined from the semantic content of
the sentence. According to Recanati, indeed, this leads to
the conclusion that pragmatic processes can’t only be con-
cerned with the understanding of implicatures from their
explicit content, as some pragmatic processes are involved
in the determination of the explicit content itself. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, Recanati argues against the no-
tion of minimal proposition, at least in the semantic sense.
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The point made by Syncretist theorists is that the rigid
distinction between explicit and implicit is misleading. Philoso-
phers who - like Recanati - claim to criticize the Gricean
picture, don’t realize that they themselves embrace this
preliminary distinction and move along the same track of
Grice. They then account for a more labelled schema, where
one can, roughly, distinguish two notions of a Minimal
proposition: a purely semantic and a pragmatic notion.
I will take now into account what I consider to be the
most convincing perspective in the Syncretic panorama:
the view of Kent Bach. According to Bach, the phenomenon
of semantic underdeterminacy is actually a pervasive phe-
nomenon in natural languages, however it has not to be
accounted in Recanati’s terms. Recanati’s solution - Bach
claims - safeguards Grice’s distinction between Explicit and
Implicit, and only ‘draw[s] the distinction differently - widen-
ing the scope of what is said and calling that explicit content-
but Eˇ keep[s] it exhaustive’106. For Bach, there is a middle
ground between the explicit and the implicature, that he
calls the ‘implicit’ (and ‘implicitures’). As we saw, every
semantically underdeterminated sentence does not convey
any complete proposition. To be completed, Bach claims,
these sentences need to undergo a process of completion:
this process is conceptually mandated, ‘because the utter-
ance of a semantically underdeterminated sentence leaves
out a conceptual element (or a relation between conceptual
elements)’107. The outcome of this process of completion is
what Bach calls the ‘implicit’ (or the ‘implicitures’). Let’s
see some example:
(58) Steel isn’t strong enough.
(59) Willie almost robbed a bank.
As Bach writes, these sentences ‘though syntactically well-
formed, are semantically or conceptually incomplete, in
the sense that something must be added for the sentence
to express a complete and determinate proposition (some-
106 Bach (1994), pp. 38-39.
107 Ivi, p. 10.
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thing capable of being true or false)’108. The point is that
the required form of completion is only conceptual, that is
it does not need to affect the ‘explicit’ ground, since there
is ‘no syntactic reason why everything needed to deliver
a complete proposition should correspond to something
in the syntactic structure of the sentence’109. This is quite
evident in a sentence like (21), repeated here as (60)
(60) I love you too.
(60) can be interpreted in four different ways, depend-
ing on the component to which ‘too’ applies. To under-
stand this proposition is to conceptually complete the se-
mantic content of the sentence, by adding some further
conceptual information that corresponds to nothing in the
syntactic structure of the sentence itself. This distinction
between explicit and ‘implicit’ (distinct from ‘implicated’)
is, according to Bach, quite clear, and the only reason why
a philosopher like Recanati can ‘count implicitures as ex-
plicit contents of utterances, or identify them with what is
said, is that [he] uncritically assume, along with Grice, that
there is no middle ground between what is said and what
is implicated’110.
Furthermore, there is another form of pragmatic process
which affects the complete proposition and that is different
from implicature, that is the process of ‘expansion’ (Bach
refers to his account as ‘expansionism’). While Completion
is the ‘filling in of a propositional radical’, Expansion is ‘the
fleshing out of the minimal proposition expressible by an
utterance’111. Let’s recall the example (47)
(47) You are not going to die.
In the relevant context, the proposition (47) expresses
the complete (once saturated the indexical element) propo-
sition that ‘the kid is not going to die’. However this, as
108 Ivi, p. 3.
109 Ivi, p. 8.
110 Ivi, p. 19.
111 Ivi, p. 22.
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we saw, is not the intended proposition: according to Bach,
the intended proposition is an expanded proposition of the
sort: ‘You are not going to die from that cut. This - Bach
claims - is neither a case of Recanatian ‘explicature’112 nor
of genuine implicature; rather it is an example of ‘implici-
ture’. The fact that the expanded proposition is not part of
the explicit ground (‘what is said’) is testified to the very
feature that these ‘expansions’ are ‘defeasible’ without con-
tradiction:
(47.2) You are not going to die - said the goddess
Thetis to his immortal son Achilles113.
Bach’s central claim is that the implicit (inexplicit) is a
pervasive ground of natural language meaning, which does
not affect saying.
I agree with Grice’s critics that neither is a
case of implicature, although both involve basi-
cally the same sort of pragmatic process as in
implicature proper, but I see no reason, as they
do, to extend the notion of explicit content, of
what is said. For me there is inexplicit meaning but
no inexplicit saying114.
In this perspective, there is still room for a notion of
Minimal proposition, that corresponds to the first completed
proposition.
The main point of Bach’s defence of the Minimal propo-
sition against Recanati is that this defence is neither argued
for the sake of an alleged priority of semantic, nor in virtue
of the theoretical value of the Minimal proposition. To
the contrary, the point is exactly psychological. According
to Bach, even if Recanati is right assuming that in many
events the alleged minimal proposition is never accessed
112 The term ‘explicature’ actually refers to a technical notion (quite the
same of Recanati’s view) of Relevance Theory. See Sperber & Wilson
(1986), pp. 176-193 (2nd ed.).
113 The example is from Claudia Bianchi.
114 Bach (1994), p. 22.
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1. Sentence Meaning
Saturation
2. WIS (less-than-minimal)
Completion
3. WIS (minimal)
Expansion
4. WIS (Pragmatic)
Secondary Pragmatic Processes
 Implicitures
5. Implicatures
Table 2.5
in the actual process of utterance understanding, nonethe-
less it is exactly this proposition that is needed to access the
linguistic content of the utterance. That the minimal propo-
sition is available in a case like the one of the ham-sandwich
is what actually keeps the ‘local process’ of semantic trans-
fer ‘from being triggered in a case like (55) [‘the ham sand-
wich is getting eaten’], uttered in similar circumstances’.
The point here is that the expansionist account
does not pose as a theory about the temporal
order of the process of understanding. Rather,
it is a theory about the character of the infor-
mation available to the hearer in the process,
whatever the psychological details, of identify-
ing what the speaker is communicating, that is,
what is implicit in an utterance that explicitly
expresses only a minimal proposition. The level
of the minimal proposition, of what is strictly
and literally said, is needed to account for the
hearer’s access to the linguistic content of an
utterance. What it does suggest is that what
is strictly and literally said need not be con-
sciously accessed. This leaves open the possibil-
ity that it is accessed unconsciously or at least
106 semantic underdeterminacy
that it be available to the hearer, even if not ac-
tually accessed115.
Recanati takes into account two different sorts of Syn-
cretic view, Bach’s ‘expansionist’ account and Scott Soames’
theory of the minimal proposition as a ‘common denom-
inator’. I consider his objections to the Syncretist chal-
lenge extremely conclusive for the latter but not for the
former. Soames’ strategy of abstracting the minimal propo-
sition from ‘what is said’ in the pragmatic sense, by filtering
out all the context-dependent elements, is demonstrably in-
valid, since it holds only in those cases where ‘what is said’,
in the pragmatic sense, is richer than ‘what is said’, in the
semantic sense. This is of course true of the cases in which
‘what is said’ (pragmatic) is the output of a process of free
enrichment (a proposition like (53)). Only in those cases ‘it
is plausible to suggest that the minimal proposition itself
is part of what is asserted’116. If one assertively utters (55)),
in Soames’ view, one commits oneself to (55). However, Re-
canati comments, ‘one cannot commit oneself to the truth
of a specific proposition p without committing oneself to
the truth of a less specific proposition q which it entails’117.
Therefore, the utterer of (55) not only would commit him-
self to the proposition that ‘the ham-sandwich orderer left
without paying’, but also to the absurd minimal proposition
that ‘the ham-sandwich itself left without paying’.
Recanati doesn’t have an equally convincing argument
against the Bachian view. He simply objects to Bach that
there is ’no such thing as a complete proposition autonomously
determined by the rules of the language with respect to the
context but independent of speaker’s meaning’118. How-
ever, as we saw, Bach agrees with Recanati that in cases of
semantic underdeterminacy the semantic contents of the
sentences in context are non-propositional: that’s why he
regards as ‘minimal’ only the first (conceptually) completed
proposition. Recanati assumes that what is ‘deeply wrong’
115 Ivi, p. 37.
116 Recanati (2004b), p. 15.
117 Ivi, p. 16.
118 Recanati (2004a), p. 59.
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with the Syncretic View (insofar it is based on the literal-
ist picture) ‘is the assumption that semantic interpretation
can deliver something as determinate as a complete propo-
sition’119. But this claim, we saw, focuses exactly the sort of
problem Bach tries to avoid, by arguing in favour of a non-
semantically controlled form of completion in processing
the minimal proposition.
Recanati shows that the process of saturation is itself
context-driven in a way that forces us to appeal to the wide
(extra-linguistic) context. Consider the following example:
Suppose that there has been a ritual fight be-
tween respectively five warriors and five beasts.
The beasts are a wolf, a lion, a hyena, a bear,
and an alligator; the warriors are armed with
swords, and carry shields with distinctive dec-
orations (the first warrior has the moon on his
shield, the second one has the Eiffel Tower, the
third one has the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer roar-
ing lion, and so on). Each warrior is assigned
a particular beast which he or she must stab to
death. After the ritual fight, the five beasts lie
on the ground with swords through their bod-
ies. This is the context. Now suppose that in
this context I utter ‘Bring me the lion’s sword
- I want to have a look at it’. In this context
I think there are two accessible interpretations
for ‘the lion’; ‘the lion’ can be interpreted liter-
ally as referring to the lion (on of the beasts), or
non-literally as referring to the warrior who has
(a picture of) a lion on his shield. If we choose
the first interpretation, the relation which will
be contextually assigned to the possessive con-
struction will be one of the salient relations which
hold between the lion (the animal) and the sword
which can be seen emerging from its pierced
body. If we choose the second interpretation,
the relation will be totally different; it will be
one of the salient relations between the warrior
119 Ivi, p. 56.
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and the sword which he used in his fight against,
say, the bear.
Now suppose the correct interpretation is the
second one: the speaker actually refers to the
warrior with a lion on his shield and wants to
see his sword (that is, the sword which emerges
from the bear’s body). What is the minimal
proposition expressed by the utterance, in this
context? I doubt that there is one, but if the
minimalist insists, here is the only available pro-
cedure for determining it: to get the minimal
proposition, we must give the word ‘lion’ its lit-
eral interpretation, because the non-literal inter-
pretation results from an optional, non-minimalist
process; and we must assign a particular value
to the variable ‘R’ carried by the possessive con-
struction. Which value? Well, the value which
corresponds to what the speaker actually means.
(Remember: there is no other way to determine
contextually a value for the genitive, than by ap-
peal to a speaker’s meaning.) But that value is
that which goes together with the intended non-
literal interpretation of ‘lion’! The result is a
monster: what the phrase ‘the lion’s sword’ con-
tributes to that is said in the minimalist sense
is something like THE SWORD WHICH THE
LION (THE ANIMAL) USED DURING THE FIGHT.
The minimal proposition thus determined is ab-
surd and evidently corresponds to no stage in
the actual process of understanding the utter-
ance. 120
. As the above example seems to show, the alleged min-
imal proposition, even in the Syncretic sense, would be
a ‘monster’121, between sentence meaning and speaker’s
meaning, with no psychological relevance at all. This is
fully correct, but one can still wonder whether this kind of
objection holds in the case of Bach’s completion. The only
120 Recanati (2004a), p. 63.
121 Ibidem.
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sort of response I think Recanati could give is that in the
example of the ritual fight the type of effect obtained on
the intuitive truth-conditions is a ’strong pragmatic’ effect,
something which can’t be neither an instance of saturation,
nor of Bachian completion.
I think that the distinction shaped by Jason Stanley be-
tween propositional and non-propositional Syncretism122 comes
in handy at this point. As Recanati has shown, the former
is actually ‘a difficult position to maintain’123, while for
the latter there could be a suspicion ‘that there is no great
difference between non-propositional syncretism and Re-
canati’s contextualism’.
My suspicion is therefore that the most im-
portant disputes in the theory of meaning are
not between contextualism and syncretism [. . . ].
Rather, the genuinely important disputes in the
theory of meaning are between those who main-
tain that the contents primarily asserted by the
speakers are not generally the semantic contents
of the sentences they use (even relative to those
contexts), and those who maintain tat the con-
tents primarily asserted by speakers are gener-
ally (not always, but typically) the semantic con-
tents of the sentences used (relative to those con-
texts)124.
Hence, I think Recanati could reject Bach’s view only on
the basis that such a multiplication of sense levels is theo-
retically uneconomical, while a single criterion of context-
dependence is preferable. And Bach could reply, using the
words of Stanley, that ‘linguistic communication is rule-
governed and convention-bound in a way that would be
mysterious, if there were strong pragmatic effects on intu-
itive truth-conditions’125.
122 See Stanley (2007), p. 234.
123 Ivi, p. 236.
124 Ivi, p. 237.
125 Ivi, p. 238.
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2.9 summary
In the present chapter I introduced the phenomenon of
semantic underdeterminacy. Such phenomenon seems to
radically undermine Grice’s picture and the related shape
borderlines he drew between, respectively, Semantics and
Pragmatics and Explicit and Implicit.
I started from a radically relativistic approach to utter-
ance meaning, the one supported by John Searle, in order
to show how the issue of semantic underdeterminacy can
be claimed to be extremely pervasive in communication.
Searle shows how the phenomenon of ’linguistic relativity’
seems to threaten the entire semantic enterprise at its heart
and to frustrate even the simplest attempt of semantic anal-
ysis.
After this sketchy and quite informal presentation of the
phenomenon, I went on presenting a taxonomy, due to
Robyn Carston, of the possible sources of semantic under-
determinacy and I discussed in some details a large case
study. More importantly, I attempted a first approach to
the Semantics/Pragmatics distinction, by illustrating some
of the commonly accepted assumptions concerning the se-
mantic job. I presented the so-called Grice-Gazdar the-
sis, which states that pragmatics can be equated to ’mean-
ing minus truth-conditions’. Then, counter-examples to this
view are presented and the Grice-Gazdar thesis is strongly
undermined by showing that pragmatic factors actually
are very often involved in the determination of the truth-
conditional content of sentences. I labeled this kind of im-
passe in Grice’s shape picture of communication as ’Grice’s
Circle’ and outlined three possible theoretical options to
overcome such impasse.
A first, very conservative paradigm is presented. Such
an approach, due to Jason Stanley and others semanticists
of traditional orientation, has been labeled as ’hidden in-
dexicalism’. The main idea behind this view is that ’all
truth-conditional effects of extra-linguistic context can be
traced to logical form.’. The approach is developed with
respect to several examples, and it is shown how, in Stan-
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ley’s view, every occurrence of semantic underdetermined
meaning is in fact a case in which the value of a hidden in-
dexical in the logical form has to be contextually supplied.
Stanley’s conclusion is then that there is no pragmatic con-
tribution to the truth-conditional content, since every truth-
conditional effect can in fact be successfully semanticized.
At the end of this presentation, I illustrated some objec-
tions to this thesis. It seems eventually that hidden index-
ical view is untenable since, for each instance of semantic
underdetermined meaning, ’the onus of proof lies on the
advocates of syntactic slots and there has not as yet been
any successful proof providedŠ.
I then turned to Levinson’s theory of presumptive inter-
pretations. This is a theory which acknowledge the prob-
lem represented by Grice’s Circle (incidentally, the defi-
nition of ’Grice’s Circle’ is due to Levinson himself) but
claims to be able to overcome such issue maintaining at
the same time the validity of the Grice-Gazdar thesis, and
by means of a revision of Grice’s own concepts.
I introduced for the first time the theme of defaults.I
discussed at lenght Levinson’s view and showed why his
view of default interpretations is, at the and, untenable, but
how it represents, at the same time, an important opening
to the idea of preferred interpretation. An idea which can
be maintained and, with opportune modifications, further
developed.
I explained in details how Levinson’s view involves a re-
vision of received Gricean picture leading to the introduc-
tion of an intermediate level of meaning between sentence-
meaning and speaker’s meaning. This is the level of utterance-
type meaning. It is at this level that GCI arise. GCIs, in
Levinson’s view, are default interpretations which are gen-
erated automatically according to three heuristics. Such
heuristics (modelled on Grice’s conversational maxims) are
inferential shortcuts that help to overcome the bottleneck
of human communication, which is represented by the slow
rate of the articulation process.
I focused on the second (I) heuristic, which is the one
that is responsible for example for phenomena of enrich-
ment of the meaning of logical connectives. I introduced
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Levinson’s intrusive construction view, which is a first at-
tempt to overcome the problem represented by counter-
examples to Grice-Gazdar thesis. Levinson’s view is that
there is circularity in Grice’s view, insofar as pragmatically
derived interpretations can intrude into truth-conditional
content. However, far from being a threaten to Grice’s the-
ory, this is a further proof of the existence of Levinson’s
middle layer of meaning: only GCIs can indeed intrude
into truth-conditions and default interpretations therefore
can straightforwardly interact with semantic content. Levin-
son suggests that such mixed semantic-pragmatic view about
truth-conditional content can be approached using a cor-
relatively mixed formal approach. He suggests to resort to
the formalism of DRT, however this proposal is not further
developed.
I then presented several objections to Levinson’s view.
Some of these are objections which are internal to Levin-
son’s theory and are due to Emma Borg and Anne Bezuiden-
hout. While trying to respond to some of such objections, I
encompassed the ones that I found most conclusive. More-
over, I illustrated some external objection to Levinson’s the-
ory, which are due to Robyn Carston. On the one hand, I
showed how the line of objection argued by Carston is very
conclusive, under the assumption that the Grice-Gazdar
thesis has to be rejected in view of a successful treatment
of semantic underdeterminacy. On the other hand, I illus-
trated Levinson’s quite convincing counter-objection that
this kind of approach eventually represent a ’semantic re-
treat’. I ended the section with an open question: is it
possible to advocate for the existence of default interpreta-
tions without resorting to a Gricean apparatus (and, correl-
atively, without encompassing Grice-Gazdar thesis) and, at
the same time, without being blamed of semantic retreat?
A tentative answer to this question will be the topic of the
next chapter.
Finally, I turned to a more radical approach to the is-
sue of semantic underdeterminacy. Starting from the ac-
knowledgment that one possible option to overcome the
impasse created by Grice’s Circle is to reject Gricean pic-
ture as a whole, I illustrated how such an attempt is pur-
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sued by one of the most influential contemporary pragma-
tists, François Recanati, in his ’truth-conditional pragmat-
ics’. I showed how concerns of psychological plausibility
are at the earth of this approach, a feature which such ap-
proach shares (together with a radical underdeterminacy
view) with the relevance theoretic paradigm. I illustrated
Recanati’s conception of What is said and his Availability
based approach, and showed how a radically different ap-
proach to the issue of truth-conditionality is possible, when
truth-conditions are analyzed from the point of view of the
’intuitions’ share by competent speakers and interpreters.
In the present chapter, a multiplicity of threads have
been interlaced. My purpose in the next chapter is to show
how such threads can be pulled all together in a unitary
theory of default interpretations.
3 DEFAULT SEMANT ICS
I do not pretend that this notion is
straightforward, and I grant that it is not easy
to defend. Yet I believe that the idea of a
preferred (or default) interpretation is much too
important to be ignored just because it is a
difficult concept. Moreover, the existence of
preferred intepretations has (for me at least)
something of that brute self-evidence that Dr.
Johnson invoked when he kicked a stone to
dispatch Berkeley’s idealism. We grope to grab
and harness the beast without the slightest
doubt about its existence.
—Levinson (2000): xiii.
3.1 open issues
In the previous chapter, we have seen that the picture of
communication which stems from Grice’s theory of conver-
sational maxims and implicatures is subject to a number of
objections and counterexamples. All such objections and
revisions to Grice’s theory start from the acknowledgment
of a phenomenon of pervasive linguistic non-specificity,
which goes far further Grice’s domain of conversational
implicature and which strongly undermines his sharp di-
vision of labour bewtween Semantics and Pragmatics. This
is the phenomenon which I have labeled (following an in-
fluential tradition) as ’semantic underdeterminacy’.
To repeat, Grice’s claim is that, for the full determination
of ’what is said’ (= semantic/truth-conditional content) of
an uttered sentence, the only form of context-dependence
needed (and allowed) is restricted to lexical or syntactic dis-
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3.1 open issues 115
ambiguation and indexical resolution. The resultant full-
fledged propositional form can then undergo a process of
pragmatic exploitation which generates conversational im-
plicatures. In a slogan, due to Gerald Gazdar, Pragmatics
is ’meaning minus truth-conditions’
Semantic underdeterminacy view, advocated by many
philosophers and linguistics, shows that it is not possible
to keep to a minimum the degree of context dependance
needed for the determination of the semantic content. By
contrast, a number of apparently pragmatic factors very of-
ten intrude into the semantics of sentences in communica-
tion. The view that semantic content, once completely de-
termined, provides the input for pragmatic exploitation is
strongly threatened and, accordingly, a circularity between
’what is said’ and implicatures is recognized in Grice’s own
theory (Grice’s Circle).
I showed that there are schematically three possible al-
ternative to face the problems arising from semantic un-
derdeterminacy view. In a nutshell, the three options are
as follows:
rejected semantic underdeterminacy The first option
consists in rejecting the idea that there are semantic
underdetermined meanings, by claiming that each
apparent pragmatic effect on truth-conditional con-
tent can in fact be semanticized (e.g. Stanley (2007));
controlled semantic underdeterminacy the second
hypothesis is to acknowledge a form of semantic un-
derdeterminacy, but to claim that it is only a con-
trolled form of the phenomenon, where the alleged
cases of pragmatic intrusion into the truth-conditional
content are limited to default interpretations guided
by three pragmatic heuristics (and assimilated to Grice’s
GCIs) which interact with semantic analysis, metaphor-
ically in the way two pens of different colors write of
a same sheet (the contributions are, then, distinguish-
able but give rise to a unique text) (e.g. Levinson
(2000));
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radical semantic underdeterminacy the third alterna-
tive consists in rejecting tout-court Grice’s borderline
between semantics and pragmatics (and, accordingly,
between explicit and implicit, what is said and what
is implicated) and argue in favour of a radically free
contribution of pragmatics to the truth conditional
content. In truth-conditional pragmatics, the vari-
ety of radical semantic underdeterminacy view advo-
cated by François Recanati, the sole criterion for dis-
tinguishing ’what is said’ from implicatures is that of
conscious availability. A different sort of such radical
view is advocated by Relevance Theorists. (e.g. Re-
canati (2004a) and Sperber & Wilson (1986), Carston
(2002))
As we have seen, each of the paradigms taken into ac-
count as representative of one of the proposed alternatives
is unsatisfactory and open to several objections. Each ac-
count is defective insofar as it leaves a number of unre-
solved question and it is unable to present a unitary model
of treatment for the relevant case study. Either the solution
is too restrict, or it seems ad hoc or, rather, too vague.
To be sure, all these paradigms also raise a lot of good
questions and, in many cases, make some steps toward the
search for suitable solutions. However, though partially
convincing, they all lack something important for a tenable,
really explanatory semantico-pragmatic theory.
I will shortly summarize some of the objections we have
mentioned against the presented paradigms and try to give
a map of merits and deficiencies of the extant theories:
• As regards to the first theoretical option, it has been
objected that the solution is too limited and extremely
dispersive insofar as it lacks a unitary principle of ex-
planation and resorts, for each occurrence of alleged
semantic underdetermined meaning, to the search for
a suitable deep structure involving hidden indexicals.
All in all, although the goal of semanticization is de-
sirable insofar as it points toward the manipulabil-
ity and formal treatability of the case study, however
such approach seems to lack any predictive power
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and, accordingly, to lose much of its theoretical (not
to mention its intuitive) appeal. To quote the words
of Katarzyna Jaszczolt:
All in all, [hidden indexicalists] make an
important point that before postulating truth-
conditional pragmatics with free, not syn-
tactically controller enrichment (...), before
discarding intuitions about semantic form,
one has to investigate all semantic options.
But they fail to investigate any further be-
yond the least plausible: syntax of some
non-existent ’sentences’1
• As for the Levinsonian proposal of default interpreta-
tion, it has been argued that it crucially rests on a un-
justified Gricean assumption concerning the ’implica-
tive’ nature of pragmatic contributions. Such assump-
tion eventually forces this approach to introduce a
potentially useless further level of meaning. More-
over, it forces the account to catalogue under a ’rather
eclectic category’ (that of GCI) a nonhomogeneous
case study, including GCIs arising ’at the level of
word, phrases, sub-sentential expressions and whole
sentences’2. Finally, while it seems intuitively appeal-
ing to resort to the category of default interpretations,
the composite semantico-pragmatic formal treatment
which is hinted for such category is not further devel-
oped and the metaphor with which such treatment is
introduced seems to rest on a crucial confusion con-
cerning the very notion of ’semantics’.
To adopt a metaphor, in these proposals
there is a common slate, a level of proposi-
tional representation, upon which both se-
mantics and pragmatics can write he con-
tributions may be distinguished, let’s sup-
pose, by the color of the ink: semantics in
black, pragmatics in red. Semantics and
1 Jaszczolt (2005a): 16.
2 Jaszczolt (2005b): 39.
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pragmatics remain modular ’pens’ as it were:
they are separate devices making distinc-
tively different contributions to a common
level of representation. The slate thus rep-
resents the semantic and pragmatic content
of accumulated utterances, and it is this rep-
resentation as a whole that is assigned a
model-theoretic interpretation.3.
. Carston argues that such metaphor involves a con-
fusion between the two notions of semantics advo-
cated by Relevance Theorists (linguistic and truth-
conditional (see p. 84). The first, blue ink, seman-
tics seems to be close to Carston’s ’linguistic’ (context-
invariant) semantics. However, being representational
(which, following Carston I see as an advantage of
a semantic theory) it involves a translation from the
purely symbolic system into a representational (logico-
conceptual) one. Such a ’translation’, according to
Carston, gives rise to the second, truth-conditional
notion of semantic content, which crucially involves
pragmatic filling to become complete. On this analy-
sis, we no long have a composite semantico-pragmatic
device which writes on the same piece of paper but
where, at the same time, the two contributions are
transparently distinguishable by the analyst. On the
contrary, we have a double conception of semantics,
where the second, ’real’ semantics is inextricably (and
indistinguishably) interlaced with pragmatic elements.
• Concerning the third, more radical option, it seems
intuitively very appealing to claim that there is in
principle no restriction to the contribution that prag-
matics can give to ’what is said’. In fact, provided the
apparent pervasiveness of the phenomenon of seman-
tic underspecificity, it seems a theoretical quality to
state no upper bound for the degree of pragmatic en-
richment and development of the logical form which
is the output of syntax to get a full-fledged proposi-
3 Levinson (2000): 193.
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tion. Furthermore, it seems as well desirable to let
default and non-default inferences to be clearly dis-
tinguishable by means of a psychological criterion of
conscious availability. By contrast, it seems that, ex-
actly insofar as it is extremely ’liberal’, the account
lacks any predictive power and it is useless to the
aim of providing a model for linguistic competence
and understanding. It seems moreover that at the
end there is no long room for a notion of semantics
in the traditional sense. As Stefano Predelli has cor-
rectly pointed out:
Minimalism’s presumed defeat would re-
main largely irrelevant for the treatment of
genuinely semantic questions. On the other
hand, if the true target of Recanati’s discus-
sion is a semantically relevant level of WIS,
that is, the outcome of a semantic proce-
dure of interpretation, it is unclear why the
ideas of complete propositionality or auto-
maticity may be relevant4.
It seems, to use Levinson’s incisive slogan, that al-
though we have apparently got grasp on the extreme
variety of contextual contributions to utterance mean-
ing by means of a single methodological criterion, we
have nonetheless reached this goal at the cost of a
true ’semantic retreat’.
3.2 what makes a good theory?
The summary of open issues in the theories presented
so far led us to a retrospective list of the methodological
merits and weaknesses of each of the (broadly conceived)
presented theoretical options.
Such a comparative prospectus can now be useful to
foil by contrast the features which we expect a success-
ful semantico-pragmatic theory should present. What we
4 Predelli (2006): 31.
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hope to end up with is a theory which is able to preserve
what seems intuitively plausible in Grice’s paradigm and
at the same time to cope with the issue of semantic under-
determinacy without giving up the possibility of a seman-
tic analysis in standard, model-theoretic fashion.
More specifically, we ask for our theory the following
requirements:
methodological parsimony First of all, it seems intu-
itively appealing to have a theory which preserve
Grice’s advice of avoiding the multiplication of senses
(i.e. the postulation of ambiguity) in favour of a sin-
gle principle of explanation in cases of multiple read-
ings. However, provided the arguments concerning
semantic underdeterminacy developed in previous
chapter, standard Gricean analysis involving a rigid
semantic content and a pragmatic layer restricted to
conversational implicature seems manifestly precluded.
We want then our theory to show a more fine-grained,
though clearly understandable, borderline between
semantics and pragmatics.
intention-based approach A second, important Gricean
requirement which our theory should intuitively be
able to preserve is that of being a theory of mean-
ing based on the recovery of the intentions behind a
speaker’s uttering a certain sentence. An intention-
based approach, à la Grice, would of course require
additional explanation regarding the sort of psycho-
logical processes and the kind of intentionality which
are claimed to be in play. It should also clarify whether
the resultant representation of meaning is to be taken
to information from the speaker’s side or from the
side of the addressee. Finally, it should make it clear
on which kind of inferential model it resorts and whether
there a difference is advocated between inferential
and non-inferential processes of meaning recovery.
levels of meaning As a corollary to the first require-
ment, we want our paradigm to clearly state how
many levels of meaning we account for and exactly at
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which layer each contribution from a different sources
is supposed to come in play. The theory should ac-
cordingly explain if such division of levels is actu-
ally mirrored in a psychologically plausible theory
of information recovery from such different sources.
Moreover, provided a clearly defined notion of, re-
spectively, semantics and pragmatics, the paradigm
should explain if the level at which a comprehensive
modeling for the process of language understanding
belong to the semantics or the pragmatics.
formal apparatus and compositionality If the aim of
our theory is the one of explaining linguistic perfor-
mance by means of a plausible model of language un-
derstanding, it seems reasonable to ask for a formal
device which help such modelling. The alternative
view is to acknowledge that formal enterprise with
respect to natural language understanding is even-
tually un-explanatory, insofar as the variety of prag-
matic contribution is completely free and, in princi-
ple not specifiable. This could be the case: however,
what we hope out theory to be equipped with is a
way to accommodate pragmatic information coming
from different sources into a plausible formal repre-
sentation. A couple of corollaries follow from such re-
quirement: first of all, we expect our formalization to
hold predictive power with respect to the formaliza-
tion of new pieces of case study. Our formal devices
should be not only a way for accommodating a suit-
able logical form from complex utterances, it should
also make the right predictions when fed with new
inputs. Secondly, it seems intuitively plausible for
a theory which allows for formalization and which
holds predictive power on new and potentially unan-
alyzed pieces of information to be compositional. It
seems to be a minimal adequacy condition for a se-
mantic theory aiming to mirror the actual process of
language understanding.
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defaults The discussion of Levinson’s theory of presump-
tive interpretations left us with the aftertaste of a un-
satisfactory analysis of an otherwise basically unob-
jectionable notion. It seems, therefore, that a suit-
able theory of language understanding should allow
for the category of default interpretations. However,
such category should not be constrained in an undue
Gricean dress, but should be shaped in line with the
three abovementioned requirements. That is to say,
the theory should clarify whether defaults are to be
recognized at semantic or pragmatic level; it is desir-
able that the introduction of such category does not
lead to the introduction of an additional and poten-
tially redundant level of meaning (as it is the case in
Levinson’s account) but, at the same time, the cate-
gory of default interpretations should be treatable in
accord with the requirement of formal manipulability,
which means, moreover, that such category should
be clearly distinguishable in our semantic represen-
tation and should respect the compositionality condi-
tion stated above.
3.3 jaszczolt’s default semantics
A theory which matches all the previously listed require-
ments would not of course be immune from objections.
However, it would be at least a paradigm capable of es-
caping many of the theoretical dead-ends of the theories
taken into account so far.
Such an approach would preserve the undeniable advan-
tages of a pragmatic, intention-based, Gricean picture and
at the same time it would take seriously into account the
need for semanticization and formal modelling of the pro-
cess of language interpretation and the related need for
preserving meaning compositionality.
Now, I will tentatively suggest that a theory which seems
to satisfy all the above mentioned requirements can be
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found in the paradigm of Default Semantics, developed
in several books and papers by Kasia Jaszczolt5.
As the name of the paradigm clearly suggests, this is a
theory which crucially depends on the acknowledgment
of default meanings. However, the theory of preferred in-
terpretation is the outcome of a complex and articulated
theory of meaning and language interpretations.
Before addressing thoroughly the details of Default Se-
mantics (hereafter DS) I would like to briefly indicate some
important merits of such theory: first of all, it is a the-
ory which approaches in a radically new way the phe-
nomenon of semantic ambiguity and underdeterminacy.
Jaszczolt puts into question every single accepted concept
in use in the extant semantic and pragmatic paradigms and
shows how such notions can be recast or even abandoned
in favour of more workable ones.
Accordingly, and what is for me more important, it shows
how most of the theoretical oddities and impasses affecting
the extant pragmatic theories derive from the way many
distinctions are commonly shaped, unquestioned and as-
sumed to be relevant.
Jaszczolt shows, by contrast, that in many cases there is
no need for many of such discussions once we acknowl-
edge for a radically different view of approaching the case
study. That the theory will result at the end in a convincing
paradigm or that one would object it and also reject it at
all, makes no difference with respect to the hugely instruc-
tive way of facing a common battery of issues and show
how it is possible to analyze them in an utterly new fash-
ion by building an extremely well motivated theory which,
most of all, appears to be theoretically well aware of every
distinction and subtleties which is in play.
All in all, as it often happens for really new philosophical
theories, DS is built on the ruins of a number of commonly
accepted and hardly questioned theoretical assumptions.
5 See for example Jaszczolt, 1999, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2011.
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3.3.1 Logical form and semantic underdeterminacy
Consider Levinson’s presumptive interpretations. The
motivations for the introduction of such category, besides
its intuitive appeal, are to be found, according to Levinson,
in the search for a plausible explanation for the incredi-
ble speed and efficiency of human communication as com-
pared with the incomparably slower rate of the articulation
process.
This is intuitively a very stringent reason which appar-
ently lead us to acknowledge the existence of a system of
shortcuts in language understanding by means of default
or preferred interpretations. However, as I have already
noticed, it seems quite odd that in order to explain the ra-
pidity and efficiency of human linguistic competence one
is forced to introduce a further level of meaning, as Levin-
son does.
Such a move, by contrast, seems to be suggested by ’ex-
ternal’ considerations, concerning the re-modulation of the
unitary Gricean category of GCIs as holders of default
meanings, rather than by ’internal’ motivations of theoreti-
cal consistency. It is possible that forcing such defaults into
an eclectic category including hardly unitary expression-
types (like words, phrases, sub-sentential forms, whole
sentences) would give the advantage of a unitary Gricean
re-description of the phenomenon. However, either one
have to recognize that such further level of meaning is the-
oretically needed but psychologically inert, or it is true that
such additional layer would ’exacerbate processing difficul-
ties rather than alleviating them6.
It seems then that a theory which allows for defaults
should not increase the complexity of the picture, at least
if it is claimed to mirror the actual interpretation process.
Default Semantics is a theory of meaning which allows
for a single-level of representation. Such single level con-
sists in a merging of information which are allowed to
come from different sources. The crucial point is that none
6 Bezuidenhout (2002): 265.
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of these sources hold a compositional privilege over the
others.
To escape the problem posed by semantic underdetermi-
nacy, Levinson introduced the notion of intrusive construc-
tions. The picture of DS is as well intrusionist insofar as
it allows pragmatic enrichments to freely enter into the se-
mantic representation. However, the model is intrusionist
in a very different way as compared to Levinson’s one. In
this latter theory we were faced with the problem of how to
explain apparent cases of contextual effects into the truth-
conditional content of the sentence. Levinson’s solution
was to let a controlled variety of pragmatic elements to in-
trude into the semantic content.
However, a different solution involving semanticization,
was advocated by hidden indexicalists who claim that such
elements can be eventually traced back to the logical form
(hidden truth-functional structure of the sentence).
According to Jaszczolt, the crucial mistake is to consider
logical form and the related notion of truth-conditional
content, in terms of the semantically developed output of
the syntactic module, as a theoretically useful and psycho-
logically relevant notion at all.
In the traditional Gricean picture, the role of semantics
is to determine a full propositional content which can act
as the input for pragmatic exploitation. Semantic repre-
sentation is equated to such truth-conditional logical form.
Once acknowledged that such picture is untenable, due to
the phenomena of semantic underspecificity, theorists - as
we have seen - has proposed various way in which prag-
matics can contribute to the development and embellish-
ment of such logical form.
However, Jaszczolt argues, once we acknowledge that
Gricean picture is unsatisfactory, there is no need to save
the very notion of logical form at all. According to DS,
such obstinate attempt to preserve the centrality of this no-
tion rests on the undue assumption of a privilege of the
syntactic representation as input to semantic analysis and
to the correlative assumption that semantic content has to
be equated with logical form. Once we reject such idea, we
have no longer reasons to claim that logical form has to be
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pragmatically enriched, since logical form is no longer the
’core source of meaning’.
Logical form is what it is: the output of syn-
tactic processing, and all attempts to make it
what it is not, or embellish or complete it with
information coming from elsewhere, succumb
to the myth that gives the logical form a privi-
leged place in utterance interpretation, that is
treats it as the core source of meaning. The
latter, however, is not an assumption that one
must necessarily follow.7
All in all, that of logical form can be maintained as ’at
best a theoretical construct device for explanatory purposes
rather than a viable stage in processing meaning8
What does it mean, then, to reject the centrality of the
notion of logical form? It means to reject the heart of the
very idea of semantic underdeterminacy. Grice’s central
precept was the one summed up in his Modified Ockham
Razor that ’senses has not to be multiplied beyond neces-
sity’. Accordingly, far from posit ambiguities in cases of
multiple readings, it is better to acknowledge a single se-
mantic, more general, meaning which can then undergo
pragmatic processes of exploitation and give rise to the
multiple readings.
Semantic underdeterminacy view start from the recogni-
tion of such precept and then concludes that, when the
resolution of similar multiple readings affects the deter-
mination of the semantic content, logical form has to be
underdetermined (or, in Atlas’s view, unspecified) with re-
spect to such contextual parameters.
If we look at this analysis more closely, it clearly appears
that the unspoken assumption is that logical form has to be
equated to semantic representation. This is why, following
Stanley and others, tracing back to logical form all contex-
tual effects of truth-conditions seems and accordingly get a
7 Jaszczolt (2005a): 19.
8 Jaszczolt (2005a): 25.
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richer semantic representation is claimed to be a definitive
rejection of the semantic underdeterminacy thesis.
But, if we anckowledge for a rich semantic represen-
tation, why should such semantic representation be con-
strained at the level of logical form, traditionally conceived?
Once again, it seems that the assumption of syntactic out-
put as the privileged source of compositional representa-
tion of meaning is responsible for such analysis.
Accordingly, DS does not allows for semantic underde-
terminacy as well as for semantic ambiguity. Or, better,
it acknowledges semantic representation to be underdeter-
mined only in those cases where it seems to play a cogni-
tive role, that is ’in the situations where the addressee rea-
sons from genuinely underspecified or ambiguous premises’:
In other words, in addition to saying that un-
derspecified semantic representation is not nor-
mally a cognitively real level of utterance pro-
cessing, I am saying that even theoretically it
need not be discerned very often9.
However, it seems that rejecting both ambiguity and un-
derspecified semantic representation left us without a way
for acknowledging for the standard case study of seman-
tic underdeterminacy view. In fact, one cannot resort to a
skeleton logical form to be filled by means of hidden in-
dexicals, since there is no such thing as a logical form in
standard sense. Moreover, neither can one claim for any of
the underspecified semantic schemas which are accounted
for in the different theories, nor it is possible to argue in
favour of any of the other forms of semantic/pragmatic
enrichment/development of the semantic representation,
insofar as such semantic representation (conceived as the
output of syntactic module) has simply disappeared from
our theoretical picture. As a consequence:
In Default Semantics (...) logical form has no
privileged status. In such an approach to mean-
ing construction, there is no semantics/ prag-
9 Jaszczolt (2005b): 11-12.
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matics boundary, and the ambiguity/underspe-
cification dilemma proves to be a wrongly posed
problem10.
However, given the overriding both of the semantics/prag-
matics distinction and of the ambiguity/underdeterminacy
alternatives, how it is now possible to fruitfully deal with
the various case study so far considered?
In DS, the answer to this question consists in moving
the level of semantic representation, ’so to speak, one level
higher’11 and, furthermore, in considering the various so-
urces which contribute to such higher single level represen-
tation ’on equal footing’.
It might be of help considering the Table 3.112. Here I
schematically summarized the various theories taken into
account with respect to the way each of these paradigms
shapes the sub-distinctions within the semantics/pragma-
tics boundary.
Author Semantic
represen-
tation
Disambi-
guation
& ref-
erence
resolu-
tion
Minimal
proposi-
tion
Enriched
proposi-
tion
Addi-
tional
proposi-
tion
Grice
1989
Sentence
meaning
What is said Implicature
Relevance
Theory
Semantics1 Explicature⇒ Semantics2 Implicature
Levinson
2000
What is said GCI (defaults) PCI
Recanati
2004
Sentence
meaning
What is saidmin WISprag Implicature
Bach
1994
What is said Impliciture Implicature
Table 3.1
Although very differentiated, it is worth noting that all
the theories fit the scheme provided in the first row of
10 Jaszczolt (1999): 9.
11 Jaszczolt (2005a): 91.
12 This is a revised version of the table in Levinson (2000): 195.
3.3 jaszczolt’s default semantics 129
the table. That is to say: even though there are theories
which allow for a ’parallel’ processing between semantic
and pragmatic contribution to utterance meaning (e.g. Rel-
evance Theory and truth-conditional pragmatics and, in a
sense, Levinson’s view), nonetheless all such approaches
acknowledge for a left-to-right reading of the table above,
which crucially involves a ’syntax-based logical form in the
process of utterance interpretation that is temporally prior
to the output of the other sources13’.
DS overrides such level of representation (the column in
light-blue in Table 3.1) and moves the semantic output one
level higher than the other sources of linguistic meaning
which are conceived on equal footing.
Two questions naturally arise. Provided that completely
different sources of meaning contribute to a single seman-
tic representation, which kind of semantics is in play here?
And, secondly, given that information from extra-linguistic
context enter in the determination of such single represen-
tation, why is it Default Semantics and not Pragmatics?
The answer to the first question is that this is a kind of
non-linguistic semantics, whose objects are ’thought-like
objects’. It is a kind of semantics more close to Carston’s
truth-conditional semantics (Semantics2) in the table 3.1,
but without entailing any development of the logical form
to get a full thought (or proposition)14.
As for the second issue, it is true that DS allows contribu-
tion from any source to contribute to the semantic content.
In this respect, therefore, it is in agreement and goes even
far beyond truth-conditional pragmatics. However, as we
will see, it crucially rests on the assumption that such com-
plex set of contributions can be semanticized in a singular,
though dynamic, semantic representation.
13 Jaszczolt (2005a): 94.
14 As a matter of fact, in DS there is no commitment to the representa-
tion of ’thoughts’. What is semantically represented is a more coarse-
grained representation of what is truth-conditionally relevant in the
representation of a thought, something which DS labels as ’general-
ization over thoughts’. This is why, as we will see, the basic units of
analysis in DS are neither sentences nor utterances but rather ’acts of
communication’. See Jaszczolt (2005a): 74-75.
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DS is thus contextualist as regards to the truth-conditional
content, however it does not share with Recanati’s view
the idea that the nature of speaker’s meaning is integrally
pragmatic15.
In the next section we will see more closely how such
single level semantic representation looks like.
3.4 merger representations
3.4.1 Recasting theoretical constructs
We have seen that the central assumption in DS is that
all possible sources of linguistic information are regarded
as on equal footing and they all contribute to a unique,
single-level semantic representation.
Such conclusion of DS is a natural consequence of a
methodological principle, which is assumed in DS and which
is claimed by Jaszczolt to be an application of Grice’s Mod-
ified Occam’s Razor to levels of representation of meaning.
As we know, Grice’s MOR states that ’senses should not
be multiplied beyond necessity’. Now, according to Jaszc-
zolt such principle has been betrayed in semantic underde-
terminacy view, since in order to avoid the multiplication
of senses (semantic ambiguity) theorists have postulated
the multiplication of levels of meaning (to account for dif-
ferent degrees of underspecified logical form). Once we
reject the idea that underspecification has in fact a role to
play, unless in context where it has psychological relevance,
there is no more room left for multiple layers of meaning.
The methodological principle of Parsimony of Levels states
as follows:
pol Levels of senses are not to be multiplied beyond ne-
cessity16.
As a result of PoL, no independent semantic realization
is assigned to a syntax-based logical form of the sentence.
15 See Jaszczolt (2005a): 96.
16 Jaszczolt (2005a): 14.
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Such an apparently simple move allows DS to argue against
the theoretical utility of the following constructs:
• Semantic underdeterminacy
• Logical form
• Sentence meaning
• What is said
• Middle level of meaning (Bach, Levinson)
• Semantics/Pragmatics borderline.
I have already give reasons for the rejections of the first
two abovementioned points.
Given the assumption about the equal compositional value
of the various sources of meaning, utterance meaning is
not primarily governed by constraints of word meaning
and sentence structure. Accordingly, given PoL, there is
no need for such level of meaning as ’sentence meaning’ to
be semantically realized in the theory.
Hence, provided we get rid of sentence meaning as a no-
tion having semantic realization in our theory, the closely
related notion of ’what is said’ looses its theoretical impor-
tance. This is straightforward if WIS is regarded in Grice’s
terms as a minimally contextually saturated logical form.
However, also when considered in Recanati’s terms as
the first conscious truth-evaluable representation made avail-
able by the speaker, it is nonetheless the output of a asso-
ciative semantico-pragmatic train of processing which has
at its basis a syntax-based form. So, we can get rid of Re-
canati’s WIS as well.
According to Jaszczolt, indeed, the notion of WIS is the-
oretically redundant as it is an unnecessary complication
deriving from considering sentence level as the core source
of meaning. Moreover it is a senseless notion if we try to
use it without further specifications, like: ’(i) in what unit:
sentence, utterance, discourse;29 (ii) by what/whom: by
the unit considered or by the speaker; and (iii) from whose
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perspective: the speaker’s, the audience’s, or the theoreti-
cian’s17.’
All in all, I propose to retain the semantic in-
nocence and treat what is said as it is treated
in everyday parlance and not introduce it to se-
mantic theory. What is said is not a level in
utterance processing; it is not a theoretical unit
either. It can be many things. And if it can be
many things, let us respectfully exclude it from
theorizing18.
As for the variously advocated middle level of mean-
ing, DS has it easy to reject Bachian conception of ’implici-
ture’. Bach’s implicitures are a middle level between min-
imal proposition and implicature and are accordingly in-
troduced to reject the intrusionist view. Bach’s impliciture
(driven by the processes of completion and expansion) are
indeed subcategories of what is said, regarded as the out-
put of syntax (plus saturation). Now, if we have no longer
a notion of WIS it is hard to see how Bachian impliciture
can arise.
As for Levinson’s utterance-type meaning, the point is
much more crucial in DS, as Levinson’s view calls into
account the very notion of default interpretations. As al-
ready mentioned, I think that Jaszczolt has perhaps one of
the most conclusive objections against Levinson’s middle
level. The category of GCI as shaped in Levinson’s theory
is rather eclectic.
All it does is create an illusion of categorial
unity beyond the eclectic collection of salient
senses19.
. Levinson’s postulation of a single middle level of mean-
ing including a great variety of units from which GCIs
arise seems to be widely ad hoc. Moreover, GCI are not
implicature in standard Gricean sense insofar as they are
17 Jaszczolt (2005a): 22.
18 Jaszczolt (2005a): 24.
19 Jaszczolt (2005a): 43.
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claimed to arise locally and not at propositional level. And
the related cancellability of GCIs seems to run against the
primary purpose of a theory of default interpretations, i.e.
give reason of the speed and efficiency of human commu-
nication. In conclusion:
If embellishments are eclectic as far as their
sources are concerned, then the ’level’ they cre-
ate cannot be but a waste basket20.
Finally, the whole construction which is attempted in DS
leads almost naturally to the conclusion that the Seman-
tics/Pragmatics issue is at least a wrong posed problem.
Once a single rich semantic representation, allowing for
contribution of different sources on equal footing, is ac-
knowledged there is no semantics/pragmatics (but also no
syntax/semantics or syntax/pragmatics) borderline.
Once the assumption of a merger is in place,
the interfaces do not belong to our theoretical
discourse. They pose the problem of interpreta-
tion in the wrong way, focusing on what is only
an intratheoretic issue of boundaries, rather than
an issue about discourse processing21.
3.4.2 Acts of communication and compositionality
I have so far set the scene through showing how DS com-
pletely recasts the standardly used theoretical constructs.
However, besides such pars destruens, DS introduces new
notions and concepts to account with such reformulated
scenario.
Rejecting the view that language understanding proceeds
linearly from sentence meaning to implicature, in favour of
a picture in which a single semantic representation receives
information from different and equally relevant sources, re-
quires asking which kind of unit is the one which is object
of semantic analysis in DS.
20 Jaszczolt (2005a): 26.
21 Jaszczolt (2005a): 33.
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Semantic unities in DS could be of course be utterances,
and there is no doubt that DS is a theory of utterance
meaning. However, as we will see, insofar as it is a dy-
namic semantics and it resort to a formalism (the one of
DRT) which is explicitly construed to account for pieces
of discourse which are larger then sentences (and, accord-
ingly, utterances of such sentences), utterances cannot be
the ideal unit of our theory.
Moreover, DS is radically post-Gricean insofar as it de-
fines meaning in terms of a composite notion22. However,
DS takes such Gricean assumption to its extreme conse-
quences, and defines meaning not as (primarily) the out-
put of the stricto sensu linguistic source of information but
as the merging of multiple sources of information which
’are treated as temporally interrelated as far as their contri-
bution to the merger representation is concerned23.’
On this view, taking utterances as the units of DS would
be misleading as utterances are standardly regarded as pri-
marily linked to sentences.
For both these reasons, DS is claimed to be rather a se-
mantic theory of ’acts of communication’. The locution
seems appropriate, since it is designed to be intermediate
between the too narrow notion of ’utterances’ and the too
wide notion of ’thoughts’.
Relevance Theoretic truth-conditional semantics (Semantics2
in Table 3.1) is claimed to be a semantics whose unit of
analysis are thoughts (or proposition). It is a non-formal,
entirely conceptual, sort of semantics which is entirely guided
by the principles of Relevance. Jaszczolt shares with Carston
the idea that thoughts are too much fine-grained to serve
as a unit of semantic analysis in formal terms. However,
she argues that we can single out a representation which,
though more coarse-grained than thoughts, is nonetheless
capable of capturing the relevant truth-conditoinal import
of various sources of information.
Acts of communication so defined appears then to be a
suitable semantic unity which is basically not linguistic but
22 See Levinson (2000): 91.
23 Jaszczolt (2005a): 94.
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acts as a generalization over thoughts24. It is a generaliza-
tion insofar as the semantic representation is not claimed
to be able to capture the structure of a thought, but only to
represent its truth-conditional content.
Now, in addition, such truth-conditional content is claimed
to be compositional. This is why DS is qualified as a ’com-
positional theory of acts of communication’.
But what kind of compositionality is here in play? Well,
of course there is no matter of compositionality in the tra-
ditional Fregean sense, as compositionality of word mean-
ings in accordance with sentence structure. In fact, we are
working under the proviso that word meaning and sen-
tence structure are only one of the multiple sources of acts
of communication. But, once again, how it is possible to
preserve a compositional semantics while rejecting the cen-
trality of syntactic form?
I should now introduce a further central concept in DS,
that of merger representation (henceforth MR).
MRs are exactly the sort of semantic representation of
acts of communication. They are mergers of the following
four sources:
1. Combination of word meaning and sentence struc-
ture
2. Conscious pragmatic inference1
3. Cognitive defaults
4. Social-cultural defaults1
It is important to remember that all these sources are
claimed to be on the same level. Points 1. and 4. in the
list hold the subscript 1 to distinguish them from social-
cultural defaults and conscious pragmatics inferences which
are at the base of the generation of implicatures. MR,
indeed, are representation of meaning of acts of commu-
nication, they merge information coming from linguistic
knowledge, mental states and social-cultural encyclopedic
information. DS shares with the extant paradigms accounted
24 Jaszczolt (2005a): 240.
136 default semantics
in the previous chapter the intuitive idea that (particular-
ized) implicatures come one (inferential) step later.
Compositionality in DS arises at the upper level of MRs.
There is no need for compositionality ’at the level of the
combination of word meaning and sentence structure - neither
is such a level necessary as an independent construct’25.
Rather,
Compositionality is then, so to speak, removed
from the linguistic ’level’ and placed on the level
of representing acts of communication. It can be
appropriately called metacompositionality26.
3.4.3 Intentionality and cognitive defaults
I will leave for the moment the analysis of the way in
which the compositional representation is accounted more
specifically (i.e. also in formal details) and turn to the more
general topic of the status of the sources of MR.
DS is claimed to rest on a leading assumption (from
Searle (1984): 89).
Just as it was bad science to treat systems
that lack intentionality as if they had it, so it
is equally bad science to treat systems that have
intrinsic intentionality as if they lacked it.
DS resorts to the influential tradition which can be traced
back to the works of, among others, Brentano, Bolzano and
Husserl and Searle. According to such tradition, mental
states exhibit ’aboutness’, that is to say they have the prop-
erty of being about something or to have an object.
Intentionality as a propriety of mental states or as a fea-
ture of our brain27 is inherited by language. What is for
human language to have intentionality? It is the same as
to have a referent of discourse. In DS it is assumed that the
primary intention in communication is to secure a referent
of the speaker’s utterance. Accordingly,
25 Jaszczolt (2005a): 83.
26 Jaszczolt (2005a): 83.
27 Damasio (1999): 78-79.
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In short, intentionality can be understood for
our purposes as that property of linguistic ex-
pressions that makes them refer to objects U˝ be
it individuals or states, events or processes. ’In-
tentional’ can be coarsely equated with having
a referent. If we allow events, states and pro-
cesses to count as such referents, then intention-
ality can be understood as the referentiality of
linguistic expressions.
Intentionality is thus intended as referentiality in DS.
Such move can be read as a radicalization of Grice’s intu-
ition that reference assignment is the only pragmatic pro-
cess which is part of the semantics28.
Moreover, intentionality in DS, according to Searle’s pre-
cept, is claimed to be one of the possible and allowed
sources of speaker’s meaning. More importantly, the ac-
knowledgment of intentionality as one of the sources of
meaning makes it possible to introduce the notion of de-
fault interpretation, at least in its cognitive variety.
Cognitive defaults (CD) in DS are the sort of preferred
interpretation which can be traced back to the intentional-
ity. How? To explain the point it is needed to introduce to
further principles of DS.
One is the already mentioned principle of Primary Inten-
tion, which states that:
pi The primary role of intention in communication is to
secure the referent of the speaker’s utterance29.
The second is the principle of Degree of Intentions:
di Intentions allow for degrees30.
The idea behind the two principles PI and DI is that it
is possible to account for many of the issue traditionally
28 See Jaszczolt (2005a): 115 for a similar remark.
29 Jaszczolt (2005a): 52.
30 Jaszczolt (2005a): 51.
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accounted in the semantics/pragmatics interface by resort-
ing to these two simple principles and allowing the mean-
ing of acts of communication to be (also) a function of the
strength or degree of intentionality of a certain expression.
The strongest intentionality is also the default intention-
ality and it gives rise to cognitive defaults, i.e. default
which can be traced back to intentions of the underlying
mental states according to PI. DI, on the other hand, which
is a result of the assumed basic ’referentiality’ of linguistic
expressions, enters in the assignment of referents in cases
of presupposition, anaphoric links, definite descriptions, in
accordance with PI.
To explain the point, let’s consider a simple example
which takes into account definite descriptions31.
(62) The best architect designed this church.
According to the semantic underdeterminacy view, sen-
tence (62) is semantically underspecified as regards to the
kind of reference which is held by the definite descrip-
tion. In fact, the phrase ’the best architect’ can refer to
some specific individual (say, Antoni Gaudì, in a context
in which the utterer of (62) is pointing to the Sagrada Fa-
milia in Barcelona), or it can have no referential import and
be a property attributed to who the utterer of (62) thinks is
the best architect, whoever he is.
According to Jaszczolt32, there is a third type of reading
which is allowed, that is the one involving a sort of refer-
ential mistake. Accordingly, the speaker of refchurch can
utter the definite description with the (mistaken) intention
to refer to, say, Simon Guggenheim, designed the Sagrada
Familia).
Correlatively, we have three alternative logical forms to
account for the (underspecified) sentence (62), correspond-
ing respectively to the referential, the mistakenly referen-
tial and the attributive reading.:
31 The example and relative discussion are taken from Jaszczolt (2005a):
106-111.
32 See for example Jaszczolt (2002): 130ff.
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(62.1) Designed the church (a) a = Antoni Gaudì
(62.2) Designed the church (a ′) a ′ = Antoni Gaudì
(62.3) ∃x(Designed this church (x)∧ ∀y(Designed
this church (y)→ y = x)∧Best architect (x))
It seems that the, in the most contexts, the referential
reading is the unmarked one, that is it is the preferred
interpretation unless the context suggests otherwise. Ac-
cordingly, Jaszczolt claims, the strongest intentionality is
linked with the referential use of the definite description.
In such case the intentionality is un-dispersed, intersub-
jectively accepted and so it is the best candidate to hold the
strongest, default intentionality.
In the readings (62.2) and (62.3) the intentionality of the
underlying mental state is respectively dispersed, subjec-
tively strong but intersubjectively inacceptable, and very
weak (in case of attributive use).
The idea should be clear: instead of accounting for the
different readings in terms of semantic unspecificity of the
logical form, DS claims that the alternative readings are
function of the intentionality of expression which is a in-
herited from the degree of intentionality of the underlying
mental states. The strongest the intentionality, the strongest
is the chance for the default interpretation to arise.
We have then a notion of default which does not invoke
an eclectic and rather un-explanatory category of expression-
types but, rather, resorts to the intentionality in its different
degree as a possible source of utterance meaning.
In short, where intentionality-based defaults
are discernible, intentions interact with the log-
ical form and produce a full semantic represen-
tation33.
33 Jaszczolt (2005b): 15.
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3.5 drt in a nutshell
DRT is a semantic theory developed by Hans Kamp, start-
ing from his seminal paper Kamp (1981).
The main idea behind the theory is that semantic inter-
pretation should take into account not sentences in isola-
tion but, rather, discourse chunks.
One related main feature of DRT is the idea that dis-
course interpretation is incremental. This is to say that,
in order to give formalization of the way in which inter-
preters understands pieces of discourse it is needed to ac-
knowledge for the way in which the interpretation of new
sentences updates the context in which the following sen-
tence will be uttered.
On this approach, there is no clear-cut distinction be-
tween content and context, insofar as the content of a given
sentence in discourse serves as the context of the following
one. DRT’s strategy of updating context aims to mirror
the actual processing of utterance understanding. In fact,
DRT is furthermore a representationalist theory of inter-
pretation, i.e. the semantic structures (Discourse Represen-
tation Structures or DRSs in DRT) are claimed to be a re-
production of the kind of mental representation which one
interpreter build up in the course of discourse interpreta-
tion.
DRT was principally introduced to give an analysis of
anaphora resolution, and particularly to provide a success-
ful formalization for well-known Geach’s Donkey Sentences.
Donkey Sentences are problematic sentences like (63):
(63) Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it.
The problem with sentences like (63) is that if we try to
give an analysis of it in classic first-order predicate logic it
would seem that the following would be the case:
(63.1) ∀(x)(Farmer(x)∧∃(y)(Donkey(y)∧Owns(x,y))
→ Beat(x,y))
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However, such analysis turns out to be uncorrect, inso-
far as the second y is out of the scope of the existential
quantifier.
The right rendering of the sentences would be then as in
(63.2):
(63.2) ∀(x)∀(y)((Farmer(x)∧Donkey(y)∧Owns(x,y))
→ Beat(x,y))
We are accordingly left with the problem of how to ac-
count for the fact that to an indefinite construction (like
our ’a donkey’) has to be assigned universal force in or-
der to capture the anaphorical link betweeen the indefinite
description and the indefinite pronoun (’it’).
In DRT we have DRS which are composed as follows:
we have a universe of discourse referents which are intro-
duced in the first row of the diagram and which corre-
spond to bound variables in the classic first-order predi-
cate logic, and a list of ’discourse conditions’ in the main
box, with correspond to predicates of first order logic.
A DRS is verified by a so called embedding function
with maps discourse referents onto individuals of a given
model M. Accordingly, sentence interpretations in DRT can
be standardly provided in model-theoretic fashion.
In DRT the interpretation of a sentence like (63) is straight-
forwardly given in a DRS like (63.3):
(63.3) x, y
Farmer (x)
Donkey (y)
x owns y
⇒
x beats y
Given the definition of embedding function (i.e. verify-
ing function) for DRSs (I will drop details here), the ref-
erence markers in the antecedent box are accessible to the
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consequent, so it is possible for the consequent to refer
to y. The point can be further spelled out by means of
an intermediate representation where we could introduce
further reference markers (say, v and w) in the right box
and accordingly add the conditions x = v, y = w and
Beats( v,w)34.
The main point, however, is that DRS assigns no quanti-
fying force to indefinites per se. An indefinite like ’a don-
key’ in (63) only introduce a new discourse referent.
What quantifying force they seem to have is
not theirs, but derives from the environment in
which they occur. If the semantic material asso-
ciated with ’a donkey’ is introduced in the main
DRS (...) the quantifying effect will be existen-
tial, owing to the fact that this DRS is verified
in a model M iff there is a way of verifying it
in M. If the semantic material associated with
’a donkey’ is introduced in the antecedent of a
conditional, as in [(63.3)], the quantifying effect
will be universal, owing to the fact that a con-
dition K → K ′ is verified in M iff every way of
verifying K can be extended to a way of verify-
ing K’. This view on indefinites lies at the heart
of DRT.
Hence, given the formalism of DRT, the issues related
to ’donkey sentences’ disappear and the formal treatment
that DRT provides in terms of DRSs is quite unproblematic
and straightforward. Also, the constraints on marker acces-
sibility which stem from the semantics defined for DRSs,
34 Notice that the discourse referents are not introduced in the main
DRS but in a newly introduced subordinate DRS. This is why, intu-
itively, the universally quantified expression concerns discourse refer-
ents which are only hypothetically introduced as arbitrary bearers of
the conditions stated in the antecedent and are not individuals which
are part of the domain of the main DRS (’markers belonging to the
universe of the main DRS get an existential interpretation’ van Eijck
& Kamp (1997): 186.). This obviously makes them non accessible to
anaphoric link with the main DRS: a restrictive condition which, un-
surprisingly, turns out to make the right prediction. See Kamp & Reyle
(1993): 166-171.
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makes it possible to get the available anaphoric links be-
tween discourse referents and to preclude the possibility
of unavailable links as in (64):
(64) John does not own a guitar. He plays it.
The DRS for (64) is as in (64.1)
(64.1)
x, z
¬
y
Guitar (y)
x owns y
x plays z
In such DRS variable y is introduced in a subordinate
DRS and is then not accessible by the main DRS. Accord-
ingly the marker z cannot bind y (by means of a condition
like z = y). This means that it is not possible to interpret
the pronoun ’it’ as referring to the ’guitar’ in the first sen-
tence. This happens in fact to be the right prediction.
I will not enter into details of the semantics for DRS.
This sketchy overview on DRT was only given to make
the reader a bit familiar with the formalism which (in an
emended and extended form) is used in DS.
Besides formalities, it is worth stressing some main fea-
tures of a theory like DRT which are crucial for its being a
semantic formal theory for the paradigm of DS:
• DRT is a semantic theory of ’coherent multi-sentence
discourse and text’. Accordingly, it takes into account
ando produces semantic representation which goes
beyond the borderlines of sentences uttered in isola-
tion.
• As a result of the multi-sentential nature of its seman-
tics, DRT is an incremental theory, which is claimed
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to mirror the actual process of discourse understand-
ing which procedes ’bit by bit’.
• Finally, given this two assumptions, DRT is a theory
which is often (even if not necessarily) equipped with
a dynamic semantics, ’where the center of the stage,
occupied so long by the concept of truth with respect
to appropriate models, has been replaced by context
change conditions, with truth conditions defined in
terms of those’35
3.6 the best architect
I will now turn back to example (62). As we have seen,
there are three possible interpretations for the definite de-
scription ’the best architect’, which in DS are claimed to
reflect three possible degrees of intentionality of the under-
lying mental belief, respectively
1. strong or un-dispersed intentionality = default, refer-
ential reading
2. dispersed intentionality (between speaker and hearer)
= non-default referential reading
3. weakest, dispersed intentionality = attributive read-
ing
Using a DRT-style diagrams, Jaszczolt argues that the
following are suitable semantic representation for the three
readings:
(62.1.1) Default referential reading
35 van Eijck & Kamp (1997): 181.
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x y
[Antoni Gaudì]CD (x)
[Sagrada Família]CD (y)
[[x]CD designed [y]CD]WS
As in DRT diagrams, we have a first line in which the
universe of the DRS is introduced and the following lines
in which the conditions are given. The only difference with
DRT is that in Default Semantics DRS syntax is not the
only input of semantic representation, that’s why the con-
tent of the square brackets can be something which is not
even syntactically realized in the sentence. This is the case
for the description ’the best architect’ and the demonstra-
tive ’this church’. Instead of such phrases we found in the
semantic representation the correspondent referents, with
the subscribed indication of the source which is responsi-
ble for a particular bracketed material36.
Merger representation (62.1.1) represents then the first,
default referential reading, where the referent of the de-
scription ’the best architect’ and of the demonstrative ’this
church’ are provided by means of Cognitive Default (CD)
and the resultant relation ’x designed y’ is given by the
interaction of word meaning and sentence structure (WS)
and cognitive defaults.
(62.2.1) Non-default referential reading
36 Obviously, the semantics of our DRSs has to be implemented to al-
low variables for referent markers to range over the set of discourse
referents both in default and non-default readings
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x y
[Simon Guggenheim]CPI1 (x)
[Sagrada Família]CD (y)
[[x]CPI1 designed [y]CD]WS
In an analogous way, MR for (62.2) is given by (62.2.1).
In such case we have that the mistaken referent intended
by the speaker of (62) is recovered by the hearer. Assum-
ing the hearer ’has the correct and sufficient knowledge
base for referential identification of the individual talked
about’, such process of recovering of a speaker’s mistak-
enly intended referent involves by the hearer a process of
overriding of the default.
Two points are worth noting: first, that in DS semantic
representations are representations mirroring the process
of understanding of an act of communication by a model
hearer.
Secondly, that the overriding of the default reading in
case of conscious pragmatic inference (CPI1) does not in-
volve the cancellation of the default, since - different from
Levinson’s cancellable GCIs - both CD and CPI1 are claimed
to be computed at global level, that is: after the whole utter-
ance (or, better, act of communication) has been processed.
Accordingly, there is no risk that the overriding of defaults
leads to a slowdown, rather than to a speedup, of the inter-
pretation process.
(62.3.1) Attributive reading
x y
[The best architect]CPI1 (x)
[Sagrada Famìlia]CD (y)
[[x]CPI1 designed [y]CD]WS
3.7 connectives in ds 147
The attributive interpretation comes with the weakest in-
tentionality. The default reading does not arise and ’the
speaker’s thought is taken to be about no particular, known,
identifiable individual37’.
In conclusion, what the case of definite descriptions shows
is that in a typical context in which multiple readings are
allowed, there is no need to resort to semantic underde-
terminacy. First of all, as the semantic representation is a
merger which mirrors the result of a process of interpreta-
tion, it is straightforwardly introduced the pretty intuitive
claim that underdeterminacy of logical form, as well as am-
biguity, is in play only when it has psychological relevance,
that is to say not as frequently as the semantic underdeter-
minacy view seems to suggest.
Furthermore, there is no longer room for discussion con-
cerning the role that the underspecified propositional form
holds in the actual process of utterance understanding, since
it has in fact none. There is only one resultant semantic
representation, one which is intended to mirror the men-
tal representation of an ideal hearer. Such mental repre-
sentation is thought-like (even if it is not claimed to be
the representation of a thought), insofar as it represents
the truth-conditional skeleton of a hearer’s thought. MR
is then more coarse-grained than a thought, but, insofar
as it is both compositional and truth-conditional, it has at
the same time the advantage of being a theoretical object
which is much more suitable for semantic analysis than a
thought by itself.
3.7 connectives in ds
3.7.1 Overview
In conclusion of this discussion of DS, I will now address
the topic which has been a privileged case study in the
present work, i.e. the issue concerning the alleged seman-
tic ambiguity of logical connectives in natural language.
37 Jaszczolt (2005a): 113.
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In chapter one (see p. 2), I started the discussion of
Grice’s theory of meaning with a long quotation from the
very beginning of Grice’s William James Lectures. Such ini-
tial passage is indeed devoted to the theme of sentential
connectives and their counterpart in natural language and
shows how this sort of questions, concerning the best way
to shape the borderline between logical particles and their
enriched natural language equivalents.
As a philosopher and a logician, Grice was manifested
a keen interest for this kind of issues, which are able to
shed light to the very heart of the relation between logic
and natural language semantics.
As we know, Grice’s assumption of methodological par-
simony (his Modified Occam’s Razor), led us to the search
for a unitary and entirely pragmatic treatment of the en-
riched interpretation of logical particles. Senses are not to
be multiplied beyond necessity: therefore, there is no need
to postulate an ambiguity between two or more meanings
of logical connectives. By contrast, it is enough to single
out a unique, more general interpretation - the one which
is along the lines of the truth-tables for classical boolean
connectives - as the semantic meaning. And to derive
all the enriched non-truth functional contributions which
are standardly attached to sentential connectives as occur-
rences of (generalized) conversational implicatures.
Grice devoted several pages to this topic, particularly ad-
dressing the issue of the inclusive/exclusive ambiguity of
disjuction38 and the defence of a purely logical way of de-
scribing implication in natural language39.
Grice’s analysis was famously defended by Gerald Gaz-
dar40, who also resorts to Gricean principles of conversa-
tion in order to show why only the classical negation op-
erator (¬) is present in English among the four combinato-
rially available one-place operators and, analogously, why
only the four two-place connectives are lexically realized
(∧,∨,→,↔) among the sixteen available possibility41.
38 See Grice (1989): 44ff.
39 See Grice (1989): 58-85.
40 See Gazdar (1979): chapter 4.
41 Gazdar (1979): 68ff.
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Gazdar also attempts a defence of Grice’s view against
the already mentioned approach of Cohen (1971). As we
have seen, Cohen tried to show that the Grice’s analysis
in terms of GCIs as allegedly responsible for the enriched
interpretations of sentential connectives cannot be main-
tained, insofar as such implicatures would have to arise
also in contexts in which sentences triggering GCIs are em-
bedded in longer and more complex sentences (e.g. condi-
tionals) and accordingly does not express a complete state-
ment, in blatant contradiction with Grice’s own theory of
conversational implicatures.
Gazdar’s defence of the traditional view consists in re-
jecting Grice’s analysis of natural language conditionals in
terms of material implication. Following Stalnaker’s anal-
ysis of conditionals, Gazdar argues that the role of the an-
tecedent in a conditional is simply to update the context of
evaluation of the whole sentence with information which
are consistent with the previous contextual assumptions.
In case of examples like the ones of the old king’s death
(see (37) and (37.1) of chapter 2, p. 71), then, both the
consequents would be evaluated with respect to the infor-
mation made available in the context by the antecedents,
including the respective implicatures. That is to say, in the
first case, the fact that ’Tom will be quite content’ would
be evaluated in a context in which, given the antecedent
and the relative implicature, old king’s death precedes the
declaration of a republic, while in the second the same fact
would be evaluated in a context in which the temporal or-
der of the events is the opposite.
If, unlike Grice, we are not tied to a classical
view of natural language semantics, then there
is no good reason to try and treat all or any con-
ditionals as cases of material implication. At the
same time, just because we allow a more com-
plex semantics for if. . . then. . . sentences on the
basis of rather strong evidence, this does not
entitle us to elaborate the semantics of all the
other logical operators on the basis of the ar-
gument presented by Cohen. This is especially
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so when the apparent deviations of and from ∧
and or from ∨ are so well accounted for by the
Gricean hypothesis.
All in all, Gazdar’s defence of Grice’s analysis rests on
the possibility for implicatures to be generated locally, con-
trary to Gricean view.
Levinson’s view, as we have seen, also is an attempt of
preserving Grice’s analysis in terms of GCIs. Levinson
tries to show that intrusive constructions (as he labels con-
texts like the one of Cohen’s ’old king’s death’), far from
showing the insufficiency of Grice’s analysis, are a proof of
the peculiar intermediate status of GCIs which are default
interpretation triggered by the use of certain expression-
types (like, e.g., natural language. Given the assumption
of Grice’s circle, i.e. that generalized conversational impli-
catures can contribute to the truth-conditional content of
a sentence, such preferred interpretation are allowed to be
generated also at sub-sentential level (i.e. locally) and are
subject of cancellation given the appropriate contrasting
evidence.
All in all, however, though having a peculiar nature, en-
riched interpretations of logical connectives are treated by
Levinson as cases of conversational implicatures and the
Gricean analysis is therefore preserved.
As we have seen, an utterly different analysis is given in
truth-conditional pragmatics in terms of free enrichment.
Conjunction buttressing, exclusive reading of disjunction,
conditional perfection42 are all cases in which literal mean-
ing undergoes a train of unconscious pragmatic processes
which eventually yield an enriched proposition, which is
42 For Conditional perfection, firstly noticed by Geis & Zwicky (1971),
it is intended the phenomenon by virtue of which a conditional is
strengthened to a biconditional as in
(63) If you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars.
. Example (63) seems to trigger the implicature that ’if you don’t mow
the lawn, I won’t give you five dollars’, and accordingly that ’If and
only if you mow the lawn, I will give you five dollars’, i.e. a strenghen-
ing from if to iff. For discussion, see e.g. Jaszczolt (2002): 78ff, Levin-
son (2000): 119ff. and van der Auwera (1997).
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equated with What is said, as the first consciously avail-
able representation of speaker’s meaning.
In an analogous way, in Relevance Theoretic framework,
enriched interpretation of connectives are regarded as none-
inferences, that is they are not occurrences of implicatures,
but of development of the logical form by means of infer-
ences triggered by the contexts. In Relevance Theory, a
major distinction is made between conceptual and proce-
dural meaning43: it is argued that some connectives, like
the standard boolean connectives, do contribute to the en-
coded conceptual (i.e., in terms of RT, truth-conditional) se-
mantic content, while others discourse markers (like ’there-
fore’, ’nonetheless’, etc...) do not contribute to the concep-
tual content, but rather provide ’a constraint on, or indica-
tion of, the way some aspect of pragmatic inference should
procede44’.
Be that as it may, according to Carston, thinking of infer-
ences in case of connectives as default inferences (in the
sense of Levinson’s GCIs) ’runs into a number of prob-
lems’. As for the case of ’and’, e.g., the default view:
...does not account for the wide range of sub-
tly different temporal, cause-consequence and
other relations, which ’and’-conjunctions can com-
municate (...); it postulates a default inference
rule for temporal sequence attached to ’and’,
but the same inference goes through for juxta-
posed cases (...); it cannot account for the fact
that temporal sequence may be assumed, on the
basis of conjunct ordering, even when it is in-
consistent with highly accessible general knowl-
edge (and so should be defeated according to
GCI theory)45.
Though not allowing for defaults, nonetheless Carston’s
analysis is based on the existence of highly accessible cog-
nitive scripts, i.e. for temporal ordering or cause/effect
43 The distinction is due to Diane Blakemore and introduced in Blake-
more (1987).
44 Carston (2002): 379.
45 Carston (2002): 259 fn. 1.
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relation in case of ’and’-conjunction. Such mental schemas
are accessible by virtue of the cognitive and communica-
tive principles of Relevance, which state, respectively, that
’human cognition tends to be geared towards the maximi-
sation of relevance’ and that ’every ostensive stimulus con-
veys a presumption of its own optimal relevance’46.
Considering an example like (64):
(64) He handed her the scalpel and she made the inci-
sion.
Carston gives an explanation in Relevance theoretic terms
of the reasons why the interpretation in (64.1) is very much
likely to arise than the one in (64.2):
(64.1) He handed her the scalpel and a second or two
later she made the incision with that scalpel.
(64.2) He handed her the scalpel and simultaneously
she made the incision with her pocketknife.
The hearer constructs the most accessible in-
terpretation (that is, the stereotypical one) and,
provided that is satisfies his expectation of rel-
evance, he stops there. Abstracted from any
narrative or conversational setting as the exam-
ple is there, the default assumption is that this
highly accessible interpretation does give rise
to the expected range of effects, so the hearer
doesn’t go on to consider other less accessible
interpretive hypotheses. Furthermore, the other
logically possible interpretations, such as [(64.2)],
are not just less accessible, but massively much
less accessible, and no particular one of them is
more obviously available than dozens of others,
so that even a hearer dissatisfied with [(64.1)]
could have no idea which hypothesis to try next.
It follows that a speaker who wanted to commu-
nicate something other than [(64.1)] would not
46 Sperber & Wilson (1986) : 255.
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be able to do so by uttering [(64)] and, if func-
tioning rationally, wound not attempt to do so.
3.7.2 The Myth of Logical Connectives?
All summed, hence, it seems that intuitively Carston’s
relevance theoretic approach, though not resorting to an
explicit category of default meanings, is much more close
to DS-style explanation, than it is, e.g., an explicitly default
oriented approach as Levinson’s. And in fact it turns out
the be the case.
However, before approaching the relatively simple view
of DS on sentential connectives, a point is maybe worth not-
ing. The unspoken assumption that, from Grice’s analysis
on, is in play in the treatment of sentential connectives in
natural language is that of they being the natural counter-
part of boolean operators of classical logic. This apparently
odd assumption is motivated by a number of arguments:
first of all, the simplicity and effectiveness of a semantic
analysis in terms of truth-functional particles is hard to
be abandoned and it also offers a very elegant and uni-
tary explanation (in terms of pragmatic inferences) of the
enriched meanings conveyed by such particles in natural
language. However, as the whole range of examples pro-
vided in semantic underdeterminacy view, such approach
can hardly be maintained, as it is exposed to a number of
conclusive counter-examples.
Secondly, one standard argument in favour of the assim-
ilation of natural language connectives to logical ones is
the fact that many of the default enrichments which are
triggered by means of implicatures are claimed to be uni-
versal and, nonetheless not lexicalized in any languages,
and accordingly they are claimed to be witnesses of a ’real
pressure in language against independent lexicaliation of
notions made redundant by implicature47.
To make just an example, it is commonly argued that,
though ambiguity is a typical intra-linguistic phenomenon,
that is if a word is genuinely ambiguous between two senses
47 Gazdar (1979): 78.
154 default semantics
in a language, one would expect to find languages in which
such ambiguity is resolved. However, this is not the case
for the inclusive/exclusive reading of disjunction. To cite
the words of Gennaro Chierchia:
Although it would be possible for natural lan-
guages to have more than one morpheme to ex-
press disjunctions, such morphemes tend to be
all systematically ambiguous between an inclu-
sive and an exclusive sense. It would thus be
the case of an universal ambiguity, a case with-
out precedent48.
However, while we can easily reject the first Gricean ar-
gument in favour of the assimilation of natural language
connective to logical ones, evidences from cross-linguistic
studies make also possible to undermine the second one.
As it is quite conclusively demonstrated by Mauri &
van der Auwera (2012) ’the notion of connective is not de-
fined in formal terms. A given interclausal relation may
indeed be encoded by an array of morphosyntactic struc-
tures, ranging from invariable discourse connectives, to
auxiliaries, clitics, pre- and post-positions, case affixes, ad-
verbial affixes and even suprasegmental marking49’.
Cross-linguist evidences provided by Mauri & van der
Auwera show that the customary analysis of connectives as
abstractions over logical boolean operators is unmotivated
and a number of counterarguments runs against such as-
similation.
According to the data collected by Mauri & van der Auw-
era, there is a strong discrepancy between the semantic/prag-
matic distinctions which are identified between logical and
natural language connectives (temporal, causal ordering of
end; inclusive/exclusive reading of disjunction, etc...) and
the actually coded distinctions in natural language.
What comparative researches seem to show is, by con-
trast, that many of the commonly acknowledged distinc-
tions (and exactly those distinction for which semantic and
48 Chierchia (1997): 185. Translation mine.
49 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 1.
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pragmatic paradigms have tried to give explanations) are
of marginal or even no relevance to natural language.
Reversing Chierchia’s argument, it is claimed for exam-
ple that the unattested existence of independent lexicaliza-
tion for inclusive and exclusive reading of disjunction, far
from showing a universal inferential pattern governed by
Gricean maxims, is by contrast index of the irrelevance of
such distinction for natural language disjunction.
By contrast, a number of different semantic distinctions
are encoded in several languages, such as sequential and
non-sequential disjunction, declarative and interrogative
disjunction, ’simple’ and ’choice-aimed’ disjunction, etc...
Furthermore, it is easy to find languages which does not
encode a connective for ’or’ and also, as it has been surpris-
ingly demonstrated by Paul Gil in the case of Maricopa lan-
guage spoken by Native American in Arizona50 languages
which lack a connective for ’and’.
In conclusion:
Such a discrepancy strongly challenges the
plausibility of a direct equivalence between log-
ical connectives and connectives in natural lan-
guages, and suggests that a more promising di-
rection of research would be to understand what
strategies such languages employ to express con-
junction and disjunction: should we assume that
in such cases it is all left to pragmatics? What
seems to be more interesting is to examine the
division of labor between the part of meaning
that is encoded in the connective and the part
of meaning that is inferred through pragmatic
processes, looking at this borderline as a flexi-
ble notch, moving along both a diachronic and
a synchronic continuum51.
According to Mauri & van der Auwera the semantic/prag-
matic borderline as regards to connectives is dynamic in
two senses: in diachronic terms, it is easy to see how highly
50 Gil (1991).
51 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 3.
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conventional implicatures can gradually become lexicalized.
This is a phenomenon which has been widely observed
and which does not concern primarily sentential connec-
tives (let’s think of the shift from ’drinking’ to ’drinking
alcoholic’ which is almost universally lexicalized in Euro-
pean languages).
Secondly, from a synchronic perspective, the borderline
is dynamic with respect the distinction between the kind of
information which is encoded and the sort of information
which is left to pragmatic inference. As far as such distinc-
tion is in play, it is shown that ’the world’s languages put
the borderline between coding and inferencing at different
points along the continuum52’.
Space considerations prevent me from dealing with the
wide variety of data which are provided by Mauri & van der
Auwera in favor of their approach. What is worth stressing
is only the point that cross-linguistic evidence show that
there is apparently no independent motivation to argue in
favor of the equivalence of logical and natural languages
connectives.
This does not mean that it is useless for the semanticist to
try to isolate the encoded, semantic meaning of a particular
connective in a given language and to analyze which kind
of information is semanticized and which is left to prag-
matics. However, such task has to be performed keeping
an eye of the proviso that such borderline is flexible, and,
more importantly, that the distinctions between encoded
and enriched interpretations, for which semantic theories
traditionally try to give reasons, can be of marginal (if not
of no) linguistic relevance.
3.7.3 Connectives and merger representations
I will now turn back to DS and shortly give an overview
on the analysis which in this paradigm is given for the case
study of sentential connectives.
Quite surprisingly, it will turn out that the analysis for
connectives which is attempted by Jaszczolt in DS seems
52 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 5.
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to match very well the provisos which arise from cross-
linguistic studies.
Consider examples (65), (66), (67)53:
(65) I dropped the glass and it broke.
(66) I looked up and it started snowing.
(67) I smiled and John smiled too.
In (65) a cause/effect relation (besides, of course, a tem-
poral enrichment) seems to be quite indisputably involved
in the interpretation of the sentence, to the effect that speaker’s
dropping of the glass caused its breaking.
Consider now example (66). Which kind of relation is
triggered here by the conjunction? Of course a relation of
temporal order, as it is presumed that the snowfall has be-
gun immediately after speaker’s looking up. It seems indis-
putable that there is no causal relation involved here. But
what if sentence (66) is uttered by someone equipped with
the supernatural power of make it snow, say Santa Claus?
In such (however fictional) context, we should recognize
that now a cause/effect relation is entailed.
Let’s turn to example (67). Would be we prepared to say
that, in this case, a causal relation is in play or it is only
the case for a temporal ordering? Well, as Jaszczolt notices,
such example seems to be intermediate between the two
just discussed.
What it seems to be concluded by these example is that,
intuitively, the enrichment is in a sense default, while in
another it is highly dependent on contextual factors (for
example me being or not being Santa Claus in example
(66)).
The question is thus how can we maintain such intu-
itions in a way which is consistent with the assumptions of
DS.
Apparently, it seems appealing to postulate the existence
of a kind of cognitive default to explain those cases, how-
ever at a closer glance, such conclusions looks implausi-
ble, as it seems that we should allow for the existence of a
53 Examples are from Jaszczolt (2005a): 206-207.
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number of different cognitive defaults governing the differ-
ent sort of event-relations which are triggered in different
contexts. Analogously, if we tried to give a Gricean expla-
nation in terms of defaults, to the effect that we postulate
that the causal reading in cases like (65) is the default given
the degree of informativeness conveyed by the speaker is
stronger if the interpretation is causally enriched, such kind
of explanation would be hardly controllable and it would
easily give rise to overgeneration, that is to the postulation
of cognitive defaults where there is none. With the unwel-
come side-effect of a decisive weakening of the theory54.
However, it seems that explanation in terms of default
schemata or cognitive scripts, like the one advocated by
Carston, comes at handy at this point. It is an analysis
which resorts to a notion of default, but which crucially
does not attach such default interpretation to a lexical ex-
pression (a connective), but rather to a situation-type of
the kind of ’dropping-breaking’ one in example (65). This
is a solution which allows for a certain degree of context-
dependence and at the same time it allows to resort to the
concept of default.
But, one could ask, which kind of defaults? If not CD
(provided the risk for overgeneration) the only possible al-
ternative in DS are Social Cultural Defaults (SCD1). As a
matter of fact, it seems that such category would do the
job in the case of sentential connectives. We have an en-
riched interpretation which is explained in terms of de-
fault, preserving the intuitive appeal of such claim, and
at the same time is not attached to a lexical item, preserv-
ing the context-dependance of such default inference, and
more importantly, we have an explanation which calls into
account social-cultural factors which are the kind of factors
which, following Mauri & van der Auwera, are claimed
to be responsible for the different degree of pragmatic in-
formation which is intended to be added to the encoded
information.
54 Concerning the risk for overgeneration in DS see Jaszczolt (2005a): 61-
62.
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While it would seem of course too strong to postulate a
kind of cognitive defaults, insofar as these are ’universal
in that they are governed by the structure and operations
of the human brain’, furthermore such move would also
strongly contrasts with evidences from comparative stud-
ies in linguistics concerning the great diversity between en-
coded information and default inferential enrichments for
sentential connectives in different natural languages.
All summed, then, it seems that the category of SCD1, i.e.
simply ’more ordinary ’shortcuts’ in reasoning’, is ideal in
that it make possible to maintain the force of our intuitions
concerning the default nature of connective enrichment,
and at the same time to support the assumption of context-
dependance and, more importanlty, of cultural flexibility
of the kind of information supplied by such default infer-
ences.
Moreover, the category of SCD1 makes it possible to pro-
vide an intermediate solution between the less plausible
approach in terms of Levinson’s GCIs and the more plau-
sible, but too much compromised with relevance theoretic
(both cognitive and linguistic) assumptions, Carston’s the-
ory of default cognitive scripts in terms of nonce-inferences.
The MR for a sentence like (65) (for the sake of simplicity,
tenses are left unanalyzed) is then given as follows:
(67.1) MR for sentence (65): ’I dropped the glass and
it broke’
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x y e1 e2
[e1 ∧ e2]WS
the speaker (x)
glass (y)
[e1 < e2]SCD1
[e1 and therefore e2]SCD1
e1 [x dropped y]WS
e2 [y broke]WS
In conclusion,
All in all, the point I am making is this. The
debates over the semantics and pragmatics of
sentential conjunction and can be easily surpas-
sed when we acknowledge the fact that con-
scious pragmatic inference or default enrichment
are themselves the product of the act of com-
munication situated in context. Pace Levinson
(2000), context-dependence and nonce-inference
are very different concepts and context-depen-
dence does not preclude defaults when the lat-
ter are understood as CDs and SCDs155.
Concerning the case of disjunction, DS goes along the
lines of the semantic analysis for ’and’. However, in case
of ’or’, there are some further complications which are not
present in the conjunctive case.
Jaszczolt shares with Mauri & van der Auwera the as-
sumption that the fact that the exclusive reading of disjunc-
tion is not lexicalized in natural language militates against
the actual relevance of such distinction. However, accord-
ing to Jaszczolt (who follows in this case van der Auwera &
Bultinck (2001): 181.) such lack of lexicalization is reflected
55 Jaszczolt (2005a): 209.
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at the cognitive level and strongly prevents the postulation
of a cognitive default for this kind of enrichment.
Given this assumption, Jaszczolt concludes that resort-
ing to SCD1 can also in this case do the job. However,
it cannot be claimed that there is a social cultural default
which is uniquely responsible for the exclusive reading of
disjunction, insofar as the variety of additional readings in
case of disjunction is much more fine-grained than in case
of conjunction.
Accordingly, there is no way to postulate exclusive dis-
junction as the most salient (i.e. default) interpretation.
Such picture once more suggests that, if a SCD is in play,
it is a default which is related with the sentence content,
rather than with the connective itself.
It seems that, just as is the case with con-
junction, the processing of sentential disjunc-
tion gives rise to more and less salient interpre-
tations but these interpretations are based on
the content of the sentence. If there are defaults,
they are not defaults for or but rather defaults
for the sentence56.
The point seems intuitively well argued, and, what is
more important, it also seems to fit the data provided by
comparative linguistics. Accordingly, the MR for the ex-
clusive reading of (68), intended as triggered by means of
SCD1 is given as in (68.1):
(68) Gray is a professor of law or a judge.
(68.1) MR for sentence (68)
56 Jaszczolt (2005a): 211.
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x
Gray (x)
[professor of law (x) ∨ judge (x)]WS
¬[professor of law (x) ∧ judge (x)]SCD1
Such a MR crucially rests on the assumption that the ex-
clusive reading of or is provided by means of a (default)
scalar inference. It is, indeed, customarily assumed (after
Grice (1978/89)) that exclusive reading of or is obtained
following Grice’s first maxim of quantity, to the effect that
a speaker’s being cooperative and uttering a disjunctive
sentence like (68) would be taken to believe (and then im-
plicate) that the correlative conjunction is false. This is
why conjunction and disjunction forms an entailment scale
<and, or> where the former entails the latter, but not vice-
versa. Thus, though a disjunction is (truth-functionally)
compatible with both disjuncts being true (and hence com-
patible with the correlative conjunction), the use of a dis-
junctive form is taken to implicate that the relative conjunc-
tion is false, as a cooperative speaker would have uttered
the latter if he had been in the position to do so.
Even though Jaszczolt acknowledges that a generaliza-
tion so as to maintain the view that exclusive reading of
or is due to a scalar inference is objectionable, nonetheless
she claims that such view can be supported in light of the
following considerations57:
57 Jaszczolt’s remarks are made keeping an eye on the ’semantic map’
of the relations between conjunction and (inclusive/exclusive) disjunc-
tion given in terms of Aristotelian square of opposition in van der
Auwera & Bultinck (2001): 177.
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[T]here are still sufficiently strong reasons to
adopt scalarity of <and, or>. English conjunc-
tion and disjunction easily fit in the Aristotelian
square of oppositions in that (i)∧ has a contrary
∧¬, ¬∨; (ii) ∨ has a subcontrary ∨¬, ¬∧; and
(iii) exclusive disjunction can be easily built into
the square of oppositions between
neg∧ and ∨. Naturally, this ’building into’ the
square of oppositions has to be understood in
terms of concepts for conjunction and disjunc-
tion rather than words. This conceptual distinc-
tion can then be approached in terms of prag-
matic or semantic scales.
Although DS is neutral with respect to the assimilation
of natural language connectives with their logical counter-
part, it seems that maintaining the assumption that <and,
or> form a semantic or pragmatic scale is still too strong.
This is why such an assumption is based on the idea that
connectives can be built in the Aristotelian square of oppo-
sition and that, accordingly, the pragmatic scalarity reflects
the correspondent logical entailment scale between con-
junction and disjunction (in fact, in the Aristotelian square
disjunction is the subaltern of conjunction, i.e. the former
is implied by the latter).
However, as it has been convincingly argued by Mauri &
van der Auwera (2012), Mauri (2008) concerning languages
which show different inferential enrichments for disjunc-
tion and also languages which lack connective for disjunc-
tion and accordingly manifest different strategies for ex-
pressing it, natural language disjunction seems to be bet-
ter captured by a relation expressing the ’potential, rather
than truth-functional status of the linked SoAs [states of
affair]58. It bas been noted, in particular, that (1) there
is a clear tendency among language which lack a lexical-
ized operator for disjunction to express it as a list of poten-
tial alternatives and (2) language which have two different
connectives expressing disjunction does not use them to
58 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 12.
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distinguish inclusive and exclusive readings (therefore con-
firming the marginal relevance of such distinction) but by
contrast to express the distinction between choice-aimed vs
simple disjunction. Such evidences strengthen the hypoth-
esis that of a ’crucial anchorage of disjunction on the one
hand in the modal dimension of epistemic possibility, and
on the other hand in the discourse dimension of speakers’
expectations regarding hearers’ reactions to their utterance,
which may or may not result in a choice59’. These data
seem to threaten the assumption that natural language dis-
junction can be analyzed in terms of the correlative truth-
functional operator and, accordingly, to undermine the view
that conjunction and disjunction form a semantic or prag-
matic scale.
By contrast, a different treatment of disjunction in terms
of epistemic modalities has been advanced in the field of
logic and formal semantics by Zimmermann (2000) and
Geurts (2005).
Dropping formal details, in both the two slightly differ-
ent approaches disjunction is analyzed in terms of the con-
junction of modal alternatives. In such an approach, the
essential contribute of ’or’ is to provide a list of alterna-
tives, so that a disjunctive proposition like (68) is roughly
equivalent to (68.2):
(68.2) Gray might be a professor of law and he might
be a judge.
However, if the right interpretation of (68) has the form
of (68.2), then obviously there is no way to get the exclusive
reading by means of a scalar implicature. The crucial point
of this analysis of disjunction is then that:
If disjunctions are covert modals (. . . ) a con-
junction does not entail the corresponding dis-
junction, so there is no good reason for assum-
ing that ’and’ and ’or’ form a pragmatic scale.
Hence, on the present account there is no ob-
vious way of obtaining the scalar implicature
59 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 15.
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that is usually held responsible for the exclusive
reading of ’or’60.
According to Geurts, the exclusive reading of or is equally
obtained by means of a maxim-driven implicature, but not
a scalar one.
the two conjuncts of [(68.2)] address the same
question, say, what Gray’s job is or might be,
and as the speaker is supposed to be cooper-
ative, there is a presumption to the effect that
he will attempt to specify each alternative in all
relevant respects. Hence, in both possible cases
entertained by the speaker we are entitled to as-
sume that Gray has just a single job, as a corol-
lary of which it follows that in the first case he
is not a judge and in the second he is not a law
professor. Whence the exclusive interpretation
of [(68.2)]]. I submit that exactly the same ap-
plies for the disjunction in [(68)].
This seems an elegant solution, which is able so preserve
the evidences collected by Mauri & van der Auwera (2012)
to the effect that natural language disjunction expresses
a modal relation between the two states of affair and at
the same time to give a formally well defined treatment of
disjunction.
The question is then which is the result of such a re-
analysis of disjunction on the treatment which is made of
’or’ in DS? Well, it seems that rejecting the assumption that
exclusive reading of or is obtained by means of scalar in-
ference does not result in the impossibility to manipulate
such exclusive readings as social-cultural defaults. First of
all, in DS there is the assumption that such defaults (like
the one for exclusive disjunction) are defaults for sentences
rather than defaults for specific lexical items.
All summed, it seems that a slight modification of the
MR for disjunctive sentences would do the job. However,
60 Geurts (2005): 403.
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such modification would crucially rest on the possibility of
introducing modal operators into MRs.
As a matter of fact, however, a modal operator of epis-
temic nature (∆) has already been introduced in DS to ac-
count for the different ways of expressing futurity in En-
glish61. Crucially, such modal operator allows for grada-
tion modality aiming to reflect the degree of intentionality
behind different strategies of expressing future events.
As noted by Jaszczolt, ’other modals, such as may, might,
can, could, would, can be accounted for by extending the cur-
rent analysis so as to include further specifications of ∆62’.
It seems then that the exclusive reading of disjunction can
be maintained in DS as the result of SCD1 in suitable con-
texts of acts of communication, and that, even though the
analysis of disjunction is shifted from a truth-functional to
a modal one, a minor implementation of the formal appa-
ratus of DS would do.
However, for the purposes of the present work, I will
not attempt such implementation. What I want to stress is
only the fact that DS analysis of the inferential enrichment
to disjunctive sentences seems to be perfectly compatible
with a different and more plausible way of accounting for
the connective ’or’.
I will stop here the analysis of connectives in DS without
addressing the however interesting topic of conditionals
and negation, as it would lead us too far from the central
topic of such research.
Let’s only notice that Jaszczolt’s analysis of conditional
perfection is given in terms of restriction of the discourse
topic, without assuming an actual process of strengthen-
ing to biconditional. As it has been noted by Mauri &
van der Auwera (2012), ’cross-linguistic data seem to con-
firm Jaszczolt’s account of conditionals protases in terms
of topics63’, therefore providing further evidence in favor
of the paradigm of DS.
61 Jaszczolt (2005a): 160-174.
62 Jaszczolt (2005a): 173.
63 Mauri & van der Auwera (2012): 17.
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3.8 summary
In the present chapter I introduced the paradigm of De-
fault Semantics (DS). Such approach has been introduced
in order to offer a solution to the difficulties shown by all
the approaches based on the semantic underdeterminacy
view.
I started summarizing the weaknesses of the extant treat-
ments of semantic underdeterminacy. The main deficien-
cies have been identified either in some theories’ being
predictively powerless or incapable of matching speaker’s
intuitions (e.g. hidden indexicalism), or in the search for
ad hoc solutions aiming to preserve standard Gricean ap-
paratus (Levinson) or finally in the loss of the possibility of
modeling utterance interpretation by means of standard se-
mantic tools (e.g. Relevance Theory and Truth-conditional
pragmatics).
In contrast with such acknowledged defects of the extant
theories, a sketchy outline of the features a good semantico-
pragmatic theory should match has been introduced. I
found that some crucial traits of a suitable theory should
be as follows: first, the theory should preserve Gricean core
principles of methodological parsimony (that is, avoiding
the multiplication of senses or levels of sense) and of an
intention-based theory of meaning. Secondly, the theory
should match speaker’s intuitions and be able to mirrors
them in a suitable formal representations which is ideally
compositional. Finally, it seems a intuitive requirement to
ask our theory to allow for the category of defaults.
Next, I tried to show that the theory of Default Seman-
tics, developed by the philosophers of language and lin-
guist Katarzyna Jaszczolt, is able to match the abovemen-
tioned requirements and at the same time to avoid the
problems arising from the extant theoretical alternatives.
DS crucially rests on the assumption that logical form as
the syntax-based representation of meaning is only one of
the possible sources of utterance meaning and, moreover,
one which does not hold any compositional privilege over
the others. According to this assumption, the classical di-
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chotomy between genuine ambiguity and underspecified
logical form in cases of multiple readings is surpassed in
favour of a picture in which utterance meaning is obtained
by means of a merger of different sources of meaning and
where, accordingly, there is no room for a notion of under-
determined propositional form (at least in contexts where
such underdeterminacy has no psychological relevance).
I showed that the assumption of a merger representa-
tion replacing the classical analysis of utterance meaning
in terms of semantic and pragmatic developments on the
syntactic output (be such developments either linear or in-
teractive) leads contextually to the rejection of other core
notion of extant semantic and pragmatic theory, i.e. the no-
tions of ’what is said’ and sentence meaning. As a result of
such radical moves, I showed how the classical issue con-
cerning where locating the borderline between semantics
and pragmatics is argued to be misguided and eventually
proved to be an irrelevant problem.
I then turned to the clarification of the central concepts
of DS. I showed how DS is based on a restatement of the
suitable units of semantic analysis. DS is indeed commit-
ted to the idea, quite common in dynamic approaches, that
semantic representation should mirror the incremental na-
ture of discourse processing. On this assumption, which
DS shares with formal approaches like DRT, I showed how
it is needed to shift from utterance meaning as the unit of
semantic analysis to the meaning of so-called acts of commu-
nication. Acts of communication are claimed to be thought-
like objects, which reflects the merge of information which
compose propositions, and are more coarse-grained than
thought themselves. However, such intermediate degree
of granularity makes them suitable theoretical objects for
semantic analysis.
Acts of communication, indeed, are claimed to be com-
positional. However, compositionality is not intended as a
property of sentence meaning, i.e. it is not the product of
word meanings and sentence structure, but is located, so
to speak, one level upper, at the level of merger representa-
tions. In such way it is possible to enjoy the advantages of
a compositional and formal semantics (which resorts to a
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revised and extended form of the formalism of DRT) and
at the same time to have a single-level semantic representa-
tion which crucially includes contributions from any side
(including pragmatic ones).
I then turned to the central notion of ’default’ in DS. I
showed how DS assumes the existence of scales of salience
of meaning. The most salient the interpretation, the easiest
is for the hearer to understand it. Salient interpretations
are default interpretations in DS. Defaults in DS divide
into cognitive and social-cultural ones. Cognitive defaults
are rooted in human brain and reflects the intentionality of
mental states behind the use of a certain linguistic expres-
sion. Intentionality in DS is in fact treated as one of the
possible sources of linguistic meaning.
Crucially, scales of salience are claimed to reflect the cor-
relative degrees of intentionality of the mental belief un-
derlying the use of a certain linguistic expression. The
highest degree of intentionality reflects the default inter-
pretation, which is understood as such by the hearer. To
reflect such interpretation process, merger representations
(MRs) in DS allows for the interpretations deriving from
cognitive defaults. Such move results in a semantic repre-
sentation which perfectly mirrors speaker’s intuitions con-
cerning the meaning of a certain utterance, although very
often it considerably departs from the meaning encoded in
the uttered words and sentence structure.
As an example of the treatment of multiple readings pro-
vided by DS, I showed how the theory is perfectly able to
deal with ambiguities in definite description. On the as-
sumption that definite descriptions allow for three differ-
ent degrees of intentionality corresponding respectively to
the referential, mistaken and attributive reading, I showed
how the MRs for such readings can naturally be built fol-
lowing the guidelines of DS.
As a necessary interlude, I briefly introduced the formal-
ism of DRT and shortly explained the raison d’être of such
theory of discourse processing.
Finally, I turned to the analysis of the privileged case
study of the present work, i.e. that of sentential connec-
tives and showed how the (however only tentative) treat-
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ment of DS works for such case study. I gave an out-
line of the decades-old debate (spurred by the works of
Grice on the topic) concerning the nature of the enriched
information supplied by sentential connectives. Also, I
presented a number of data from comparative linguisticg
which strongly undermine the view that the meaning of
natural language connectives can be equated to that of
their logical counterparts.
Turning back to DS, the theory shows how the distinc-
tions classically involved in such debate can be surpassed
in favor of a view which analyzed sentential connectives in
their contexts of utterance.
The analysis of default semantic shares with Relevance
theoretic approaches the idea that enrichments generated
by connectives are triggered by the activation of cognitive
scripts concerning stereotypical situation-types. Such as-
sumption makes it possible to detach default interpreta-
tions from the connectives themselves (as it happens in
Levinson’s default theory) and to ascribe such preferred
interpretations to inferential shortcuts guided by social-
cultural knowledge concerning situation-types.
According to this assumptions, the semantic represen-
tation for sentential connectives resorts to the category of
social-cultural defaults and gives a convincing analysis in
terms of them.
Finally, I shortly questioned the analysis which is given
in DS for disjunction. As cross-linguist studies seem to
show that the distinction between inclusive and exclusive
reading is irrelevant for natural language disjunction and
starting from the hypothesis (also stemming from com-
parative linguistic evidences) that disjunction is better ex-
plained in terms of modality, I sketchily presented an al-
ternative logic treatment of disjunction which treats dis-
junctive sentences as a list of (conjuncted) alternatives, by
resorting to modal notions and formalisms.
Finally, I suggested that such evidences do not threaten
the analysis of connectives which is provided in DS and
that a slight implementation of its formal apparatus to as
to allow for the introduction of an operator of epistemic
modality (of the sort which is required in modal accounts
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of disjunction) can come at handy in order to maintain the
spirit of DS-analysis of disjunction, while slightly revising
its letter.
CONCLUS IONS
This pragmatics-rich semantics pertaining to
merger representations is possibly the most
radical move a compositional theory of
meaning can make in the direction of
pragmatics.
—Jaszczolt (2005a): 98.
We have then reached the end of our research path. It
is maybe worth shortly looking back and concluding the
work, in Grice’s style, with a ’retrospective epilogue’ so as
to evaluate what we have eventually end up with.
Grice’s theory of meaning and communication, introdu-
ced at length in the first chapter, has proved to be incred-
ibly influential in the development of contemporary Prag-
matics. Not only have the issues left open in Grice’s own
picture and the evident weaknesses of his approach been at
the core of all the following attempts to develop a theory
of utterance meaning. More importantly, however, many
of Grice’s original ideas and suggestions, where appropri-
ately revised, have proved to be the first step toward a
suitable solution to many of such open questions.
The Semantics/Pragmatics interface as it stemmed by
Grice’s insights has been the topic of a widespread debate
during the last four decades. Where are we supposed to
posit the borderline between, on the one hand, what is en-
coded in and, on the other, what is inferentially added to
speaker’s meaning? According to Grice, as we have seen,
a conservative conception of semantics can be maintain-
ing by allowing contextual contribution to ’what is said’ to
be kept to a minimum, i.e. to disambiguation and refer-
ence resolution. All other kinds of contextual enrichment
to speaker’s meaning is a matter of conversational implica-
ture.
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Conversational implicature is inferentially derived, is gui-
ded by the maxims of conversation and the cooperative
principle, is not part of the encoded meaning insofar as it
is cancelable and, most crucially, it is computed after the
semantic content of the sentence has been completely de-
termined.
As I have tried to show in the second chapter, such rigid
picture is no longer supportable, as the assumption of se-
mantic determination clashes against a pervasively attested
phenomenon in natural language, i.e. that of semantic un-
derdetermination (or underdeterminacy, or underspecifica-
tion, sense-generality, etc...).
Can we really leave everything which is not encoded in
the semantics of word and the structure of the sentence
to implicature? Is it realistic a picture which claims for
the previous determination of a ’semantic content’ which
very often completely departs from the intended meaning?
More radically, isn’t it true - as it has been argued by John
Searle - that every utterance rests, for its felicitous inter-
pretation, on a set of background assumptions which is
potentially infinite and practically non specifiable?
Since the beginning of the 70s of the Twentieth Cen-
tury, such kinds of questions have rapidly eroded the core
of Grice’s dichotomy between semantics and pragmatics.
Two main theoretical orientations have gradually arisen: a
first, more conservative one, which claimed that Grice’s
picture with its traditional conception of semantics could
be maintained by means of slight revisions of his theory;
and a second, more radical, aiming to prove that the phe-
nomenon of semantic underdeterminacy conclusively un-
dermines Grice’s theory.
As for the former, side, it has been argued, for exam-
ple, that Grice’s theory should be implemented, in case of
multiple readings and underspecificity of logical forms, to
allow for semantic content to be not properly underdeter-
mined but rather ’general’ with respect to the possible in-
terpretations. ’Sense-generality’, as it has been labeled by
Jay Atlas, makes it possible to cope with semantic under-
specification and at the same time to preserve Grice’s pic-
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ture of communication, according to the Kantian assump-
tion that:
Pragmatic inference without sense-generality
is blind, but sense-generality without pragmatic
inference is empty64.
Otherwise, as in hidden-indexicalist view, scholars of
such orientation have argued that all truth-conditional ef-
fects of extra-linguistic context should be traced back to the
logical form, i.e. it is possible to distinguish between a sur-
face and a deep structure of the sentence, and alleged prag-
matic contributions to the semantic content can be proved
by contrast to be part of the (deep) semantic structure, by
means of hidden indexicals.
On the other side, as we have seen, scholars more in-
volved in psychological and cognitive concerns have ar-
gued that, for Gricean view to be preserved, it seems to be
required that interpreters actually process ’minimal propo-
sitions’ (or semantic, truth-conditional content) also in sit-
uations in which this substantially departs from speaker’s
intended proposition. And it is claimed that, from a cog-
nitive point of view, this assumption can hardly be main-
tained.
By contrast, it has been suggested that it is necessary to
resort to different kinds of ’cognitive principles’ (i.e. Rel-
evance theoretic ’cognitive principle of relevance’ or Reca-
nati’s ’availability principle’) to explain how really the pro-
cess of utterance understanding takes place. I showed that
endorsing a (radical) pragmatic theory equipped with such
sort of cognitive principles seems to have the advantage of
matching speaker’s intuitions concerning utterance mean-
ing. Nonetheless, as I tried to show, it has the drawback of
allegedly leading to abdication of the traditional role of se-
mantic theory, an accusation which has been appropriately
labeled (by Stephen Levinson) as ’semantic retreat’.
Next, I showed how the concept of default interpreta-
tion seems to offer a middle solution between the two ap-
proaches, at the same time both fitting speaker’s intuitions
64 Atlas (1989): 124.
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about utterances’ truth-conditionals and offering a solution
which, in a sense, allows for ’semanticization’ of speaker’s
meaning.
However, the first articulate theory of default interpre-
tations which has been introduced, i.e. Levinson’s theory
of GCIs, although it makes an important opening to the
theory of meaning based on default interpretations, seems
to be eventually jeopardized by an undue commitment to
Gricean assumptions.
Finally, I presented the paradigm of Jaszczolt’s Default
Semantics. I stressed the point the such approach seems
to be able to account for semantic underdeterminacy with-
out giving up a (formal) semantic treatment of utterance
meaning and, at the same time, by developing the tools
for accounting for every sort of pragmatic contribution to
speaker’s meaning.
The theory also crucially involves the notion of default
meanings, which are claimed to be directly traceable to the
intentionality of mental states underlying linguistic expres-
sions.
In conclusion, it seems that a great variety of case study
is passible of treatment on the basis of merger represen-
tations in DS. Nonetheless, only little part of the history
has already been told. Default Semantics is a relatively
new paradigm, which, to date, has been convincingly de-
veloped only to account for definite description and belief
reports (two topics which, incidentally, are closely interre-
lated).
So, even though if the theory seems to be intuitively very
appealing and methodologically splendidly motivated, no-
netheless large part of the job is still to be done. In partic-
ular, it is necessary to show that DS is able to provide an
unitary account for all cases of semantic underdeterminacy,
and it must be said that many of the issues traditionally
accounted for in semantics/pragmatics discussions are at
present largely untouched.
In future, Default Semantics should prove to be able to
show that the semantic representations which it provides
are not ad hoc, but are by contrast based on unitary and
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solid semantic principles which are eventually capable of
equip the theory with a strong predictive power.
At present, in fact, DS seems to lie on excellent theoreti-
cal foundations: it offers a radically new approach to tradi-
tional problems and provides a new and convincing recast-
ing of classical concepts. Thanks to its new philosophical
assumption, DS gives the possibility of facing traditionally
difficult issues and, very often, to abandon them as false
problems (confront the case of semantics/pragmatics bor-
derline).
However, to such outstanding methodological founda-
tions it does not corresponds, at present at least, a uni-
form semantic treatment capable of proving itself really
predictively powerful. For the time being, the construc-
tion of MRs for DS seems still quite random and hardly
predictive. Furthermore, as compared with an analogous
approach (one whose formalism DS borrows and imple-
ments) as is DRT, it seems that DS still crucially rests on
the intuitions of the semanticist who perform the job of
formalization, and is far from providing a construction al-
gorithm for merger representations.
The theory, therefore, is by no means exempt from critics.
Nonetheless, a Default Semantics project is currently active
at the University of Cambridge, with scholars from differ-
ent theoretical backgrounds contributing the development
of the theory.
We can thus hopefully and reasonably expect that the
theory will be fruitfully developed and implemented in
the next years.
An however little contribution to such enterprise, I hope
has been also given with the present work.
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